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See the psychopath. He lies motionless. His head is fixed. His feet protrude from a 
futuristic tube. Bursts of noise bang rhythmically. Stimuli flicker before his eyes. He 
responds by pressing a button in his hand. He is in a neuroimaging laboratory. His 
immoral behavior has brought him here. He is here because he is special – that is, 
because his brain is special… Brian Dugan was such a psychopath in a brain scanner – 
and a rapist and a murderer. During his trial in 2009, neuroscientist Kent Kiehl 
testified that Dugan’s neuronal activation patterns resembled those of other 
psychopaths. Was Dugan suffering from neurological disorder? Was this a mitigating 
factor?  Did  his  brain  make  him  commit  his  crimes?  The  prosecution’s  rebuttal 
witness, psychiatrist Jonathan Brodie, disagreed, stating that the application of 
neuroimaging evidence in the courtroom was “a terrible leap” (Hughes, 2010 p. 342). 
The jury deliberated for ten hours and then decided unanimously: Dugan was found 
guilty and was sentenced to death. Yet Dugan’s defense attorney Steve Greenberg 
remarked that “[w]ithout the brain imaging stuff the jury would have been back in an 
hour” (G. Miller, 2012 p. 788). Commenting on the case, legal scholar Stephen Morse 
observed: “Brains don’t kill people. People kill people.” (Hughes, 2010 p. 342). 
Modern neuroscientific methods and technologies offer new perspectives on an 
 
intriguing and elusive object of research: morality. Currently, neuroscientists scan 
psychopaths’ brains, study the effects of neurotransmitters on moral cognition, 
temporarily interrupt neuronal networks associated with moral decision-making, and 
research immoral conduct in patients with distinct brain lesions. Recently, a science 
that confidently calls itself neuroscience of morality has emerged. Neuroscience of morality 
integrates findings, methods, and theories from a range of disciplines and research 
fields in order to study the neurobiology of moral mind and behavior. Predicated on 
the rationale that good and evil are essentially functions of the brain, the insights 






controversy around Brian Dugan’s trial suggests, neuroscience’s implications for penal 
evaluation, criminal law, and legal policy could be momentous. Accordingly, new 
academic fields – such as neurolaw or neuroethics – sprouted, which aim to analyze 
the science’s legal and ethical ramifications. 
Perhaps because of its alleged revolutionary potential, the neuroscience of 
morality sparked extensive analysis and opposition – from within and without the 
discipline. Neuroscientists critically assess their colleagues’ studies and relativize their 
claims. Philosophers, historians, jurists, anthropologists, and sociologists analyze 
neuroscience’s inroads into moral territory. Harsh criticism is voiced against the 
neurobiologization of vice and virtue. The upshot is a heated debate about the 
potentials and limitations of neuroscience and its implications for normative 
discourses. 
This controversy is of long standing. Though modern neuroscience of morality 
is comparatively young and its proponents often describe it as unprecedented, the 
scientific search for the somatic origin of good and evil has a long history. 
Phrenologists, brain anatomists, criminal anthropologists, social Darwinists, and bio- 
psychiatrists explored the physiology of morality over the course of the last two 
centuries. Their science yielded descriptions of moral brain centers, murder cells, and 
postencephalitic moral insanity. These somatic understandings challenged established 
notions of morality and caused disputes in the academy, the courtroom, and society at 
large. The science of the moral brain ignited controversy – then and now. 
The  modern  structure  of  the  neuroscience  of  morality  is  built  on  old 
 
foundations. At times, the legacy of bygone eras is still visible: Ancient notions, old 
theories, and past scientists’ arguments linger on. Current research sometimes 
capitalizes on this inheritance, sometimes ignores it, and sometimes rejects it. 
Constancy and change characterize the historical trajectory of the science of the moral 






elements disappeared over time allows for valuable insights into the current science 
and its conflicts. In light of this, it is surprising that there has only been little historical 
research on the subject. Somatic morality appeared in the context of several historical 
works (e.g. Becker, 2002; Rafter, 2008; Richards, 1987; Wetzell, 2000), but the science 
of the moral brain has escaped historians’ attention so far – with one noteworthy 
exception. Jan Verplaetse’s (2009) seminal book “Localizing the moral sense: 
Neuroscience and the search for the cerebral seat of morality, 1800-1930” 
comprehensively covers the nineteenth century, but fades out in the 1930s. 
Against this backdrop of an emerging neuroscience of morality, smoldering 
controversy, and a scarcity of historical research, this dissertation asks the following 
question: When, why, where, how, in which contexts, and with which consequences 
was morality in the brain researched? The dissertation consists of five independent 
scholarly discourses which have been published or were submitted for publication in 
scientific journals. The five chapters address different topics, contexts, and periods in 
theoretical and historical perspective. The chapters explore how the moral brain was 
known and made knowable, how it emerged and developed, and how it framed 
people and societies and was framed by them. The aim throughout is to elucidate the 
past in order to render the present intelligible. 
Before elaborating on the structure of this dissertation, a few qualifications are 
necessary. First of all, the term morality is ambiguous. Its meaning is highly 
complicated, context-dependent, and subject to historical change. In the past and 
present, brain scientists used the term in a variety of ways, describing cunning, 
deceitfulness, disinhibition, aggression, criminality, promiscuity, alcoholism, and so 
on. These conceptualizations clarify that the search for cerebral morality proceeded 
most of the times by studying its opposite: immorality. For example, researchers 
observed immoral conduct in patients with distinct brain lesions and then inferred 






individuals. Only in recent years, neuroscientists turned to studying morality (or its 
aspects) per se. However, ambiguity persists. Accordingly the term morality is used in 
this  dissertation  in  a  broad  sense  –  that  is,  as  the  experts  used  it  themselves. 
Moreover, there is no such thing as a moral brain. Brain scientists researched 
constituents and facets of morality, rarely ascribing moral agency to their object of 
research, but rather focusing on intricate neurobiological phenomena (somehow) 
related to morality. The specific relation of – for example a moral brain center – to 
morality as such was frequently not elucidated. The interplay between the cerebral and 
the ethical often remained unclear. Hence, the moral brain is a notion representing a 
set of assumptions, methods, theories, practices, and research agendas. The moral 
brain embodies – and at times epitomizes – all of the above, however it is not a clear- 
cut scientific entity. Finally, research on said moral brain was scarce. In the past, 
scientific  studies  on  the  subject  were  a  curiosity  and  speculations  on  it  usually 
appeared in the context of other research questions. Experts who ventured to trace 
morality in the brain were frequently criticized by their colleagues. The critics’ main 
argument was that investigating right and wrong lay beyond the capabilities and scope 
of brain science. 
The first chapter picks up on this argument by providing an historical overview 
over when, where, and how the brain has been invoked in the study of morality. The 
chapter analyzes the epistemic and conceptual labor necessary in operationalizing 
morality for neuroscientific means. It shows how morality is located, translated, and 
defined in order to make it accessible and assessable in terms of the brain. 
Neuroscientific methods, technologies, and theories are not neutral tools, but make 
demands of their object of research. The historical and theoretical analysis clarifies 
that neuroscience shapes its object of research according to its needs, yielding a 






The second chapter scrutinizes bio-psychiatric frames for immoral persons at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Five exemplary cases of immoral persons are 
described in the context of the respective bio-psychiatric theories. The chapter shows 
how these misdemeanants were rendered as immoral and insane due to a disordered 
brain and discusses the consequences of this framing in terms of moral agency and 
legal responsibility. Moreover, a current case is used to illustrate constancy and change 
in biological understandings of immoral persons. 
The third chapter traces a specific localization of morality in its particular 
historical context. In the 1930s, the German neuropathologist Karl Kleist pinpointed 
what he called the Gemeinschafts-Ich (community-I) in the prefrontal cortex of the 
brain and claimed that this was the cerebral seat of morality. In doing so, Kleist made 
use of the localization doctrine – that is, the idea that the brain is divided into 
different  functional  units.  Contemporaries  launched  scathing  criticism  at  Kleist, 
among other things, for applying the outmoded localization doctrine. Nevertheless, 
the Gemeinschafts-Ich lived on over the following decades and was reshaped in 
accordance with theoretical shifts in brain science.   The chapter clarifies the 
dependence of research on morality on general theories of brain functioning. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the study of immorality through the eyes of a 
neuroscientific research tool: electroencephalography (EEG). It presents a history of 
early EEG research on psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality in Great Britain and 
the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. Then, uncertainty and dissension pervaded 
EEG research on misdemeanants. The analysis shows that knowledge production, 
calibration of the novel research tool, and the establishment of credibility for the new 
technology occurred simultaneously. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
past and present of the brain science of morality, arguing that persistent 
methodological and theoretical problems already inherent in early EEG research call 






This  fifth  chapter  takes  scientific  knowledge  on  somatic  immorality  as  a 
vantage  point  in  order  to  assess  its  formative  power  on  normative  practices  in 
historical and contemporary contexts. Several historical examples of acting on somatic 
immorality are discussed: Penal reform debates in Germany (1880s – 1940s), the 
British Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, and endocrinology and psychosurgery of 
criminality (USA 1930s and after). A focused analysis of the fertility of bio- 
criminological knowledge for therapeutic or punitive action and policy formation is 
provided, with the aim of understanding the mutual constitution of the epistemic and 
the normative in bio-criminological discourses. Moreover, the present discussion on 
biomarkers for criminality is put into historical perspective. The analysis suggests that 
the respective knowledge (that is, how it was framed) determined how somatic 
immorality was acted on: How immorality was deemed to be materialized in the body 
or brain partly predetermined attempts to control it. In the course of history, concepts 
for somatic immorality became more complex and elusive. Policies aimed at treating, 
policing, and legislating immoral bodies or brains mirrored this development. 
Subsequently, the chapter argues that in the past and present the political, economic, 
and social context co-determined whether or not somatic immorality was acted on. In 
closing, the chapter critically discusses the political potential of bio-criminology to 
function as a foundation for making and managing society by generating, rationalizing, 
and justifying interventions and policies. 
The theme of the good, the bad, and the brain ties the five chapters together. 
In general, all of the chapters examine epistemological issues arising when experts 
turned to the brain to testify on morality. This focus on knowledge production and 
related discourses – that is, epistemic versions of reality and the corresponding 
normative practices (Cf. Smith, 1981 p. 10) – reflects my personal interests. Putting 
issues of epistemology in the center of the stage, selecting related plots, and choosing 






Accordingly, this dissertation offers a mere selection of different historical trajectories 
and possible modes of analysis. Multiple histories of the good, the bad, and the brain 
could be written. 
This dissertation took inspiration from a mixture of methods and theories and 
from the works of several notable historians and theorists of science. Specifically, it 
draws on historical epistemology, historical ontology, as well as ideas from science 
and technology studies and the sociology of knowledge (Daston & Vidal, 2004; 
Hacking, 2002; Jasanoff, 2004; Rheinberger, 2007; N. Rose, 2007). The result is an 
informed historical narrative on the neuroscience of morality. After engaging for 
several   years   with  the  plethora  of   sources  and   the   vast  array   of  possible 
interpretations, I have come to realize that my historical account is but a mere 
approximation – or as one of the writer Julian Barnes’ (2011 p. 17) characters put it 
(perhaps somewhat hyperbolically): “History is that certainty produced at the point 









Invoking the brain in studying morality: A theoretical and 






Schirmann, F. (2013b). Invoking the brain in studying morality: A theoretical and 







Contemporary neuroscientific approaches try to make morality accessible and 
assessable by linking it to the brain. This wedding between a material entity and an 
elusive, multifaceted notion has both distinctive preconditions and complex 
implications. The triadic framework of locating, translating, and defining morality in 
terms of the brain is applied to illustrate the process of utilizing the cerebral realm for 
studying the moral realm. A historical and theoretical perspective is introduced to 
investigate how the relation between brain and morality has been and is being 
established. It is demonstrated that the meaning of both the brain and morality is in 
constant flux and dependent upon theorizing and research practice. Thus, I argue that 






“Morality is as firmly grounded in neurobiology as anything else we do or are. 
Once thought of as purely spiritual matters, honesty, guilt, and the weighing of 
ethical dilemmas are traceable to specific areas of the brain.” (de Waal, 1996 pp. 
217 - 218) 
 
 
The brain is pervasive. It affords every aspect of our psychological life, including 
morality. Given this essential function, it prevails in the study of humans. It coaxes 
researchers towards studying it as a source of mind and behavior, covering topics 
from  romantic  love  to  cultural  conflict  (Gergen,  2010).  It  catches  researchers’ 
attention by luring them into thinking that the human subject is in fact a cerebral 
subject. It endorses the popular doctrine that it will reveal itself through scrupulous 
examination and thereby furnish us humans with seminal knowledge about ourselves 
(Vidal, 2009). The brain is powerful indeed; and as the soaring amount of papers on 
the neuroscience of morality testifies, it is being invoked in studying morality. 
Advocates of this undertaking postulate that the origins, causes, and concomitants of 
moral mind and behavior are best to be understood by investigating the composition 
and functioning of the brain (for reviews see Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Mendez, 
2009). 
 
What  is  this  powerful  thing  in  our  head  that  allegedly  drives  our  moral 
conduct? Is it the fixed material entity that neuroscience takes it to be? The history of 
brain research amply illustrates how the brain, as an object of study, has been subject 
to change. Whereas the Ancient Egyptians ignored it, modern neuroscience idolizes it 
(Finger, 2005; Gazzaniga, 2005; Hagner, 2008). Thinking about the brain and ascrib- 
ing attributes to it is of long standing. Assumptions about its constitution and capacity 
have varied over time. What are the implications of the brain’s changing history? 
Could it be that the brain is not rigid, but in flux, and, as a consequence, evasive? To 
specify: What is changing is not the brain per se – that is, the material entity as it is 
putatively studied by neuroscience – but  the notion of the brain – that is, the specific 
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Invoking the brain in studying morality 
 
 
set  of  assumptions,  methods,  theories,  and  practices  that  researchers  utilize  and 
adhere to in order to investigate it. What is thought of the brain and what it “really” is 
are impossible to keep apart clearly. Correspondingly, the notion of the brain is and 
was  being  established  in  different  contexts  of  use  within  diverse  communities, 
resulting in a multifarious object of study that is flexible and contingent to a time and 
place (Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010). 
Proclaiming the vicissitude of the notion of the brain relativizes its role as a 
pervasive mediator by putting it into historical perspective. Furthermore, suggesting 
that neuroscientists who conceive of themselves as studying a material entity in fact 
study a volatile set of notions obviously is a strong claim against the realism 
interweaved in their endeavor. The point here is not to dispute the brain’s possible 
significance in the generation of human mind and behavior, or to vilify neuroscience, 
but to show that what modern neuroscience studies is a specific notion of the brain 
which has been (and most likely will be) subject to change in the course of history. 
Accordingly, researching and understanding morality via the brain are subject to 
change, dependent upon the given status of neuroscience. That the meaning of 
morality is ambiguous – that is, its equivocality invites versatile definitions (Gert, 
2011) – contributes to its malleability in terms of the brain. Correspondingly, I use the 
word “morality” here and throughout this essay in a broad and ambiguous sense. 
Keeping this in mind, the goal is to demonstrate that the given corpus of scientists’ 
assumptions about the brain has influenced the conceptualization of morality as an 
object of the neurobiological sciences. The result is an idiosyncratic determination of 
morality in terms of the brain. In order to show this, I will analyze the process of 
utilizing the brain for the study of morality via the triadic framework of locating, 
translating, and defining. Subsequently, the history of the combined study of brain 






relation over time. In conclusion, the specific concept of morality that is studied by 





Making the brain the moral domain 
 
 
According to some scholars who are enthusiastic about neuroscience, morality is to be 
transformed into “a problem of brain biology” (Tancredi, 2005 p. x). This implies that 
the fabric of our moral conduct is not individual experiences, not social relations, not 
cultural traditions, but neurons and axons. The brain is the moral domain. Before the 
establishment of this domain is analyzed, some clarification on the tacit notion of the 
brain in neuroscience is required here. 
First, neuroscientific approaches to human mind and behavior in general and to 
morality in particular rest on the assumption that the brain is a reliable informant. Its 
reliability is assumed owing to its putative impartiality: the brain does not have an 
opinion (unlike biased ethics professors); it simply provides facts. The brain as part of 
the natural realm is perceived to be a neutral arbitrator: it is non-human, thus non- 
subjective,  and  hence  by  studying  it  objective  knowledge  about  morality  can  be 
derived. After all, how could nature be wrong? Second, the assumption of neutrality 
extends to the idea of historical stability: it is and always has been the same thing that 
is studied. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the brain appeals because it promises 
a solid foundation of morality in the natural realm. Individuals, groups, and cultures 
are fickle; the brain is not. Its firm biological roots in nature add credibility to claims 
derived from it. 
But how is this bundle of neurons employed to convert morality into “a 
problem of brain biology”? The conversion is a complex process of utilization that 
entails a plethora of philosophical, methodological, and empirical questions (Kahane 
& Shackel, 2010; N. Levy, 2007; Schleim & Schirmann, 2011). Here, the focus is on 
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forming  the  relation  between  the  brain  and  morality.  Consider  the  following 
abbreviated quotation from Tancredi (2005 pp. 9-10): 
 
 
“Three of the Seven Deadlies [sic] […] have already been shown to be affected 
by biological factors in varying degrees, and in some cases the individual may 
have little power, or “free will,” to prevent them from happening. […] 
With regard to the most conspicuous display of society’s notion of gluttony – 
obesity – […] [m]any causes of obesity have nothing to do with lack of control 
or excessive self-indulgence. Metabolism, which is genetically determined, can 
result in weight gain despite efforts toward control of excessive eating. Studies 
have shown that obesity may involve either of two brain systems: the system 
that sends hunger and satiation messages to the brain or the system associated 
with  the  reward  circuits  involved  in  drug  […]  addiction.  […]  Research  is 
already showing that gluttony and obesity may involve abnormalities in specific 
areas of the brain. […] [T]he human brain is highly sensitive to food and 
[research has shown] that the presence of food increases brain metabolism in 
specific areas. Increased metabolism in the right orbitofrontal cortex correlates 
highly with self-reports of increased hunger and desire for food.” 
 
 
When reading this quotation superficially, one is left with the impression that 
attaching moral notions to the brain is self-evident, long overdue, and scientifically 
substantiated. The metamorphosis from gluttony to obesity to metabolism to genetic 
determination to brain involvement goes swiftly and smoothly. However, a closer 
look reveals that the conversion, and subsequent dissolving, of a Deadly Sin into the 







Locating refers to the process of transferring gluttony from the verbal and social 
realm into the physical realm: An indication for gluttony is placed in the “right orbito- 
frontal cortex.” An amorphous word – that is, a descriptive term for certain behaviors 
with normative connotations that is embedded in culture and religion – is assigned to 
a cerebral region, a part of the physical world. A compulsory change of residence is 
made for the Deadly Sin. The second process, translating, incorporates a re- 
description of gluttony in terms of bio-scientific language, for example metabolism. 
This amounts to more than harmless metonymies. Gluttony is classified as a word in 
the neuroscientific language game. This has the effect that more neuro-language can 
now be attached and applied to it (“reward circuits involved in drug … addiction”). 
Gluttony now makes sense in neuroscientific lingo (see Gergen, 2010). The third 
process is defining. Gluttony is curtailed in order to make it tangible for neuroscience. 
First, certain attributes of gluttony that bear resemblances to known features of brain 
functioning are highlighted and isolated. For example, the presence of and sensitivity 
to food in an experimental design is taken to be indicative of it (see Wang et al., 2004, 
for the original study). Thus, gluttony is divided into subcomponents that are 
neuroscientifically measurable and function as indicators for the Deadly Sin. Silently, 
the rest of gluttony’s connotation, such as indulging in excessive luxury, is dismissed. 
This rendering is in essence a process of operationalization (see Crawford, 2010; Uttal, 
2001, on this issue). In general, an operationalization serves the purpose to specify 
operations that make the concept at hand measurable. The operationalization here is a 
particular and intricate one: Gluttony has to be made measurable in terms of the 
brain, therefore certain subcomponents are emphasized which are (putatively) 
accessible with neuroscientific methods and compatible with neuroscientific 
knowledge. As a consequence, gluttony is cropped, split, and diminished in order to 
be traceable in the cerebral purview (see S. Cohn, 2011). Defining gluttony in such a 
way generates an epistemological gateway for neuroscience. 
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After gluttony is fixed in the brain (locating), addressed in terms of the brain 
(translating), and trimmed in order to fit the constraints of the neuroscientific 
experiment (defining), its metamorphosis into “a problem of brain biology” is 
complete. Philosophically speaking, this conversion is a shift in ontology (locating), 
semantics (translating), and epistemology (defining). This transformation is a 
precondition for neuroscientists’ quest to trace morality in the brain. Moreover, the 
process described above needs to be conducted for every aspect of morality 
individually, since each has its own idiosyncrasies. Other instructive examples are the 
transformations of aspects of morality, such as moral perception, moral conflict, 
moral argument, and moral pathology, into neural network functioning (Churchland, 






Establishing the brain–morality relation 
 
 
The example in the previous section demonstrates that some forging needs to be 
done in order for the brain to testify to morality. The essential step is establishing a 
relation between the brain and morality in order to constitute the brain as moral 
domain. The general idea is to connect morality, with all its versatile semantic facets, 
to an anatomical entity, the brain. 
Relating an amorphous notion to a graspable material object appears to be a 
complicated wedding. In order to avoid complication, three important things need to 
be kept in mind. First, what are related are notions, which are specific sets of 
assumptions, methods, theories, and practices. While this might be rather 
uncontroversial for morality, this also holds true for the brain (see below). Second, the 
relation between the brain and morality does not propose itself by virtue of nature; it 
is established via neuroscientific reasoning in a specific way. Third, the relation is not 






contingent to what is known of the brain, morality, and the relation of the two. The 
establishment of this relation is an actual problem that neuroscientists face and need 
to solve before they can start experimenting. They need to link morality to the brain 
in order to make the former measurable in terms of the latter. This is essentially a 
process of granting access (as the gluttony example demonstrated). Neuroscientists’ 
goal is to make morality empirically accessible and assessable by introducing a material 
purview, brain matter, which can be studied in an experimental fashion. The intention 
is to identify patterns – that is, recurring, consistent data – which add credibility to the 
claim that the brain and morality are associated. Connected with this is a general 
problem that demands neuroscientists’ attention: Owing to the fact that the above- 
mentioned connection combines the physical and biological with the psychological, it 
needs to be based on a general bridge principle that connects the brain with the mind 
– that is, a substantiated theory that unites the two realms. Numerous such theories 
have been proposed (e.g., eliminative materialism Churchland, 1981), yet they are 
subject to fierce debates. Thus, the general brain–mind interplay is contested and, 
maybe as a consequence, rarely elucidated in the neuroscience of morality literature. 
In a similar vein, explicit statements regarding the structure of the brain-morality 
relation  are  rare.  How  precisely  the  brain  and  morality  are  supposed  to  interact 
remains obscure: Is their relation causal, correlative, epiphenomenal, … ? 
Additionally, a relation between brain and morality can allow for influences in 
both directions: the brain could impact morality and/or morality could affect the 
brain. Historically and contemporarily, the focus of study has been one-sided. 
Neuroscientists have devoted more attention to the way the brain acts upon morality 
than vice versa (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Verplaetse, 2009). Thus, with respect to 
researchers’ interests, it is the brain that comes first and morality (somehow) follows. 
This is a statement about succession that does not necessarily imply causation. Yet, 
science  has  centered  on  the  role  of  the  brain  for  morality  which  ranges  from 
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association over mediation, and foundation, to determination. Keeping these 
clarifications in mind, the following section demonstrates that the brain-morality 





The brain–morality relation in flux 
 
 
The tethering of brain and morality is a process of biologization which alters the 
understanding and the study of morality. In the course of history, scientists have 
assigned various roles to the brain (Vidal, 2009) which had distinct influences on its 
expressiveness for morality. The understanding of morality as advocated in the 
different scientific approaches has varied accordingly. As will be explained below, it is 
noteworthy that the specific type of brain–morality relation of a given time is closely 
connected to the reigning neuro-/biological theories of the day. 
 
The inception 
The science-driven biologization of morality has branched roots. In the 17th and 18th 
centuries, scholars discussed the meaning of animal instinct for human reasoning and 
social functioning (Richards, 1987). Others employed the authority of nature and biol- 
ogy to legitimate societal categories (Daston, 1992). Benjamin Rush, one of the found- 
ing fathers of American psychiatry, identified physical factors that impacted the moral 
faculty at the end of the 18th century (Rush, 1786). In the 19th century, Franz Joseph 
Gall, the champion of phrenology, identified a “moral” organ in the cortex of the 
brain (Verplaetse, 2009). Around the same time, biomedically minded experts 
proclaimed immorality to be a somatic disease (Harris, 1989; Rimke & Hunt, 2002) 
and theories on criminal bodies and brains proliferated (Rafter, 2008). 
Moreover,  Darwin’s  theory  of  evolution  grounded  morality  in  the  natural 
world. According to Darwin, this was a gruesome place in which organisms competed 





sense in this framework. Darwinian theory deemed morality to be inheritable and 
expressed in instinctive behavior; thus, morality was endowed with biological qualities 
(Darwin, 1880). Most importantly, morality served a function: it was an advantageous 
trait in the struggle for survival. It increased the individual organism’s chances to 
survive and, ultimately, reproduce. As a consequence, genetic makeup for morality 
was more likely to be passed on to the following generation and by this process 
proliferated. Consequently, the origin of morality was transferred from a religious 
source  to  the  history  of  human  evolution.  This  descriptive  statement  about  the 
genesis of morality became more and more accepted. However, the possible norma- 
tive implications were subject to controversy. Comprehensive complaints were voiced 
against the idea that evolutionary principles should guide conduct in society (e.g. 
Huxley, 1893). 
Darwinian ideas influenced the scientific reasoning about morality at the end of 
the 19th century (Richards, 1987). The underlying problem that evolution needed a 
vehicle to transfer its impact onto the next generations was explained by the idea of 
heredity. While the notion that morality was inheritable was widely accepted, the 
question remained how it was to be implemented on a daily basis. Various well-known 
researchers assigned this function to the brain by associating it with morality. Baldwin 
(1899) took the brain as a precondition for morality. He suggested that the brain was 
necessary for a normal development of morality in humans. However, he referred to it 
in a rather imprecise fashion. He claimed that it must be available, but in his writing 
its actual function and functioning remained nebulous. Von Krafft-Ebing (1900) 
claimed that a normal brain is a prerequisite for moral behavior. But he also was 
unspecific on how the brain is supposed to control morality. Bleuler identified a part 
of the brain as the seat of morality, though he rejected the idea of a separate moral 
organ in the phrenological sense. He posited that “inborn or acquired inferiorities” 
(Bleuler, 1896 p. 21) of the cortex could lead to defective morality. Bleuler did not 
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think that the seat of morality was confined to a clearly definable area. His 
identification of the cortex as the neurobiological substrate for morality was vague. 
Interestingly, Bleuler thought the moral capacity could be disturbed in isolation, if the 
assumed cortical areas for morality were disrupted. This reasoning is imbued with the 
prominent theory of brain functioning of the time: localization theory (Hagner, 2008). 
Specific  brain  areas  were  taken  to  have  specific  functions,  exclusively.  In  this 
reasoning, the brain is compartmentalized. Accordingly, the search for a cerebral 
manifestation of morality was confined to defined regions (Verplaetse, 2009). 
Furthermore, the relation of the brain to morality was not specified in detail at 
the end of the 19th century. This imprecision reflects the fact that researchers were 
just starting to investigate the brain on a large scale (Finger, 2005). Knowledge about 
the  brain  was  still  meager.  The  available  methods  and  technologies  limited  the 
research options. The research of the day often involved operating on the brain; it was 
not the present neuroscience with its non-invasive imaging methods. For instance, 
Ferrier and Jackson were experimenting with induced lesions in animals to localize the 
motor cortex, but morality could not be examined in a similar vein. Jackson 
conjectured a hierarchical organization of the brain in which the evolutionarily 
younger, more advanced prefrontal cortex controlled the less developed regions and 
thus  the  socially  less  desirable  urges  of  a  person  (Draaisma,  2009).  However, 
scientists’ access to the moral brain was limited. Another way to get to the brain was 
needed. Hence, at the end of the 19th century the observation of behavior in the 
morally disturbed was common. Von Krafft-Ebing (1900), for example, documented 
numerous cases of moral transgressors; sometimes he alluded to their deficient brains. 
Yet, ideas on a cerebral cause for moral insanity or moral imbecility were of a speculative 
nature (E. Müller, 1899). Irrespective of the lack of empirical access, the brain was 
taken to be a necessary precondition for morality. However, it was not a sufficient 





the major force to guarantee for a moral person; the brain was merely associated. 
Furthermore, it had to share its featured part with the environment, as social forces 
were also thought to affect the moral person. 
It is important to note that inquiries into the moral brain were not mainstream 
research at the time. Attempts to localize the moral center in the brain were sporadic 
and proponents of it often had to face fierce criticism (Verplaetse, 2004). Abstractly 
speaking, morality was not located in the brain on a large scale. Moreover, brain 
science in general was still in its infancy. The cutting-edge research methods and 
technologies  of  the  time  were  laborious.  Empirical  evidence  was  scarce  and  the 
science itself was only at the beginning of being institutionalized (Star, 1989). 
Correspondingly, the language of the neuroscientific trade was nascent at this point. 
The rich technical vocabulary that is common to modern neuroscience had not yet 
been devised. The possibilities to translate morality by rephrasing it with brain-pidgin 
were limited. At this point in time, the brain and morality did not speak the same 
language. Furthermore, the experimental doctrine that is now accepted within 
psychology was not widely established (Danziger, 1990). As a consequence, scientists 
were only just beginning to define and operationalize their own concepts that they 
could subsequently study in experiments. Hence, efforts to define morality in terms of 
the brain in order to test it experimentally were not as common as today. 
Accordingly, the association of the cerebral and the moral realm was unspecific: 
the relation between brain and morality remained loose. Morality remained elusive in 




The  scattered  brain-focused  studies  of  morality  abated  around  1930  (Verplaetse, 
 
2009).  A  biological  approach  to  morality  was  reintroduced  in  the  form  of 
sociobiology. Sociobiologists seek to explain human social behavior with the aid of 
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evolutionary biology. Around the middle of the 20th century, sociobiologists were 
particularly interested in the phylogeny of morality (Stent, 1978). Hence, morality was 
understood to be the result of evolutionary pressures and was considered to be 
molded by the entire evolutionary history of humanity. It retained the biological 
features assigned to it at the beginning of the century (heritability and evolutionary 
functionality), but the tone was lowered with respect to their determinative power. 
Evolution was merely thought to endow humans with a foundation for morality. This 
general framework is inscribed in and implemented by genes. Building on this 
foundation – that is, working within the constraints of the framework – the (social) 
environment and the brain inform moral behavior. The paramount forces of genes 
and the environment were indisputable at the time. In this reasoning, the brain is the 
switch-point between these internal and external powers. 
Moreover, a more distinct knowledge emerged about the biological precursors 
of morality (genes and brains) owing to new methods and technologies, such as 
cybernetic modeling and simulation (Bischof, 1978), giving rise to new forms of 
thinking and knowing about morality. Advanced knowledge about the functioning of 
the brain led to more refined theories about its impact on moral mind and behavior. 
For example, Eysenck suggested that the brain stem was the basis for individual 
differences in morality. Furthermore, he stated that “genetically determined cortical 
arousal” (Eysenck, 1976 p. 123) is pivotal (see Rafter, 2008). 
In the genetically informed thinking about morality in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
function of the brain is more defined than at the beginning of the century. It is pre- 
programmed  by  genes  and  constantly  formed  by  the  environment.  It  is  the 
overlapping entity in the interplay between nature and nurture. As such, it was 
promoted from the rank of associated feature to become an essential tie in the gene– 
environment network. The brain here is a mediator. Its role is becoming more visible, 





tightened. Morality is pulled towards the brain as its significance becomes more 
pronounced. However, genes are at the center of attention; they are the potential 
locus of morality. Morality is housed in genes rather than in neurons. Moreover, in 
sociobiological reasoning, morality is defined in terms of altruism and egoism 
(Dawkins, 1976). The multitude of brain-based definitions that is characteristic of 
contemporary neuroscience is non-existent. 
 
The present surge 
An abundance of studies has recently been published on the putative neural bases of 
more and more complex aspects of human social life. Among them is a rapidly 
growing set dealing with traces of morality in the brain (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; 
Illes, Kirschen, & Gabrieli, 2003). Though basing ethical qualities in the brain has a 
long tradition (see above), the current surge in research has a new quality to it. Its 
marked feature is its dependence on technological developments in neuroimaging, 
especially functional magnetic resonance imaging. As neuroimaging grants access to 
the brain, brain research accesses complex social phenomena. A shift in attention 
from the gene to the brain is brought about, although the genetic approach has not 
disappeared completely (Raine, 2008). The brain now allows for a potential cerebral 
reification of morality. The moral mode of operation can allegedly be studied online: 
that is, in the scanner. 
The general procedure of the present approaches is to measure and map the 
brain.  Based  on  this  preprocessing,  different  approaches  to  determine  brain 
functioning  are  launched.  Aside  from  identifying  regions  of  the  brain,  some 
researchers focus on the influence of neurotransmitters, such as serotonin (Crockett, 
Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010), or hormones, such as oxytocin (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, 
Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Moll & Schulkin, 2009). The shared feature here is 
the specification of some biological substance that evidently influences the brain, but 
also influences morality. Yet, the bulk of the research utilizes neuroimaging (e.g. 
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Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) and to a lesser extent lesion 
studies (S. W. Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; R. J. Dolan, 
1999) to identify brain regions associated with morality. 
 
It is noteworthy that the theoretical framework for this undertaking is neither 
early 19th-century phrenology nor its historical successor, localization theory. The 
idea that there are exclusive brain areas for specific mind states or behaviors has 
vanished. It is widely acknowledged that there is no single moral center in the brain. A 
specific region may be active in various, unrelated situations. The brain’s complexity 
and  connectivity  are  proclaimed.  Hence,  today’s  leading  framework  is  a  sort  of 
network theory that connects distinct regions to each other and emphasizes their 
interplay (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; L. Young & 
Dungan, 2012). The same brain region can have more than one function, depending 
on what the status of the network is. Correspondingly, the brain is now conceived to 
be a non-centralized, highly interrelated, and dynamic compound. The modern 
neuroscience of morality tries to make sense of this by identifying patterns of neural 
activity  in  connected  regions.  As  a  result,  the  search  for  the  moral  center  is 
relinquished and replaced by the search for the “moral neural circuit” (Glenn, Raine, 
& Schug, 2009 p. 5). 
 
In summary, the introduction of neuroimaging technology in combination with 
the conviction that the brain is even more complex than previously imagined has 
made things more convenient and more complicated at the same time. Yet, the brain 
has become the major unit of analysis because it is widely considered a most fertile 
ground for researching human mind and behavior, including morality (Rafter, 2008). 
Along with this came a promotion in power: The brain’s alleged causal influence on 
morality has never been greater. Although the majority of the neuroscientists concede 
that culture plays a role in the formation of morality, the brain is now a sufficient 





brain-morality relation retains some leeway owing to the usage of imprecise verbs to 
connect the neural and the moral domains. Specific areas “play important roles” 
(Prehn et al., 2008 p. 33; Takahashi et al., 2008 p. 1886), “underlie” moral processes, 
or “are involved in complex social and moral reasoning” (M. B. Miller et al., 2010 p. 
2215). As the needed bridge principle between brain and mind is still contested, 
researchers appear to shy away from making explicit reference to it. 
This brief sketch of the history of the relation between the brain and morality is 
by no means all encompassing. It serves to show how time-specific thinking about 
morality is deeply entangled in the major theories on neuro-/biological functioning of 
a given period. Whereas the brain has been loosely associated with morality at the end 
of the 19th century, it declined in significance until its resurrection as a gene– 
environment mediator as a consequence of the rise of sociobiology in the middle of 
the 20th century. In the last two decades, the brain was moved to the center of 
attention and has become the primary unit of analysis for morality within a certain 
branch of neuroscience. In summary, the brain has ascended from an associated 
feature to a potent causal force. It has become the moral domain. The invocation of 
the brain in studying morality has presently reached its hitherto peak. Moreover, the 
historical sketch demonstrates that what is being invoked in the study of morality is a 
dynamic set of notions, not a constant material entity. Thus, the notion of the brain 
and its relation to morality is mutable. As a consequence, what neuroscientists take 





A new concept emerges: Brain-based morality 
 
 
One of the most pronounced characteristics of the modern neuroscience of 
morality is the explanatory power and informative value assigned to the brain. 
Understanding the cerebral realm is deemed to be sufficient to understand the moral 
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realm. This reasoning presupposes that morality is installed in the brain and can be 
explored in neuroscientific terms. Some labor on the conceptual level is necessary to 
make this reasoning intelligible and the associated research approach generative. The 
triadic process of locating, translating, and defining introduced to describe the 
constitution of gluttony as a neuroscientific object illustrates the required conceptual 
transformation. To begin with, the ontological status of morality is altered by locating 
it in convolutions, brain cells, and neurotransmitters. Not only is morality as a whole 
embedded in the brain, but its diverse aspects are meticulously replaced with certain 
areas: moral cognition is situated in prefrontal regions, moral emotions can be found 
in the limbic system, and the social dimension of morality resides in the temporal lobe 
(Moll et al., 2005). The good and the bad are anchored in the skull at multiple spots. 
Furthermore,  morality’s  new  locality  allows  for  translating  it  into  the  elaborate 
language of modern neuroscience. For example, Shenhav and Greene (Shenhav & 
Greene, 2010 p. 670) “found that increased utilitarian responding at the individual 
level was correlated with increased BOLD activity in bilateral regions of lateral 
OFC/vlPFC  and  medial  superior  frontal  gyrus,  left  middle  temporal  gyrus  and 
superior parietal lobe.” The new moral semantic comprises neural states and regions. 
Connected with this is a novel opportunity to learn about morality. Neural activation 
is correlated with moral engagement, thus scanning people’s brains allows for an 
educated guess regarding their psychological functioning as well as their virtues and 
vices. While this way of reasoning is an intended overstatement of neuroscience’s 
capabilities, it signifies the shift towards the brain as an adequate domain to obtain 
knowledge about right and wrong. Defining morality in this neuroscientific fashion 
allows the brain to be a novel epistemological gateway. Consequently, the merging of 
the cerebral and the moral sphere has brought about a new place of residence, a new 
language, and new possibilities of knowledge for morality. These modifications have 





notion of morality that has been advocated in the history of studying morality without 
the aid of the brain (e.g. Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991). 
The key aspect in the generation of brain-based morality is the conversion of 
“knowledge from one domain to another” (Nersessian, 1992 p. 19); this means that 
neuroscientific knowledge is transferred into knowledge about morality. This refers to 
a transfer of features. The current notion of the brain imposes a set of features – 
biological, empirically accessible, sub-personal, network/modular functioning – on 
morality. As a consequence, the neuroscience of morality views its object of interest as 
biologically determined and comprised of neurobiological attributes. The transfer of 
knowledge consists in considering the brain’s mode of operation to be morality’s 
mode  of  operation.  The  research  approach  also  conceives  of  morality  to  be 
measurable in a natural science fashion by experimentally analyzing its material 
components. Accordingly, the applied methods and technologies aim at capturing 
somatic properties. Furthermore, morality is deemed to reside in a subsurface domain 
that is unreachable, and, thus, uncontrollable for the person. Whereas the person is 
relieved of her or his accountability, the brain is furnished with responsibility. The 
responsive, conscious agent is thus rendered an illusion and the cerebral subject is 
endorsed. Lastly, as the current theory of brain functioning implies cerebral modules 
that interact in a network fashion, this modular structure is installed in morality (see 
Uttal, 2001, on modularity of mind and brain). Koenigs et al. (2007) state that patients 
with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (“a brain region necessary for the 
normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions,” p. 908) exhibit a 
specific tendency in their moral judgments. The brain can be partly destroyed, yet the 
remaining parts uphold functioning. The statement that fractional brain deficits affect 
parts of moral functioning indicates a transfer of this modular reasoning. The same 
approach is applied when moral reasoning is associated with the prefrontal cortex 
(Casebeer & Churchland, 2003), when it is purported that “the amygdala is important 
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for affective responsiveness to moral transgressions”  (Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, 
Passingham, & Dolan, 2006 p. 945), or when “distinct brain areas [are] involved in 
different kinds of guilt processing” (Basile et al., 2011 p. 238). Morality is split into 
modules and certain regions of the brain function as stand-ins for certain aspect of 
morality. In all cases, the functioning of the brain is taken to be the functioning of 
morality.  In  this  view,  morality  is  not  a  self-contained  entity,  but  a  modular 
compound, just as the brain. 
It is important to note that morality poses some constraints on the transfer of 
attributes. The most evident constraint is the cultural versatility of morality; therefore, 
strict brain determinism is kept at bay. Neuroscientists do not maintain that because 
we all have the same brains, we all have the same morality. While the content of 
morality remains indefinite in terms of the brain, the functioning of morality is taken 
to be universally determined by it (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). In summary, the transfer of 
knowledge from the biological to the moral realm results in a change of meaning for 
morality. To certain neuroscientists, morality now has a cerebral connotation. 
Some qualifications are necessary prior to concluding. Although the study of 
brain-based morality is popular within a certain scientific niche as well as the media 
(O'Connor, Rees, & Joffe, 2012), the practice is by no means unanimously welcomed. 
Neuroscientists  who  endorse  brain-based  morality  face  controversy  and  criticism 
from various angles. Inside the field, there is an ongoing debate on the functioning of 
the moral brain (e.g. L. Young & Dungan, 2012). From outside the discipline, the 
neuroscience of morality is challenged from advocates of behavioral moral psychology 
(Turiel, 2008), indicted for methodological confusion (Kahane & Shackel, 2010; 
Robinson, 2012; Schleim, 2008), critically assessed from legal scholars (Morse, 2006), 








The  invocation  of  the  brain  in  studying morality  is  multifarious.  It is  a popular 
research field that receives growing attention. Furthermore, it is a development within 
the wider context of the neurobiologization of psychology. Also, it is a historical 
process which entails versatile and contingent notions of the brain and morality. 
Lastly, and most importantly here, it comprises the establishment of a new concept of 
morality. In order for neuroscience to study morality, it needed to adjust its meaning 
to create a viable target for itself. Morality needed to be transformed in order to be 
handled by neuroscientific theories, methods, and machinery. As a consequence, the 
ontological, epistemological, and semantic attributes of morality are being located, 
translated, and defined in terms of the brain. Correspondingly, morality now exists in 
the brain, it is sought there, and it is talked about in terms of it. By attaching morality 
to the brain, neuroscientists restricted the elusiveness and dynamicity of morality; 
morality as an object of knowledge is downsized into brain-based morality. The study 
of this specific object of research resulted in the establishment of a self-contained 
research field with its own body of knowledge. The key point is that the invocation of 
the brain in studying morality was not a neutral act: the neuroscience of morality is 
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In the second half of the 19th-century, a group of psychiatric experts discussed the 
relation between brain malfunction and moral misconduct. In the ensuing debates, 
scientific discourses on immorality merged with those on insanity and the brain. This 
yielded a specific definition of what it means to be immoral: immoral and insane due 
to  a  disordered  brain.  In  this  context,  diverse  neurobiological  explanations  for 
immoral mind and behavior existed at the time. This article elucidates these different 
brain-based explanations via five historical cases of immoral persons. In addition, the 
article analyses the associated controversies in the context of the period’s psychiatric 
thinking. The rendering of the immoral person as brain-disordered is scrutinized in 
terms  of  changes  in  moral  agency.  Furthermore,  a  present  immoral  person  is 





Meet William Bigg: killer of animals, torturer of his siblings, and molester of girls. On 
visiting the Kingston Asylum in Ontario, Canada in the 1880s, the British alienist 
Daniel Hack Tuke gave a comprehensive description of Bigg’s case and diagnosed 
him with “moral insanity or congenital defect of the moral sense” (Tuke, 1885a p. 
365). 
 
In other words, a psychiatric expert passed a verdict on an individual’s moral 
status by imposing a diagnosis that linked immorality and neurobiology. The 
assessment of William Bigg occurred within a strand in psychiatry that studied the 
connections between badness, madness and the brain at the end of the 19th-century. 
In this context, medically trained experts endorsing neurobiological models of mental 
disorder gained authority in assessing, interpreting and treating immorality (Ward, 
2010; Watson, 2011). The resulting linkage between being an immoral person and 
having an abnormal brain yielded a specific view on immoral persons: immoral and 
insane due to a disordered brain (see N. Rose, 2007; Vidal, 2009 on being and having 
a brain). In general terms, this kind of person is afflicted by brain disorder which 
induces  insanity  which  then  precipitates  immoral  behavior.  The  upshot  is  the 
possibility to understand those who evince deviant conduct, disobey social convention 
and violate the moral order not as merely immoral, insane, or criminal, but as 
neurologically disordered. Here, science unfolds its generative powers. Scientific 
description, categorization, explanation and action generate specific ways for being 
human (Hacking, 2007; N. Rose, 1998; Smith, 2007). The resulting understanding of 
immoral persons as neurobiologically aberrant organisms proved fecund ground for 
brain scientists and biomedical professionals (Verplaetse, 2009). How then has it 
become possible to understand immoral persons in terms of disordered brains? And 
how was neurobiological reasoning applied in individual cases? 
The goal of this article is to trace the scientific discourses in the late 19th- 
century that gave way to this association and to elucidate different conceptualizations 
35  
Badness, madness, and the brain 
 
 
of immoral persons and their brains. First, the historical background is constituted by 
delineating the state of psychiatry and brain science. Next, five exemplary cases of 
immoral persons are discussed to highlight details in diagnosing brain-based moral 
dysfunction and to illustrate the different neurobiological explanations used. The 
puzzles and controversies regarding the diagnoses and explanations are analyzed and 
embedded in the historical background. Subsequently, the consequences of 
neurobiological understandings of immorality for moral agency are addressed. Lastly, 
a contemporary case of an immoral person is introduced as a contrast in order to 
show the diversity and complexity of brain-based reasoning on immorality and its 





Bad brains, bad persons: Historical background 
 
 
At the beginning of the 19th-century, a reconceptualization of mental disorder as 
encompassing all aspects of human mind and behavior took place (Porter, 2002). The 
range  of  insanity  was  broadened.  For  example,  Pinel  (1806)  introduced  mental 
diseases that afflicted the emotions. The notion of insanity no longer signified 
intellectual defect alone but also affective disturbances 
(Augstein, 1996; Carlson & Dain, 1962). Mental disorder concepts surfaced that 
targeted disturbed emotions and immorality, such as moral insanity (Prichard, 1835) 
and homicidal mania (Ray, 1838). Here, immorality was not being possessed by the 
devil, or carrying out a mere perpetration of the law, nor was it a socially caused 
phenomenon, but a mental disorder. Hence, immorality was transformed from sin to 
an effect of insanity. Rimke and Hunt described this process as the emergence of a 
“medical model of vice as pathology” (Rimke & Hunt, 2002 p. 80). 
In the context of these developments, immoral persons appeared in the cross- 





viable fields of activity for psychiatrists (Harris, 1989; Watson, 2011). Psychiatrists 
began to testify in courts on culprits’ mental and moral status (Eigen, 1995; Smith, 
1981). They appealed to a medical model of health and illness to buttress insanity 
defenses and to explain deviations from the moral norm: immoral persons were sick 
rather than merely unethical. Although biology or the brain were not always alluded to 
in court cases, certain experts influenced the debate on legal responsibility by referring 
to neural causes of mental disorder (Kroeber, 2007). 
In fact, from the middle of the 19th-century onwards, neuro-/biology played a 
significant role in explaining mental disorder (Ackerknecht, 1968; Shorter, 1997; 
Wallace & Gach, 2008). Multiple biological theories of mental disorder coexisted. 
Among them, heredity dominated psychiatrists’ reasoning for several decades 
(Ackerknecht, 1968). Heredity was a prominent feature in diverse scientific discourses 
and had different, context-dependent meanings (Müller-Wille & Rheinberger, 2012). 
In psychiatry heredity signified the idea that psychological attributes or tendencies 
were inherited from a person’s ancestors. Mental disorder was conferred upon the 
individual through biological destiny. This notion included immorality: immoral 
persons were deemed to be the offspring of immoral ancestry. Moreover, criminal 
anthropologists argued for the hereditary transmission of criminal tendencies. 
Lombroso’s doctrine of the born criminal and the alleged visibility of immorality in 
the constitution of the body was a legitimate explanation for criminality to some, but 
also spurred heated debate (Becker & Wetzell, 2006; Rafter, 2008; Wetzell, 2000). 
Closely connected to hereditary theory was the theory of degeneration. According to 
this theory mental disorder and criminality were also inherited, but degeneration 
implied  that  they  worsened  with  each  generation;  degeneration  was  progressive 
(Jalava, 2006; Werlinder, 1978). Furthermore, Darwin’s theory of evolution exerted an 
influence  on  understanding  human  beings  as  well  as  morality  (Richards,  1987). 
Darwin founded the moral sense on natural principles, proposing that morality had 
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evolved through the history of humankind. Morality was a sign of high and complex 
development of a species (Darwin, 1880). Accordingly, immorality was a reversion 
(see below). 
Aside from these biological theories, distinct brain-based explanations for 
immorality emerged in the 19th-century (Verplaetse, 2009). Although the science of 
the brain was in its infancy at the time (Finger, 1994), some experts made 
straightforward suggestions for the cerebral underpinnings of morality. At the 
beginning of the century, phrenologists Gall and Spurzheim put forth a theory of 
human character based on cranial protuberances and identified moral areas in the 
skull (R. M. Young, 1970). As phrenology was criticized and went out of fashion in 
the course of the century, other ideas on the neural basis of morality emerged within 
the context of localization doctrine. Roughly stated, the doctrine posited that the 
brain consisted of distinct centers with specific functions (Hagner, 2008; Star, 1989). 
For example, psychiatrist Moritz Benedikt assigned morality to the occipital lobes 
after having studied the brains of dead criminals (Verplaetse, 2004). 
Within the materialistic climate in psychiatry (Werlinder, 1978), experts linked the 
above-described   mental   disorders   of   morality   (e.g.   moral   insanity)   to   brain 
dysfunction (E. Müller, 1899 for a contemporary review). Consequently, disrupted 
neural functioning could lead to disturbed moral functioning. This did not take the 
form of crude determinism in all of the experts’ views. Yet the majority of them 
maintained that the brain mediated external causes – such as social influence in 
particular and the environment in general – that is, these factors acted on the immoral 
person via the brain. Hence, the brain had a double function: it was both a pervasive 
mediator and a tacit, though potent, causal force. The brain received new executive 
power that also uplifted its ethical capabilities. In that sense, scientific attempts to 
make sense of the brain coincided with attempts to equip it with moral ability. 





immorality.   Moreover,   the   quest  to   pinpoint   morality   in  the   brain   spurred 
disagreement among experts. The validity of moral centers and moral disorders was 





Exemplary cases of immoral persons 
 
 
Thus,  the  19th-century  witnessed  the  emergence  of  psychiatric  experts,  mental 
disorder concepts that targeted immoral behavior, and the linking of these concepts to 
defective biological endowment as well as brain dysfunction. In other words, badness 
was framed as madness and madness as brain defectiveness. In the view of certain 
experts, the immoral person transformed from sinner to lunatic to neuropsychiatric 
patient. Within this historical background, this section describes five exemplary cases 
of immoral persons from the end of the 19th-century in order to elucidate details in 
diagnosing  brain-based  moral  dysfunction  and  to  illustrate  the  different 
neurobiological frames and explanations used. The cases are taken from diverse 
regional, legal and administrative contexts, but these differences are not explicitly 
addressed in the analysis. Rather the focus is on the reasoning, the evidence, the 
diagnoses, and the problems of deeming immoral persons as brain-disordered at the 
end of the 19th-century. 
 
William Bigg (1843–?) 
William Bigg had been a hazard from an early age. Bigg’s family reported that he 
repeatedly mutilated and killed animals. He tortured his younger brother with a table 
knife and cut the throat of a neighbor’s horse. Punishment was to no avail. Bigg 
continued to attack horses, attempted to suffocate a baby sister by piling pillows on 
her and stole money from his father. The family kept him from being alone with his 
younger siblings and locked him up during the night. He was sent to a penitentiary at 
the age of 16 from where he was transferred to an asylum. After being discharged in 
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his 20s, he once more cut the throat of a horse and on the same day raped a girl. For 
this,  he  was  sentenced  to  death.  The  sentence  was  then  transformed  into 
imprisonment for life in an asylum. When he was pardoned for good conduct ten 
years  later,  he  again  mutilated  a  horse  and  was  re-institutionalized  at  Kingston 
Asylum. There he physically abused other inmates and escaped at the age of 41. He 
was caught the same day when attempting to rape a girl. For this assault, he was 
sentenced to a prison term. The files of the Kingston Asylum1 described Bigg as 
dangerous, vicious, cunning, devious, but also as infantile, humorless, naive and even 
“full of good intentions”. The alienists at the asylum wondered at his fascination with 
blood and his recidivism after long periods of inconspicuousness. 
Based on the asylum files on Bigg, alienist Tuke diagnosed him with moral 
insanity (Tuke, 1885a). The diagnosis had a history of its own. Moral insanity, 
introduced by Prichard (1835) half a century earlier, initially referred to emotional 
insanity and did not necessarily imply unethical behavior (Berrios, 1999; Whitlock, 
1982). Yet, in the course of the 19th-century the term’s meaning changed and attained 
an ethical connotation. The fact that Tuke rendered Bigg as morally insane indicates 
that he used the term in the later sense. In the same year, Tuke purported that a 
“physical cause” for a person’s immoral behavior was the basis for distinguishing the 
morally insane from mere sinners (Tuke, 1885b p. 175). Tuke deemed this physical 
cause to be hereditary and installed in the person’s brain from birth. In accordance 
with two authorities of the time, Hughlings Jackson and Herbert Spencer, Tuke 
surmised that the higher functions of the brain were compromised in this condition. 
The phylogenetically older and more barbaric lower functions were left uncontrolled 
and elicited wicked behavior: “Such a man as this is a reversion to an old savage type, 
and is born by accident in the wrong century” (Tuke, 1885a p. 365). In this rendering 
of Bigg as an atavism, Tuke made use of Darwinian reasoning. The higher functions 





functions failed, the consequence was deterioration into a primitive biological 
predecessor. Tuke did not clearly identify the physical cause for Bigg’s condition, but 
he suggested that irresistible impulses guided immoral persons; thus, Bigg had no 
choice but to be bad. Furthermore, Tuke was aware that understanding immorality as 
brain disorder had far-reaching consequences. Commenting on Bigg’s conviction to 
prison in 1884, Tuke writes: “But what is to be done with the man who, from no fault 
of his own, is born in the 19th instead of a long-past century? Are we to punish him 
for his involuntary anachronism?” (Tuke, 1885a p. 365). This statement shows the 
puzzle that brain-based explanations of immorality posed to legal responsibility. 
 
Charles J. Guiteau (1841–82) 
The question of immorality due to disorder of the brain was fiercely debated in one of 
the most popular court cases of the late 19th-century in the United States. After an 
erratic life of villainy and disappointed aspirations, Charles J. Guiteau shot President 
James A. Garfield on 2 July 1881. The incident had two major consequences, Garfield 
died after several weeks and Guiteau’s mental status became a highly contested matter 
(Rosenberg, 1968). There was no doubt that Guiteau was the offender. Hence, the 
ensuing trial revolved around the question whether or not he was insane. This trial 
was as much Guiteau’s as it was a trial of the definition and causes of insanity and 
immorality. The prosecution experts considered him sane and wanted him hanged, 
whereas the defense experts did their best to prove him insane.2  The defense 
summoned Edward Charles Spitzka to testify in favor of Guiteau’s mental incapacity. 
Spitzka had spent parts of his education in Leipzig and Vienna and was therefore 
amenable to European views of mental disorder. These views stressed the influence of 
heredity for the close connection between neurological and mental disease (Werlinder, 
1978). During the examination of Guiteau, Spitzka found signs of an abnormal brain: 
“The shape of his head and his face, and certain indications of imperfect brain 
development which I found, those being a defective innervation of the facial muscles, 
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asymmetry of the face, and pronounced deviation of the tongue to the left” (Spitzka, 
 
1883 p. 210). He interpreted Guiteau’s murderous action as well as his entire indecent 
life as the result of congenital “disordered brain action” (Spitzka, 1883 p. 216). Thus, 
he unmistakably declared Guiteau insane. Spitzka’s views on inheritable insanity were 
modern for the psychiatric establishment in the United States. Though the eminent 
figures in American psychiatry agreed that insanity was the result of a distortion of the 
healthy brain, they expressed their doubts regarding the doctrine of heredity and the 
validity of neurological evidence in general (e.g. Gray, 1882). At the end of the trial, 
Guiteau’s brain became the object of disagreement. The prosecution asserted that 
there were no abnormalities to be found in his brain, therefore he was sane. The 
defense retorted that the state of Guiteau’s brain was inscrutable until it was disclosed 
in autopsy. The prosecution experts succeeded. The jury considered Guiteau sane and 
guilty and he was hanged in 1882. 
If Guiteau was immoral and insane due to a disordered brain, then the autopsy 
 
should  have  provided  evidence  for  it.  However,  it  did  not  settle  the  dispute.3 
 
According to one group of experts, the assassin’s brain exhibited marked microscopic 
anomalies in the blood vessels and cellular make-up (Arnold, Shakespeare, & 
McConnell, 1882). It is noteworthy that these experts refused to make a statement 
regarding Guiteau’s insanity. Yet the significance of the cerebral aberration for 
Guiteau’s mental state was controversially discussed. Since it was unknown which 
qualities of the brain signify immorality or insanity (size, weight, structure, partial 
destruction?), there was room for antithetic interpretations. Some experts felt 
confirmed in having deemed Guiteau insane, others denied the validity of the brain 
anomalies. In a retrospective consideration of the case under the telltale title ‘A Case 
of Alleged Moral Insanity’, Elwell (1883), a witness for the prosecution, generally 





disagreed on fundamental issues. The diagnoses, the etiology of mental disorder and 
the validity of brain evidence were highly controversial. 
 
Jane Toppan (1857–1938) 
In 1901, another murderer provoked expert disagreement in the United States. Jane 
Toppan, a private nurse, had gradually poisoned several of her employers. After the 
homicides, she took loving care of some of her victims’ children and expressed 
intimate condolences to the bereaved. Toppan experienced no compunction after her 
actions. This circumstance surprised even her: “Why don’t I feel sorry and grieve over 
it? I cannot sense it at all” (Stedman, 1904-1905 p. 283). Toppan was not suspected at 
first. She had a favorable reputation and had cast a veil of elaborate lies to conceal her 
misdoings. Throughout her life, Toppan had been in the vicinity of several thefts and 
intrigues, but she was rarely associated with the incidents and never proved guilty. She 
did not evince pronounced early-onset behavioral abnormalities and led a creditable 
life, though she had a taste for morphine. The expert Henry R. Stedman (1904-1905), 
who assessed Toppan’s mental status for the court, described her as clear-headed, 
sociable, yet manipulative as well as adept at lying. 
In  her  trial,  Toppan  was  found  not  guilty  by  reason  of  insanity  and  was 
admitted to an asylum. During her confinement she developed delusions and feared 
that the asylum staff wanted to poison her. The diagnosis was complicated. Stedman 
deduced Toppan’s altered mental state from her lack of remorse and self-control, her 
indifference regarding her situation, as well as her insusceptibility to punishment. A 
craniometrical examination detected no skull abnormities; still Stedman surmised a 
biological cause for Toppan’s misdemeanor. In his view, a detrimental hereditary 
influence was the cause for her insanity and hence her irresponsibility. The putative 
biological evidence for Toppan’s condition was hardly conclusive. Stedman alluded to 
her corrupted family and the circumstance that Toppan’s “disease-history and present 
mental state correspond with a well-recognized form of mental defect of a moral type 
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due to congenital degeneration” (Stedman, 1904-1905 p. 284). Stedman’s pointing to 
Toppan’s corrupted ancestry served as evidence for her insanity within the hereditary 
model of explanation. However, this line of argument did not convince other experts. 
Psychiatrist Charles F. Folsom, who had served as an expert witness for the defense in 
the Guiteau case and who personally knew Toppan, was less decided about Toppan’s 
insanity or mere criminality (Folsom, 1909). He disputed the presence of a defining 
biological feature (heredity and the associated brain defectiveness) that could have 
caused Toppan’s moral insanity. Hence, whether or not Toppan was immoral due to 
brain disorder or insane at all remained controversial. 
 
Patient E. (1865–93) 
In continental Europe similar controversies existed, but European experts had their 
own views on potential cerebral underpinnings of unethical behavior (E. Müller, 
1899). A central question in continental disputes was whether morality could be 
 
compromised in isolation leaving the intellect intact. Were there pure cases of insane 
moral aberration? Psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler spurred the debate by describing the 
genre-defining case of Patient E. (Bleuler, 1893).4 E. was the offspring of a well- 
respected  and  physically  and  mentally  healthy  pastor’s  family;  there  were  no 
indications of any hereditary burden. Despite this, E. was recalcitrant and incorrigible 
from an early age. The family described him as withdrawn and uncommunicative, but 
as gifted at inventing imaginative stories that soon could only be classified as lies. E. 
repeatedly indulged in fraud and theft. The subsequent punishment left him 
unimpressed and did not alter his immoral behavior. Moreover, his parents deemed E. 
to be incapable of love. He was institutionalized from his late teens. First he was at 
the mental hospital at Burghölzli where the head of the institution, Auguste-Henri 
Forel, diagnosed him with a moral deficiency without delusions due to defective brain 
organization  (Bleuler,  1893  p.  59).  E.  was  transferred  to  the  mental  hospital  at 





some minor bodily signs of degeneration (e.g. E.’s beard still did not grow properly at 
age 22) and characterized him as industrious, vain, glib, yet not malicious and also 
tender with animals. According to Bleuler, E.’s intellect and memory were completely 
intact. However, E. had neither conscience nor compassion, but was devious, and 
manipulative to the core. In fact, he was so successful at utilizing the guards that 
Bleuler had to fine his staff for interacting with E. When confronted with his 
misdoings, E. disputed all involvement until he was inevitably refuted, then he 
expressed excessive regret and apologized hyperbolically. Bleuler considered these 
assurances as lip-service and was convinced that E. lacked the necessary altruistic 
feelings for true repentance. 
It is unclear on what empirical basis Forel diagnosed E. with a defective brain 
in the first place. Nevertheless, E. was the stereotype of a moral idiot5  to Bleuler. E. 
conspicuously displayed intact reasoning and at the same time impaired morality. 
Though Bleuler allowed for environmental influence, this combination signified brain 
disorder to him: “There are special functions of the cortex, which in their totality 
determine the character and the morality of an individual and these functions can be 
defective in isolation due to inborn or acquired inferiority” (Bleuler, 1896 p. 21). 
Bleuler did not spell out in detail how E.’s “functions of the cortex” were “defective”. 
The brain-based diagnosis was not substantiated with evidence from the brain. E. died 
from typhoid in 1893. It is unknown whether there was an autopsy; E.’s brain state 
remains a mystery (Cf. Verplaetse, 2009 p. 216). 
 
Christiana Edmunds (1828–1907) 
A defective brain was found to have corrupted the ‘chocolate cream poisoner’ in 
Victorian England. The well-known physician Henry Maudsley testified to his 
materialistic views (see Wiener, 1990) on immorality in a criminal case that received 
nationwide attention in 1872.6 Christiana Edmunds, an unremarkable 43-year-old, 
unmarried woman of middle-class background, was accused of having murdered a 
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boy in Brighton the year before. In an attempt to murder the wife of a man for whom 
Edmunds had a fascination, she deposited poisoned chocolate at a confectionery. 
After some puzzlesolving, the police were able to link Edmunds to the events and she 
was charged with murder. 
Maudsley was among the experts who assessed her mental state. They found 
Edmunds’ intellect to be immaculate, yet “she would have poisoned a whole city full 
of  people  without  hesitation,  compunction,  or  remorse”  (Anonymous,  1872). 
Referring to her degenerate family, the experts diagnosed her with moral insanity 
which  to  Maudsley  was  mere  brain  disorder  (Maudsley,  1874).  Further, 
neurobiological evidence to support the diagnosis was wanting. 
Most conspicuous in Maudsley’s interpretation of Edmunds’ condition was the 
completely brain-based explanation for her immorality. The moral defectiveness was 
solely a cerebral aberration. Edmunds never had a choice; a moral life was not an 
option  with  her  neurobiological  endowment.  The  inescapability  of  brain 
determination was well captured when Maudsley described Edmunds and comparable 
immoral persons as being “as insensible to the moral relations of life as a person 
colour-blind is to certain colours” (Maudsley, 1873 p. 133). Accordingly, Maudsley 
questioned the culpability of those who were at the mercy of their immoral brains. 
Though Edmunds was sentenced to death at first, she was re-examined after the trial 
and declared insane (Anonymous, 1872). Subsequently, she was institutionalized at 




Bad brains, bad persons: Late 19th-century controversies 
 
 
Bigg, Guiteau, Toppan, E. and Edmunds were accused of breaching the moral order 
in a variety of ways, ranging from cruelty to animals through cunning to premeditated 
murder. Their individual histories as well as the circumstances of their iniquities were 





justification and theories) for their diagnoses varied, reflecting the heterogeneity of 
experts’ opinions. Correspondingly, the interpretation of an immoral person’s 
condition was controversial at the end of the 19th-century. The associated debates 
testify to the coexistence of diverging expert opinions and indicate the contested 
nature of the neurobiology of the immoral person. This section further analyses these 
controversies with regard to the described cases. 
 
Brain-based explanations for immorality 
At the end of the 19th-century, various biological explanatory models for immorality 
coexisted: heredity, degeneration, evolutionary reversion and brain-based models. 
These models were not mutually exclusive; rather the experts discussed and made use 
of them in an eclectic way. To varying degrees, some of the experts based their 
diagnoses on heredity and searched for moral depravity in their patients’ family 
histories. Thus, the inspection of the forefathers’ moral status was an integral part of 
the diagnosis. However, experts’ opinions varied with regard to the constitutive power 
of heredity: Stedman partly built his diagnosis on Toppan’s vicious provenance and 
Spitzka was at pain to prove Guiteau’s father’s insanity. Contrarily, Bleuler found only 
few  signs  of  a  hereditary  burden  in  E.  and  discarded  this  line  of  evidence. 
Interestingly, though Bleuler did not deem E. to be a victim of his inherited biology, 
the expert who dealt with E.’s immoral son, H., considered him to be fully corrupted 
by his father’s (that is, E.’s) biological legacy (Maier, 1908). In correspondence with 
the contemporary popularity of heredity within psychiatry, it was alluded to in all of 
the above cases. In the cases in which experts put forth a brain-based explanation, 
only Tuke clearly stated a neurobiological mechanism (see above). Maudsley definitely 
viewed Edmunds as at the mercy of her malfunctioning brain, but he did not state an 
explanatory mechanism. Bleuler identified the cortex as the seat for morality, but did 
not  explain  in  detailed  anatomical  terms  how  morality  was  compromised  in  his 
patient. Tuke and Maudsley, however, did not link moral insanity with particular 
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neuroanatomical regions (Verplaetse, 2009 p. 198). Here, it is important to keep in 
mind that attempts to localize morality in the brain were scarce and contested. At the 
end of the 19th-century, it was unknown how and where brain malfunction caused 
immorality. 
Regarding the degree of cerebral impact on a person’s morality, the experts’ 
opinions ranged from complete brain determination over less fateful partial 
determination to a mere brain-based susceptibility for immorality. Thus, experts in 
favor of brain-based explanations for immorality differed regarding their line of 
argument and the degree of cerebral determination. As becomes clear from the expert 
disagreement  described,  these  neurobiological  explanations  did  not  convince  all 
experts at the time. Nevertheless, understanding a person as immoral due to brain 
disorder was a legitimate option for some of these experts. 
 
Evidence for immoral brains 
The  experts’  diverging  opinions  on  the  involvement  of  heredity  and  the  brain 
reflected their uncertainty regarding the question of how to prove immorality in 
individuals’ brains. In the examples given, brain damage was not as conspicuous as in 
the famous case of Phineas Gage, whose skull was penetrated by an iron bar in 1848. 
Gage evinced certain behaviors after his lesion which some experts – until today – 
interpreted as immoral (Macmillan, 2000). Contrarily, for Bigg, Guiteau, Toppan, E. 
and Edmunds there were no indications of head trauma. Their brain states were 
mysterious. There was little the experts could do to elicit the brains’ secrets. 
Contemporary methods to assess the brain were limited. Skull measurement was 
dubious, though it was used in the Toppan case. Technologies of the time did not 
grant access to the living brain. However, the dead brain could be analyzed in autopsy. 
The results were ambiguous. The controversy over Guiteau’s brain state illustrated 
experts’ disagreement. Spitzka explained Guiteau’s state via “disordered brain action”, 





validity  of  his  claims.  The  controversial  autopsy  could  not  settle  the  dispute 
empirically. It was unknown how precisely an abnormal cerebral configuration could 
have caused immorality. Contemporary models diverged on this problem and lacked 
sufficient explanatory detail. In addition to these scientific constraints, there was a 
scarcity of evidence for a potential brain disorder in all of the described cases. The 
experts’ rhetorical rather than evidence-based justifications for a given diagnosis are 
striking: brain disorder was assumed rather than observed. It is noteworthy that 
although tangible evidence was scarce and the theories vague, cerebral dysfunction 
remained a potent explanation for immorality. 
 
Immorality as mental disorder 
Not only were the causes of brain-based immorality obscure, also immorality as a 
medical condition was nebulous. Experts attributed moral disorder to heterogeneous 
cases with varying immoral characteristics (for more cases, see Digby, 1985; Longard, 
1907; von Krafft-Ebing, 1900). Labels for the condition were numerous and 
multifarious. Terms such as “moral mania”, “moral imbecility”, “moral insanity” and 
“moral   derangement”   were   commonly   used,   but   experts   differed   in   their 
understanding  of  the  conditions.  The  question  was  hotly  debated  as  to  whether 
feelings and morality could be impaired in isolation or whether the intellect too was 
always affected. The degree and severity of a person’s immorality yielded another 
problem. Experts disagreed whether immorality was an epiphenomenon or a main 
symptom of brain-based insanity. For example, Bleuler concluded his study on E. by 
stating  that  there  were  isolated  ethical  disorders.  Furthermore,  the  issue  of  a 
differential diagnosis was pending because morality was compromised in other forms 
of insanity as well. The fact that the conditions and their potential cerebral causes 
were  ill-defined  is  reflected  in  the  controversies  over  the  aforementioned  cases, 
perhaps most clearly in the dispute over Guiteau’s mental state. Experts applied their 
respective  theories  to  the  individuals  at  hand,  yielding  immoral  persons  that 
49  
Badness, madness, and the brain 
 
 
epitomized the given theory. Contrarily, famous exemplary cases, such as that of E., 
influenced the theorizing of generations of experts. 
 
Immorality versus criminality 
Brain-based moral disorders appeared not only in medical discourse, but also as 
potential explanations for culprits’ misdoings. In some cases, the brain intruded in 
penal decision-making processes: in court, experts offered biomedical explanations for 
criminality. Especially in murder cases, this practice precipitated disagreement. If 
immorality and eventually criminality were neurological diseases and if the diseased 
had to be pardoned, then all criminals could claim to be at the mercy of their brains in 
order to avoid punishment. Moreover, contemporaries feared looming mass 
exoneration due to the insanity defense in general (Smith, 1981). These fears were 
exacerbated by the fact that discriminating between immoral lunatics and mere 
criminals was problematic. Immorality due to brain-based insanity came in a variety of 
guises and cloaks. The insinuated brain malfunction affected only isolated parts of the 
misdemeanants’ personalities – that is, their moral capabilities in certain situations – 
while their perception, reasoning and other social capabilities remained sound. This 
narrowness of the moral defect made the distinction between brain-based immorality 
and criminality even more problematic. 
The experts’ contradicting interpretations of Guiteau’s and Toppan’s mental 
conditions illustrated that a mutually agreed-on demarcation criterion was wanting. As 
a consequence of this arbitrariness, the respective experts destined Toppan to the 
asylum and Guiteau to the gallows. However, contemporary experts were wary 
regarding this issue of tenuous diagnoses. For example, Tuke warned that for attesting 
moral insanity careful consideration of the individual circumstances was indispensable 
(Tuke, 1885b). Other experts rejected the distinction between badness and madness 
altogether. Bleuler used E.’s case to argue for the inadequate demarcation between 





Rethinking immoral persons in terms of bad brains 
 
 
In the above cases, thinking of immoral persons in terms of disordered brains altered 
what it means to be immoral. Though contested, the immoral persons discussed were 
conceived of as viable objects for brain science, psychiatry and medicine: their 
misdoings were observed on a behavioral level, their actions were evaluated with 
ethical  standards  and  they  were  punished  according  to  the  law.  Observation, 
evaluation and reprimand were part of the social purview, yet the respective experts 
sought the causes for their misconduct in their neurobiology. In that sense, these 
immoral persons were understood as hybrids composed of individual, social, ethical, 
but also neurobiological features. They retained their moral qualities, but biology was 
added as a potent influence on their moral nature. This extension abridged and 
augmented these immoral persons at the same time. On the one hand, ascribing moral 
qualities to the brain reduced part of the personhood to cerebral functioning (see also 
Vidal, 2009). Accordingly, their moral agency and self-determination were curbed. 
Their brains were beyond their control. This divested them of having reasons for their 
immoral behavior, as natural causes putatively determined it. On the other hand, the 
neurobiological purview augmented these immoral persons. Their brain architecture, 
their biochemical composition and their hereditary make-up were now integral parts 
of their moral being. A new domain of biological predisposing and eliciting conditions 
was added to their personhood and their moral state. 
When it took place, this transformation of immoral persons had multifaceted 
and far-reaching consequences. With the alteration of their anthropological status, 
specific ways of exonerating or dooming arose. Considering immoral behavior to be 
the consequence of an insane brain divested immoral persons of responsibility in a 
twofold way. First, the brain as a part of nature could not be held accountable. 
Second, persons being subjected to disease were not liable either. Nature and disease 
prevented the ascription of responsibility and guilt to immoral persons. In other 
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words: blaming the sick or the brain was vacuous. Scholars in the 19th-century were 
aware of these consequences. Some warned of unwarranted absolution through 
disorder and rejected this model of responsibility (Smith, 1981). Others were wary of 
determinism and the associated incapacitation of immoral persons (Rosenberg, 1968). 
Yet aside from looming exculpation, understanding immoral persons as being 
determined by their brain is also dooming. The brain became a new personal risk 
factor that abode by its own neurobiological rules. An affliction of the brain could 
lead to a distortion of a person’s morality. If this affliction was permanent, then the 
potentiality for change was limited or even non-existent. Consequently, immoral 
persons were unalterable and remained wicked until death (see N. Rose, 2007). 
Ramifications for the penal system ensued. As experts of the biomedical profession 
took the stage to assess, judge and counsel immoral persons, their legal status had to 
be reassessed. If immorality was a feature of the brain and thus beyond immoral 
persons’  control,  the  institutional  decision  to  transform  delinquents  into  prison 
inmates and the mentally disordered into patients needed reworking. 
To summarize, these controversies mirror the discourse on immoral persons at 
the end of the 19th-century. In the foreground, certain experts diagnosed immoral 
persons with specific brain-based diseases of morality. In the background, 
disagreement loomed on the conflation of badness, madness and the brain. Despite 




A new controversy: A contemporary case 
 
 
Now meet Brian Dugan: kidnapper, rapist and murderer. In contemporary Chicago, 
USA, neuroscientist Kent Kiehl examined Dugan’s brain with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and testified in court that its patterns of activation 
resembled those of other psychopaths (Hughes, 2010; G. Miller, 2012). The respective 






result from brain dysfunction. The allegedly hampered functioning of his brain was 
presented as a mitigating condition in court: the neurobiological allegedly interfered 
with the ethical. 
In the century that stands between Dugan and Bigg, Guiteau, Toppan, E. and 
Edmunds neurobiological views on the immoral person did not play a major role in 
scientific discourse. Ideas on biology and morality surfaced in diverse contexts: 
eugenics and race-ideology in the Third Reich (Wetzell, 2000), sociobiology (e.g. 
Wilson, 1975) and interdisciplinary debates (Stent, 1978). The reasons for their 
marginal role need further investigation (but see Schirmann, 2013b). Verplaetse (2009) 
argued that brain-based theories on morality gave way to more psychological views 
around 1930 because of continuing criticism and unresolved controversy. For the 
American context, historians stated that biological explanations for being human did 
not fare well with the changing political climate at the beginning of the 20th-century 
(Cravens, 1978; Degler, 1991). 
Contrary to its reduced relevance in the past century, the neuroscience of the 
immoral person has become en vogue in recent years (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). In 
the present brain culture (Thornton, 2011), there is an abundance of neuroscience- 
based niches for human identity. Various sorts of people are rendered intelligible in 
terms of their brains (Dumit, 2004; Ortega & Vidal, 2011). The immoral person being 
subject to a disordered brain represents such an option for being human; Brian Dugan 
epitomizes it. At first sight, Dugan’s case appears familiar in the light of the historical 
cases. However, the contexts (historical, cultural, political, administrative, scientific, 
etc.) differ. In the present, hereditary explanations for mental disorder or immoral 
behavior are less salient (but see Raine, 1993) and present genetics and old heredity 
are not similar (Müller-Wille & Rheinberger, 2012). Moreover, modern methods and 
technologies, such as neuroimaging, allow for an assessment of the living brain, 
whereas  in  the  past  autopsies  decided  on  the  immoral  person’s  brain  state. 
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Neuroscientific theorizing has moved beyond the localization doctrine and its search 
for moral centers. Today, it is believed that the brain functions as a network, in which 
various areas interact in constituting morality (L. Young & Dungan, 2012). 
In addition, the present scientific project of describing, explaining and acting 
on immoral persons in terms of their disordered brains is a growing, but marginal, 
current that has not yet merged with the scientific mainstream. The underlying 
neuroscientific doctrine is contested and by no means universally agreed on in the 
scientific  community.  Other  views  on  the  moral  and  the  immoral  person  exist 
(Narváez & Lapsley, 2009; Noam, Wren, Nunner-Winkler, & Edelstein, 1993). Thus, 
present immoral persons are complex: they are not ‘flat characters’ in terms of their 
brains. The mental disorder label used (psychopathy) is contested (e.g. Mullen, 2007) 
and the neural underpinnings of morality remain elusive (e.g. L. Young & Dungan, 
2012). Furthermore, there is still no consistent, over-arching theory of the 
neurobiology  of  im-/morality  (Suhler  &  Churchland,  2011).  Though  the 
contemporary neuroscience of the immoral person is nascent only, the present surge 
in  brain-based  descriptions  of  being  human  and  the  associated  practices  of 
diagnosing, policing and potentially treating people in terms of their brains might 







First, the diagnosis of immorality due to brain disorder was an option at the end of 
the 19th-century; however, experts who made use of it faced strong criticism. Other 
experts challenged the underlying biological theory, the evidence in favor of the 
diagnoses as well as the diagnoses themselves. The resulting disagreement among 
experts is indicative of the tenuous standing neurobiological views on immorality had. 






psychiatry in which it was widely acknowledged that mental disorder is brain disorder, 
brain-based views about the immoral person were contested. 
Second, the neurobiological frames for the mentioned immoral persons were 
diverse. Diagnoses reflected the experts’ specific training and preference. Depending 
on the given context and individual convictions, the experts made use of specific 
brain-based explanations for immorality in their patients. The details of these 
assessments differed and indicate that a unified view about immorality and the brain 
did not exist among supporters of the idea. Moreover, empirical evidence for immoral 
brains was scarce and contested. As a consequence brain dysfunction was alluded to 
rather than demonstrated. 
Third, the emphasis on an immoral person’s adverse neurobiological 
constituents indicated changes in thinking about immoral persons at the end of the 
19th-century. This framing abridged and augmented the immoral person’s 
anthropological status, resulting in a hybrid immoral being whose ethical prowess is 
partly determined by neurobiological factors. The associated prioritizing of the brain 
enabled a  specific  group  of experts  that promulgated  the  unity  of  neurobiology, 
mental disorder and immorality to gauge a person’s moral status. Accordingly, the 
immoral  person  could  be  framed  as  both:  a  person  and  a  culprit as  well  as  an 
organism and a patient. This diversity of identity had repercussions for the immoral 
person’s legal status. The brain-disordered immoral person posed a problem for 
discourses on responsibility, culpability, punishment and custody. 
Fourth, current views on the neurobiology of immorality share some of the 
 
features of these late 19th-century views, but differ in important respects. The brain is 
invoked differently now when compared with the past. The details of brain-based 
explanations for immoral mind and behavior vary, reflecting contemporary 
neuroscientific methods and theories. Yet, the transformation in what it means to be 
immoral that was brought about by thinking of immorality as an attribute of the brain 
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remains viable and still poses a challenge to discourses on moral agency and legal 
responsibility. The associated question whether brain science can mediate the 
justification for the decision between prison and asylum has been the source for 
discussions in the past and present (Kroeber, 2007; Schleim, 2012). 
To conclude, the histories of the described immoral persons and their 
disordered brains present themselves as histories of discord. They are a composition 
of intensive academic argument, polymorphic etiologies and shifting nosologies, as 
well as immoral persons with heterogeneous identities, debatable scientific labels and 
putative brain-based constituents for immorality. As the persistent controversy on the 
neurobiology of im-/morality makes clear, harmony has not yet been attained. The 
coherence from disordered brains to insanity to immoral persons remains contested: 
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This  article  analyzes  brain  scientists’  attempts  to  trace  morality  in  the  brain  in 
Germany from 1930 to 1960. The debate around Karl Kleist’s localization of the 
Gemeinschafts-Ich [community-I] in the 1930s is depicted in order to illustrate the 
central arguments for and against localizations of morality. The focus of this article is 
on the period 1936–1960 in which experts put forth specific ideas on morality’s 
cerebral underpinnings that mirror the larger theoretical shift from strict localization 
doctrine to a more holistic understanding of the brain. As a result of this shift, experts 
avoided exact localizations of morality. Instead, they posited correlations between 
brain areas and morality. The analysis illustrates the dependence of neuropathological 
research on morality on general theories of brain functioning and marks a first 









Modern neuroscience ventures to trace morality in the brain since around the year 
 
2000. Neuroimaging technologies offer glimpses into the brains of moral agents and 
neuroscientific evidence on criminals' brains features in court cases (Fumagalli & 
Priori, 2012; Hughes, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). However, brain science's quest 
to study morality is much older. Throughout the last 200 years, brain researchers 
made various attempts to describe, map, and dissect morality, yielding speculations on 
moral centers, criminals’ aberrant cytoarchitecture, and postencephalitic moral insanity 
(Verplaetse, 2009). This line of research was subject to controversy in the scientific 
community. To many experts, morality, along with other higher mental functions, lay 
beyond the capabilities of brain science. Consequently, there were disputes over 
research methods, the validity of data and the proposed neuronal basis of morality. 
For example, at the end of the nineteenth century, experts assailed and even ridiculed 
colleagues who proposed localizations of morality (e.g. Verplaetse, 2004). Thus, the 
history of the brain science of morality provides an intriguing example of brain 
science’s borderland and scientists’ boldness. 
In the past, the brain science of morality was marginal; just as its history. To 
 
the best of my knowledge, aside from Verplaetse’s (2009) seminal work which starts 
its coverage around 1800 and fades out in the 1930s, historians of science have not 
explicitly dealt with the topic. Verplaetse identified a “rupture” (p. 27) – a major 
transition in scientific thinking – around 1930. This “crisis” (p. 27) was characterized 
by increased skepticism regarding neurobiological views on morality and an associated 
take-over of psychologists and sociologists, who framed morality as a social 
phenomenon. As a consequence of this transition, brain science of morality became 
even rarer. However, the period after 1930 remains unaddressed. In order to offer a 
first contribution to this neglected topic in the history of neuroscience, this paper 
analyzes neuropathologists’ attempts to study morality in the brain in Germany in the 
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years 1930 to 1960. In this period, several experts searched for cerebral correlates of 
moral behavior, studied moral lapses after frontal brain lesion or posited the existence 
of brain-based disorders of decency and ethical ability. This research coincided with a 
more general debate on brain functioning. Old-fashioned localization doctrine – that 
is, the idea that the brain is organized in distinct modules corresponding to specific 
functions – was challenged by holistic understandings that stressed the integrated 
functioning of the whole brain (Finger, 1994; Harrington, 1996). Correspondingly, 
attempts to trace morality in the brain at that time reflected the tension between these 
antagonistic theories (see below). 
In this paper, I show that there were efforts to study morality in the brain after 1930. 
In order to set the stage for this, I describe the debate following Karl Kleist’s 
localization  of  the  Gemeinschafts-Ich  [community-I]  in  the  1930s,  scrutinize  the 
criticisms, and analyze the ensuing dispute that echoed through the following decades. 
The focus of this paper is on the period 1936-1960 in which experts put forth specific 
ideas on morality’s cerebral underpinnings that mirror the larger theoretical shift from 
strict localization doctrine to a more holistic understanding of the brain. As a result of 
this shift, experts avoided exact localizations of morality. Instead they posited 
correlations between brain areas and morality. I analyze the neuropathology of the 
moral brain  in  light of  this  transition by depicting the surrounding debate.  This 
analysis illustrates the dependence of attempts to trace morality on general theories of 
brain functioning and offers a first contribution to the history of the neuroscience of 
morality for the time after 1930. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In order to constitute the 
historical background, the situation in German brain science and brain-based morality 
research around 1930 is depicted. Special attention is paid to the localization doctrine 
as method and theory. Then Kleist’s localization of morality is presented and the 






attempts. As a next step, researchers’ efforts to study morality in the brain in the 
period from 1936 to 1960 are described and contextualized with the more general 
debate on brain functioning. In conclusion, the transformation from localizing moral 






Politics, German Brain Science, Localization Doctrine, 
Morality: The Situation around 1930 
 
The political and scientific climate in Germany changed dramatically several times 
between 1930 and 1960 (Vom Bruch & Kaderas, 2002). In these times of upheaval, 
German brain scientists had to deal with Nazi politics and race ideology, the expulsion 
of Jewish and dissident colleagues, inadequate research conditions during the Second 
World War, and later isolation from their international colleagues (Peiffer, 1998; 
Peiffer, 2004). From 1933 to 1945, large-scale ties between the Nazi regime and 
neurology and psychiatry existed (Schmuhl, 1987; Weindling, 1989). The Nazi Party’s 
political and private control restricted scientific freedom and demanded allegiance of 
scientists. Despite these constraints, brain science continued throughout the war and 
there was room to maneuver for scientists (Roelcke, 2008; Roelcke, 2010). 
Along with the political developments came a rise and subsequent decline of 
biological  theories  for  behavior,  mental  disorder,  and  alleged  inferiority.  Neuro- 
/biological theories had been in demise since around 1900 (Shorter, 1997), but during 
the period of Nazi rule, they experienced an unprecedented popularity. Claims about 
inferior biology were central to Nazi race ideology, eugenics, and bio-criminology 
(Schott,  2002;  Wetzell,  2000).7   With  the  end  of  Nazi  rule,  the  race-based  views 
vanished (Roelcke, 2005). Aside from these external developments, an internal battle 
between neurologists and psychiatrists had divided the scientific community in the 
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years after the turn of the centuries (Engstrom, 2003; Roelcke, 2002). The significance 
of the brain for mind and behavior was among the topics that caused continuing 
disagreement. Psychiatrists were skeptical of brain-based explanations for mental 
disorder and sought independence from the neurologists. In 1935, the Nazi rulers 
ordered the establishment of a joined society for both, but the tensions between 
disciples of the two disciplines did not abate. 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the First World War brought 
numerous  patients  with  head  wounds  under  the  eyes  of  brain  scientists.  The 
abundance  of  cases  boosted  neuropathology.  The  brain  injuries  were  manifold: 
degree, location, and associated symptoms varied considerably. As a consequence, a 
plethora of patients with diverse lesions and psychological dysfunctions, along with a 
multitude of expert's opinions formed a highly-confusing puzzle. Yet, seminal 
neuropathological work was based on these cases in the interwar years (Feuchtwanger, 
1923;  Poppelreuter,  1917;  von  Schjerning,  1922/1934).  This  work  was  largely 
 











Localization doctrine played a dominant role in brain scientists’ theorizing since the 
time of the great localizations (e.g. speech center and motor cortex) in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. However, the doctrine was contested since its inception. 
Especially the localization of higher mental functions spurred scientists’ disagreement 
(Finger, 1994; Hagner, 2008; R. M. Young, 1970). To understand the debate depicted 
in the remainder of the paper a closer look at the localization doctrine – as a theory 






The key tenet of localization doctrine as a theory consisted in the 
“fragmentation of the psyche” (Hagner, 2008 p. 20) or “decomposition” (Riese & 
Hoff, 1950 p. 63) – that is, the division of the psyche into independent units. It was 
assumed that these psychological units could be assigned to circumscribed 
neuroanatomical  counterparts,  with  a  differing  degree  of  rigor  ranging  from 
correlation to strict correspondence. Accordingly, several versions of the localization 
doctrine co-existed that varied regarding their spatial rigidity. The strictest and most 
controversial version posited “‘punctuate’ or ‘point-to-point’ localization of nervous 
function” (Riese & Hoff, 1951 p. 452) – that is, the exact matching of certain 
psychological capacities with distinct neuroanatomical centers. As a method, the 
localization doctrine proceeded by observing psychological dysfunction after brain 
damage or brain stimulation and charting the respective cerebral location. Several 
approaches helped to pinpoint brain regions: Staining methods to identify particular 
tissue in autopsy, electro-stimulation of certain regions, induced brain ablations in 
animals, and the observation of specific psychological dysfunction after lesions in 
humans.  Generally,  the  observation  of  a  coincidence  of  a  defined  lesion  with  a 
specific dysfunction was central. Based on the location of the lesion, the cerebral 
location of the (unimpaired) psychological function was then inferred. As Tizard 
(1959 p. 143) put it: “A lesion at X produces symptom T. This represents damage to 
the psychological trait Z which must be localized at X.” Interwoven in this “logic of 
deletion” (Star, 1989 p. 12) is the primacy of spatial information over, say, temporal 
information (Riese, 1967). Moreover, the design of localization theory rested on this 
reasoning method and its implicit assumptions: Circumscribed brain areas, modularity 
of psychological capacities, associated distinct malfunction, and the combining 
inference structure formed a stencil upon which localization theory was modeled. 
Close  ties  existed  between  the  tool  and  the  theory  (see  Gigerenzer,  1991).  In 
summary, two claims were inherent in the localization doctrine: an ontological claim 
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concerning the existence of distinct brain centers representing specific psychological 
functions  and  an  epistemic  claim  regarding  the  reasoning  from  lesions  to  intact 
centers. 
A specific objection against the localization doctrine surfaced at the beginning 
of the twentieth century in German-speaking brain science. Constantin von Monakow 
and Kurt Goldstein assailed the crudeness of the doctrine and called for a 
reformulation. According to them, the brain functioned as an integrated whole rather 
than as a bundle of isolated units. This holistic position emerged as an influential 
alternative theory of brain functioning in the German debates after 1900 (Isler, 2010; 
Harrington, 1996; Riese, 1967; see also Ash, 1995). Although the localization doctrine 
in general was challenged, extenuated versions of it persisted. For example, Hans 
Berger (1923) endorsed strict localizations, but along with others he questioned the 
rigidity of the divisions between the brains’ putative centers. The associated debate on 
the validity of the doctrine ranged from the microscopic (cytoarchitecture) to the 
macroscopic level (large brain areas) (Peiffer, 2004). Despite the growing controversy, 






Traces of Morality in the Brain 
 
 
While the debate on the localization doctrine smoldered around 1930, some brain 
scientists searched for traces of morality in the brain. Relating human capabilities to 
brain composition was not uncommon at the time. For example, a current in brain 
science studied the brains of the elite and criminals (Hagner, 2004). Contemporary 
researchers followed multiple tracks of brain-based morality; not only in Germany: 
British, American, and French experts made efforts to understand the neuro-/biology 






1921; Yawger, 1935) or to research the conspicuous ethical breaches evinced by 
patients with Encephalitis lethargica (Verplaetse, 2009). The various experts used the 
term morality (or cognates) ambiguously. It could refer to outright criminal offences, 
exuberance,  disinhibition,  tactlessness,  egotism,  a  lack  of  remorse,  or  minor 
indecency. The diversity of socially deviant behaviors studied as neuropathological or 
bio-medical phenomena was striking. 
In Germany, several scientific approaches to link deviancy, immorality, or 
criminality  to  biology  in  general  or  the  brain  in  particular  co-existed.  Bio- 
criminologists studied the heritability of criminal tendencies, leading to the 
controversially discussed sterilization and killing of criminals during the Nazi regime 
(Wetzell,  2000).  Psychiatrists  researched  the  genetics  of  mental  disorders 
accompanying  immorality,  such  as  moral  feeblemindedness  [moralischer 
Schwachsinn] (Dubitscher, 1935) , Kurt Schneider's compassionless [gemütlos] 
psychopathy, or Karl Birnbaum's amoral psychopathy (Werlinder, 1978). Certain 
experts speculated on a cerebral basis for moral insanity; a disorder marked by moral 
lapses  without  impairment  of  the  intellect.8   Yet,  only  few  brain  injured  showed 
“severe  character  changes  in  terms  of  ‘moral  insanity’  ”  (Scheid,  1939  p.  270). 
Although this controversial disorder was becoming outdated by the 1930s, the debate 
on it highlighted a significant distinction: Immorality as congenital mental disorder 
was different from acquired immorality resulting from brain damage (Glaser, 1932). 
How did neuropathologists account for immorality after traumas, lesions, or tumors? 
Experts knew since the nineteenth century that brain damage could lead to 
 
undesirable character changes. Tumors or trauma to the frontal lobes were associated 
with disinhibition, euphoria, indecency, and apathy (Finger, 1994). For example, Welt 
(1888) suggested a connection between indecent and immoral behaviors and 
destruction of the right orbital region. Several other researchers documented cases of 
patients’ immorality after frontal brain damage (Feuchtwanger, 1923; Grünthal, 1936; 
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Pfeifer, 1928a; Pfeifer, 1928b; Ruffin, 1939; Schuster, 1902). However, hardly any 
researcher pinpointed morality’s cerebral position. The case material was too 
heterogeneous, the locations of the suspicious brain damage varied, and only some 
patients evinced immoral conduct. Despite this lack of clarity, one prominent brain 






Kleist’s Localization of Morality and its Critics 
 
 
Karl Kleist was Professor of Psychiatry in Frankfurt and an important figure in 
German  brain  science.  His  research  on  neuropathology  and  his  neuropsychiatric 
system were seminal (Neumärker & Bartsch, 2003). Kleist (1934) had written a 
standard work on brain pathology9 based on macroscopical considerations of brain 
injuries from the First World War. In it, he localized Funktionskreise des Ichs [functional 
circuits of the I]. He identified a Gefühls-Ich [Emotional-I], a Trieb-Ich [Drive-I], a 
Körper-Ich [Body-I], a Selbst-Ich [Self-I], a Welt oder religiöses-Ich [World or Religious-I], 
and a Gemeinschafts-Ich [Community-I]. He added that “each can sicken on its own, and 
thus must represent a physiological unit, which has distinct anatomical carriers” (p. 
1169). Most important for the analysis here, the community-I corresponded to 
“fidelity, gratefulness, helpfulness, friendship and hostility, mistrust and spitefulness, 
need for recognition, imperiousness and obedience” and the “ethical attitudes and 
their expression” (p. 1169). Kleist localized the community-I in both sides of the 
orbital brain10 and thus assigned a cerebral position to morality. 
Kleist presented his work on the structured I at a meeting of the German 
Psychiatric and Neurological Society in 1936 (Kleist, 1937a).11  The reception of his 
talk was caustic. His colleagues assailed the notion of localization in general and 
Kleist’s reasoning method in particular. Friedrich Quensel, Professor for Psychiatry 






functions is much harder, almost impossible, especially if one considers how 
incomplete and vague our knowledge and notions of the nature and the limits of 
higher mental functions generally is” (Miscellaneous, 1937 p. 331). Many attendees 
shared this distrust in the capabilities of neuropathology and considered Kleist's 
attempts as premature. Moreover, the commentators voiced scathing criticism against 
Kleist’s reasoning. Johannes Lange, Professor of Psychiatry in Wroclaw, cited 
Hughlings Jackson’s famous distinction between a localization of symptoms and a 
localization of functions (“To locate the damage which destroys speech and to locate 
the speech are two different things.” (cited in Lange, 1937 p. 250)); Lange accused 
Kleist of conflating symptoms with functions. It was bad logic to reason from a 
localizable psychological dysfunction (a negative) to the location of a psychological 
function (a positive). Accordingly, one cannot infer the existence of centers. This 
‘negative argument’ reverberated through many other comments. The “logic of 
deletion” (see above) was flawed. Oswald Bumke, Emil Kraepelin’s successor on the 
Chair for Psychiatry in Munich, claimed that if one proceeded according to Kleist’s 
argumentation one could reason from the cutting of the optic nerve to the location of 
the visual center in the optic nerve itself; which was evidently preposterous. In 
addition, the arbitrary rigidity of Kleist’s categorization of the I did not fare well with 
his colleagues. In his second comment, Bumke objected to Kleist’s reification of the 
structured I: “I cannot get rid of the impression that one wants to play Tennis with 
soap bubbles” (Miscellaneous, 1937 p. 330). Hugo Spatz (1937), on the verge of 
becoming Director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for brain research in Berlin, was 
concerned regarding Kleist’s “dissection of the psyche” (p. 230). Spatz endorsed the 
idea of localizations of psychological functions. He had witnessed striking character 
changes in a patient with destroyed orbital lobes (Bostroem & Spatz, 1929) and in 
others with Pick’s disease. According to Spatz, particularly the destruction of the 
frontal pole of the neocortex (Brodman area 10, 11, and 47) disturbed the “highest 
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mental functions” (Spatz, 1937 p. 212). In addition, the described region was the 
phylogenetically youngest part of the brain and thus a candidate for the specifically 
human functions. Although Kleist received some support from Spatz, a majority of 
the attendees rejected Kleist’s ideas. 
Kleist retorted: “How can one consider me capable of such nonsense?” (Kleist, 
 
1937b p. 340). He disavowed that he was a localizer and emphasized the tentativeness 
of his findings. In this context, Kleist identified with an extenuated version of the 
localization doctrine. He suggested a “connection of certain functions and 
malfunctions  not  to  specific  places,  but  [to]  partly  large-scale  or  widespread 
formations of the nervous system” (p. 337) and adhered to a “general biological 
principle of division of labor in the nervous system, [that is,] the allocation of diverse 
functions  to  diverse  organ  parts”  (p.  337).  So  there  were  no  centers  and  no 
localization of morality? It can be doubted that Kleist meant what he said. The 
wording  in  his  publications  suggests  that  he  was  a  staunch  believer  in  strict 
localization doctrine (see Kleist, 1934; Kleist, 1935; Kleist, 1937a). Furthermore, 
Walther Riese,  Historian  of  Neurology  and former student of  Kleist,  considered 
Kleist to be one of the last true localizers (Riese, 1959; see also Uttal, 2001). 
After the disappointing conference, Kleist continued his impressive career 
(Neumärker & Bartsch, 2003). His ideas on the structured I featured popularly in the 
following decades' publications. Although his localization of morality attracted little 
attention in the years to come, it still inspired reverie and fruitful follow-up work as 
well as more criticism. In a letter, Kurt Schneider, then Head of the Clinical 
Department at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Munich, wrote to Karl Jaspers, 
Philosopher and Author of a standard work on psychopathology, it is stated that 
“[o]ne is allowed to say that Kleist's localization theory stands aside from clinical 






localizations of higher mental functions decried as mythology in the decades to come? 





Tracing morality in the brain: 1936-1960 
 
 
In 1936, Hertha Cosack, who worked with Lange in Breslau, published a paper titled 
“criminal personality change due to frontal brain damage” (Cosack, 1936). In a suicide 
attempt, her patient had shot himself through the forebrain from right to left. His 
relatives reported alarming personality changes, consisting in moral lapses, indecency, 
and callousness, yet no intellectual deficits. A year later, Lemke (1937) explained the 
brazenness of one of his patients with a tumor on both sides of the orbital brain as a 
“dysfunction of the community-I” (p. 65). Though rare, these character changes after 
impairment of the orbital brain were acknowledged as a specific neuropathological 
syndrome (see also Pittrich, 1941). The patients “become childish, superficial, silly, 
tend to scoffing and joking, are erratic and weak [haltlos], often also egoistic, spiteful, 
indecent and shameless, take liberties with morality, are agitated and occasionally 
criminal” (Duus,  1939  p.  646).  Another  expert  summarized  the patients’ 
transformation as follows: 
 
“Sick persons with injuries and tumors in the orbital brain provide the most 
glaring  examples  of  acquired  callousness  [Gemütlosigkeit]  loss  of  all  finer 
moral, social and esthetic impulses, of raw unrestrained drive [Triebhafigkeit]. 
Previously inconspicuous people conform to callous [gemütlos] psychopaths, 
cases of 'moral insanity', lose shame and sense of honor, compassion, 
consideration for others, turn indecent, dishonest, neglect their duties, commit 
crimes.” (von Baeyer, 1941 p. 25) 
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These shifts in moral behavior had been known for several decades (see above). Then, 
Welt (1888), Kleist (1934) and others had categorized these phenomena by using 
versions of the localization doctrine. Did researchers in the 1930s follow suit? 
Maximinian de Crinis, convinced National Socialist and Head of the Psychiatric 
Clinic in Berlin (see H. Jasper, 1991), proclaimed that “that, what we name with the 
often incorrectly used word morality, is also a function of the brain” (de Crinis, 1938 
p. 426). Yet, he was skeptical of Kleist’s idea that morality could be pinpointed in the 
frontal brain. First, he challenged that lesions to the lower part of the frontal brain 
yielded immorality in all cases. Second, he claimed that the brain areas responsible for 
“Gesittung” [civilized mode of behavior; morality] (p. 435) were dispersed over the 
entire brain. Thus, de Crinis rejected the determinism associated with the localization 
doctrine as well as its notion of discrete brain centers. Joachim-Ernst Meyer (1940), a 
staff member of de Crinis, agreed. Although he acknowledged the existence of 
“orbitofrontal deficit beings”13 (p. 371) and their ethical breaches, he believed that an 
exact localization of morality was impossible. However, an identification of the 
different neuronal elements on which morality depended, such as the interbrain, could 
be achieved. In this view, morality originated in several brain regions. The frontal 
brain as Kleist’s main candidate for morality began to lose brain scientists’ confidence. 
At the time, the frontal brain was an object of dispute (Filley, 2010). Brain 
scientists still analyzed the cases from the First World War (Scheid, 1939) and tried to 
account for the “myriad of deficits” (Finger, 1994 p. 325) that was associated with 
lesions to this region. A majority of the experts agreed that destruction of the frontal 
brain rarely led to deficits in intelligence and memory. However, experts observed 
diverse transformations in impulse, mood, temperament, and personality (Rylander, 
1939). Incomprehension abounded. In a review on the frontal brain syndrome, Ruffin 
(1939) listed the diverse psychological dysfunctions ranging from euphoria, moria or 






Corresponding to this wealth of psychological impairments was the elusive statement 
that the frontal brain had “a particularly human function” (Ruffin, 1939 p. 58). A 
proposition that accounted for the complexity came from Goldstein (1934), who 
suggested an impairment of the general ability to abstract in frontal lesion patients. 
Others declared the frontal lobes to be the source for general drive (e.g. Beringer, 
1941). These diverging propositions show how far from being settled the matter was: 
 
Cases were abundant and the psychological dysfunctions diverse. The number of 
brain injured further increased with the Second World War. After it, 150,000 brain 
injured were registered in Germany (Lindenberg, 1950). Again, this case material 
proofed invaluable for brain scientists and spurred new interest in brain pathology and 
localization questions (Bay, 1947; Heygster, 1949). 
In addition to the war cases, the practice of leucotomy produced numerous 
patients with instructive lesions. Though never a widespread therapeutic tool in 
Germany, German brain scientists frequently commented on the practice, its 
neuroanatomical   fundaments,   and   the   lessons   learned   from   it.   The   surgical 
intervention and the brain areas destroyed varied in leucotomy, but the majority 
involved ablating parts of the frontal brain or its connections (Hassler, 1950; 
Valenstein, 1986). Some surgeons specifically targeted the orbital brain (e.g. Knight & 
Tredgold, 1955; Ström-Olsen & Northfield, 1955). If Kleist was right, then destroying 
this area was tantamount to destroying morality. Though Kleist himself objected to 
psychosurgery   (cf.   Valenstein,   1986   p.   217-218),   other   researchers   used   his 
localization  of  the  structured  I  to  make  sense  of  the  psychological  effects  of 
leucotomy in anatomical terms (Barahona Fernandes, 1950; Walch, 1956). 
Furthermore, surgeons reported alleviation of psychotic symptoms after operating on 
the orbital brain, yet side-effects, among them apathy, lack of self-criticism and loss of 
ethical inhibition occurred occasionally. The character changes in the leucotomized 
resembled  the  moral  lapses  of  the  orbital  lesion  patients  and  were  used  as  an 
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argument against this anatomical therapy (Haddenbrock, 1949; Haddenbrock, 1952; 
Stoll, 1954). Operating on the frontal brain to some was “a crude almost childish 
endeavor” (Glees, 1949 p. 220). 
In general, character changes after lesion formed the main line of evidence in 
attempts to trace morality in the brain around the middle of the twentieth century in 
Germany – with one exception. In 1951, Oskar Vogt, then aging doyen of brain 
science and beyond his zenith, published a paper addressing cytoarchitectural 
differences in murderers. According to him, immorality expressed itself in a peculiar 
cell alignment in the lamina pyramidalis of the cortex.14  However, this type of 
microscopical analysis was not used widely in attempts to uncover morality’s cerebral 
underpinnings. Rather the neuropathological method, as Kleist had applied it, formed 
the basis for further publications on morality in the brain in the 1950s. Objections to 
this method and its theoretical basis were frequent. 
Researchers  had  registered  inconsistencies  and  a  lack  of  exactitude  in 
localization questions since the 1930s. The goal of a precise mapping of higher mental 
functions on distinct anatomical counterparts repeatedly failed and researchers more 
and more curbed their aspirations. For example, Eberhard Bay, later to become 
Professor of Neurology in Düsseldorf, commented “pushing precision in brain 
pathology  too  far  necessarily  leads  to  pseudo-exactitude”  (1947  p.  300).  Bay 
repeatedly attacked the localization doctrine as a methodological tool and as a theory 
of brain functioning (Bay, 1941; Bay, 1947; Bay, 1951; Bay, 1953). To him, the 
existence  of  areas  for  higher  mental  functions  was  an  axiom,  not  the  result  of 
empirical tests. Just because motor functions could neatly be mapped on the motor 
cortex, the inference by analogy that such circumscribed areas existed for other 
psychological functions did not automatically hold true. Thus, deficits after lesions 
had to be interpreted differently: A lesion in the frontal areas did not destroy an 






meant that immoral patients did not lack a specific moral brain area and that morality 
was scattered over the whole brain. Acknowledgment of these objections was visible 
in research on brain-based morality in the 1950s (see below). 
Ernst Kretschmer, Professor in Tübingen (see Priwitzer, 2007), addressed 
morality in the brain on multiple occasions. In the 1920s, Kretschmer (1921) had 
devised a psychopathological system based on different body types. For each body 
type, the interplay of psychological factors and biological constitution yielded specific 
characteristics and disorders. In later versions of the respective monograph, 
Kretschmer posited relations between bodily constitution and crime (Kretschmer, 
1955). A sideline in his argument rested upon observations on patients with lesions in 
the orbital and interbrain. In 1949, Kretschmer dedicated a paper to Kleist in which 
he formulated the concepts “sphärische Integrierung” [spherical integration] and 
“dynamische Steuerung” [dynamic control] (p. 470). It described the integration of pre- 
conscious, inhibitory, and general-affective representations of a given situation with 
the action required in that situation. This integration was disrupted in orbital brain 
patients, leading gradually to indecency and in severe cases to “loss of ethical control” 
(Kretschmer, 1949 p. 471). Moral behavior here had a twofold source: the orbital 
brain and the interbrain. Kleist himself had speculated on the significance of the 
interbrain for character (Kleist, 1934). In a later publication titled “The social and 
moral defect as biological problem”, Kretschmer maintained that specific kinds of 
ethical disinhibition as a result of unchecked drives originated only from isolated 
lesions in certain brain locations – that is, orbital brain, interbrain, and brain stem 
(Kretschmer, 1953a). He expounded “[t]he majority of these drive disorders lead to 
contact disorders with the environment, sociological problems but also to criminal 
lapses” (p. 32). In two other publications, Kretschmer elaborated on the link between 
brain lesion and criminality: Minute brain damage evaded the eye of the untrained 
physician and could precipitate criminal behavior, resulting in a misinterpretation of 
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the brain injured as merely criminal. Thus, neuro-psychiatric knowledge was essential 
for the legal assessment of criminals (Kretschmer, 1953b; Kretschmer, 1954). Despite 
the proclamation of clear-cut connections between brain damage and immoral 
behavior, Kretschmer was not an old-fashioned localizer. Localization to Kretschmer 
signified a division of labor in the brain, but not the existence of distinct centers. 
Furthermore, he understood localization as a statistical problem with correlations 
between lesions and dysfunction showing only on a large-scale data level (Kretschmer, 
1956). This statistical understanding of localization was predicated on the observation 
that individual brains differed. Anatomical variation was not an anomaly and direct 
comparability  of  brains  not  a  fulfilled  precondition.  Thus  a  prerequisite  for 
generalizing with the “logic of deletion” was not given. A contemporary of 
Kretschmer, Schaltenbrand (1950), emphasized brains’ dissimilitude and advocated a 
statistical approach to localization. In his brain maps, he identified the frontal area and 
the tip of the temporal cortex as parts of a bipartite “Ich-Hirn” [I-brain]. Though 
Schaltenbrand did not pinpoint morality in the brain, he maintained that lesions to the 
frontal I-brain caused aimlessness, emotional blunting, a lack of self-criticism and 
suggestibility. 
The statistical approach to localization was a reaction to a persistent problem: 
Variability. Not all orbital lesion patients changed in character and only a few turned 
immoral. Experts’ descriptions and diagnoses differed. Hans Walter Gruhle, Director 
of the Psychiatric Clinic in Bonn and an outspoken opponent of the localization 




“If one reads: failure of the community-I emanates from the interbrain, failure 
of community ethos emanates from the orbital cortex – or: only ethos is of 






there the author conjures up completely unexplained notions, which stem from 
popular psychology and which can only breed misunderstanding.” (Gruhle, 




Gruhle’s attack against imprecise description of symptoms appeared justified (see also 
Gruhle, 1954). The descriptions and the symptoms themselves were indeed diverse. 
Yet consistent enough for some researchers to propose an independent syndrome – 
consisting in disinhibition, ruthlessness, and aggression after orbital brain lesion – 
dubbed “posttraumatic organic character change” (Faust, 1955a p. 1238). Why this 
certitude  amongst  the  ambiguity?  Statistically  orbital  lesions  patients  committed 
crimes more often than other lesion patients (Hoheisel, 1954; Lindenberg, 1950; 
Rehwald, 1956). In an analysis of 6600 lesion cases, Geller (1960) found that 14 per 
cent of the orbital lesion patients came into contact with the law. This was 10 per cent 
higher than the next group of lesion patients. Geller underscored that there was no 
“clear parallelism” between “anatomical and psychological changes” (p. 404); hence, 
no exact localization. Yet, the statistical results proofed reliable enough for 
correlational  ties  between  orbital  brain  lesion  and  criminality.  This  large-scale, 
statistical understanding of localization questions exemplified a new way to conceive 
of the ambiguity of neuropathological results. Inconsistent results had continuously 
posed a problem to the localization doctrine.15 For example, researchers tried to 
replicate Kleist’s localization of the Gemeinschafts-Ich with varying success, resulting 
in disbelief in the exactitude of localizations (Faust, 1955b; Heygster, 1949). Whereas 
experts in earlier times had quarreled over the implausibility of the results, brain 
scientists around the middle of the twentieth century presented this ambiguity as 
correlations: A lesion led to a dysfunction with a certain probability. This correlational 
understanding of the lesion-dysfunction-relation accommodated for the often found 
inconsistencies regarding morality’s neuronal basis. 
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Researchers more and more questioned the rigidity of Kleist’s localization and 
adapted his theory in the light of novel knowledge about the brain. Although in the 
1950s, his ideas still served as a guidepost. Hoheisel (1954) elaborated on Kleist’s 
localization and Kretschmer’s warning of undetected brain damage in criminals. He 
referred to a murderer in the 1930s who had suffered brain trauma during an accident. 
The murderer was executed and the autopsy revealed lesions in the right temporal, 
frontal and orbital brain. Hoheisel speculated that these lesions were responsible for 
the character changes that culminated in murder. The propensity of the brain injured 
to commit crimes was well known. According to Hans-Jochen Thelen, a staff member 
of Kretschmer in Tübingen, specific lesions corresponded with typical crimes: “So 
typical  that  we  are  almost  tempted  to  speak  of  the  act  of  a  frontal-orbital-  or 
interbrain injured” (Thelen, 1953 p. 237). Indeed, the crimes of these patients were 
special. Most often they were spontaneous, random, publicly conducted and readily 
admitted in interrogation. The simplicity and aimlessness of the crimes was striking. 
All  in  all,  this  indicated  a  lack  of  control  or  inhibition  rather  than  callous, 
premeditated  criminality  (Lindenberg,  1950;  Lindenberg,  1953).  Still,  legal 
responsibility became an issue: “The psychopathology of the frontal brain, particularly 
of the orbital brain, has always had an exceptional position in forensic assessment 
because lesions there lead to character changes that are especially suited to induce 
conflict with the law” (Leonhardt, 1956 p. 501). The “Bund der Hirnverletzten” [alliance 
for the brain injured] specifically endorsed the practice of consulting physicians’ 
professional opinion in law suits against brain injured soldiers from the wars. 
According to Paragraph 51 of the German Penal Code16, offenders were not legally 
responsible if they did not have insight into the illicit nature of their action or if they 
were unable to act upon that insight due to impaired consciousness, pathological 
disorder of mental action, or mental weakness (Ewald, 1959; Kroeber, 2007). On 






Although Kretschmer, Schaltenbrand, Hoheisel, Thelen, Lindenberg, and 
Leonhardt knew that destruction of the orbital brain frequently lead to immoral 
deeds, they did not infer a moral brain area from that. The strict inference from lesion 
to positive function was no longer justifiable as additional knowledge about brain 
functioning   rendered   this   reasoning   dubious.   Generally   speaking,   researchers 
reworked the connection between orbital brain damage, character changes, and 
immorality in the 1950s, adding nuances in understanding the cases. Thelen (1953) 
discussed one of these nuances in his paper on “brain injury and criminality”. One of 
his patients suffered from a persistent “destruction of the orbitally represented 
community-feelings” (1953 p. 237). Yet, in several of his other patients, he had 
observed a recovery of the disturbed psychological functions after a certain amount of 
time. He attributed this to the brain’s capacity to compensate for damage. Other brain 
areas could take over the functions of those destroyed and in the course of time the 
psychological impairments diminished or vanished completely. The temporal 
dimension also played a decisive role in the assessment of the lesions. As time 
progressed, the symptoms of the brain injured changed. Symptoms evident shortly 
after brain trauma differed from those in later stages. Thus, the assessment of the 
lesion and the associated psychological dysfunction depended on the point in time – 
and not exclusively on the location. Temporal information appeared to be just as 
important as spatial information. Hence, a careful consideration of the course of the 
impairment   was   necessary   (Faust,   1955b).   Neuronal   compensation   and   the 
significance of the temporal dimension in the assessment of lesions had been known 
since the beginning of the century (Riese, 1967), but it took several decades until this 
knowledge was properly integrated in the canon of brain science. The brain according 
to these qualifications is dynamic. This debilitated the classical “logic of deletion” 
since it reasoned from dysfunction to location without paying sufficient heed to time. 
There was no room for strict localizations of morality in a versatile brain. 
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Walch (1956) pointed to another peculiarity. He approved of Kleist’s 
identification of the community-I and emphasized the significance of the interbrain 
for moral control. At the same time, he stressed that the neuronal sources of character 
were dispersed over the entire brain. Accordingly, Walch did not conceive of the 
orbital brain as a center for morality, but assigned a guiding, inhibitory function to it. 
Here, an abstract function replaced a moral center. Moreover, Walch emphasized that 
the appearance and severity of the orbital brain syndrome depended on the premorbid 
personality. Hence, a brain lesion only exacerbated immoral character tendencies that 
had existed before. Again, pointing to prior wickedness was not completely new. In 
the 1930s, Schneider (1935), Duus (1939), and Scheid (1939) had called attention to 
the interplay between lesion and personality. These calls were amplified in the 1950s. 
Adding premorbid personality as a psychological variable accounted for some of the 
variability in character changes after orbital lesions. 
Owing to the above qualifications and criticisms, the faith in localizations had 
 
been fading since the 1930s. Holists and localizers were still vying for dominance in 
interpreting the functions of the frontal brain, but strict localizers lost ground 
(Heygster, 1949). One commentator identified a shift in neuropathology from 
“cerebrum pathology, psychology, localization doctrine” after the First World War to 
among other things “comprehensive work of wholeness” [Ganzheitsarbeit] after the 
Second World War (Birkmayer, 1951 p. V). Correspondingly, researchers accounted 
for organic character changes without inferring the existence of brain regions for 
character or morality (De Boor, 1951). Instead of exact localizations, brain scientists 
more and more aspired to the identification of a “constant relation” (Heygster, 1949 
p. 115) between psychological dysfunction and lesion location. This implied the 
devaluation of the localization doctrine as well as the rise of a new theory of brain 
functioning. In a review on the psychopathological work on the frontal brain from 






“holistic understandings of the frontal brain syndrome” (p. 238) for the period under 
review. Häfner proclaimed that Kleist’s localization suggested a false level of accuracy, 
did not stand the empirical test of the ensuing decades, and was thus to be considered 
obsolete. Moreover, Häfner stressed that an increment of research in the past years 
had accumulated a mass of contradictory data, yielding more uncertainty instead of a 
gain in knowledge. One thing was clear though: the golden times of the classical 
localization doctrine were over and its simplistic approach to brain functioning had to 
be denounced. Accordingly, lesions no longer destroyed centers, but disrupted a 
dynamic neuronal interplay. Assigning an exact location to morality made little sense 
in this theoretical framework. 
In consonance with this shift, researchers steered clear of localizations. Hugo 
Spatz, who had partly supported Kleist at the meeting in 1936, still pondered the 
consequences of orbital brain damage because “here man is struck in his intrinsic 
nature” (Spatz, 1965 p. 237). In a footnote to the respective text, he added that he 
intentionally avoided the use of the “misguiding term ‘localization’ ” (p. 237). Over 
the last two decades, Spatz had speculated that the development of the tip of the 
frontal brain was related to the simultaneous moral improvements in human culture 
over evolutionary time (Spatz, 1955; Spatz, 1965). In a letter in 1950, Spatz wrote: “I 
believe that the progressive evolution of the frontal pole of the neocortex will lead to 
an ethical refinement of humanity” (Peiffer, 2004 p. 627). One can read these 
statements as Spatz’ speculations on the neuronal basis of morality, though they are 
explicitly not a localization. 
What about Kleist? He had not returned to his localization of morality after 
 
1936. In his last lecture in 1950, he defended neuropathology and its reasoning – that 
is, the “logic of deletion” (Kleist, 1951). In a solitary paper published after his 
retirement, he reprinted his controversial localization map featuring the community-I 
and referred to the orbital brain as “organ of character” (Kleist, 1957 p. 304). Kleist 
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died in 1960 and simultaneously the era of the last strict localizations of morality was 
fading out. Testifying to this development are speculations on morality’s cerebral 
underpinnings that appeared at the same time. Wolfgang Klages, a former staff 
member of Kretschmer in Tübingen and later to become Professor of Psychiatry in 
Aachen, stated that the “highest mental functions are tied to the integrity of the orbital 
brain” (Klages, 1958 p. 125, my emphasis). The highest mental functions, character, 
and morality were no longer localized in but “tied to” the orbital brain. This change of 
words reflected the redefinition of the localization doctrine: Relations between brain 
areas and functions had substituted exact localizations. In another publication, Klages 
put it more succinctly: “ ‘morality’ is neither ‘localized’ in the frontal brain nor in the 
interbrain, but rather everything that we consider morality in psychological, 
sociological, and ethical respect, appears to be mostly dependent upon undisturbed 








In this paper, I have documented that based on neuropathological evidence and 
reasoning researchers attempted to trace morality in the brain in the period from 1930 
to 1960.  Moreover, I have argued that these attempts took a particular form that 
reflected the reformulation of the strict version of the localization doctrine in this 
period. It is important to note that researchers voiced their speculations on morality in 
the brain mostly in the context of other debates, for example in arguments on the 
functions of the frontal lobes or the connection between orbital brain damage and 
criminality. Just as in earlier times, these speculations were scarce and few publications 
directly addressed morality in the brain. In the period under review, there was no 
large-scale brain science of morality. As Verplaetse (2009) has suggested, the science 






In particular, I have shown that Kleist's localization of morality had an afterlife 
(de Crinis, Meyer, Kretschmer, Thelen, Faust, Walch, Klages); as well as its criticisms. 
Kleist and his followers were continuously assailed (Bay, Heygster, Gruhle, Häfner). 
Long familiar arguments echoed through the attacks, mingled with novel criticisms, 
and changed neuropathologists’ conception of morality's neuronal basis. The way that 
experts deemed morality to be installed in the brain was crucially dependent on the 
more general theory of brain functioning they adhered to. Kleist’s endorsement of a 
precise localization of the community-I in the orbital brain indicated his adherence to 
the strict version of the localization doctrine. Later researchers’ hesitation to pinpoint 
morality attested to their skepticism regarding exact localizations. The underlying 
change in theory expressed itself in De Crinis rejection of an exact localization of 
morality, Kretschmer’s and Schaltenbrand’s statistical understanding of localization, 
Thelen’s remarks about brain compensation, Faust’s call for considering the temporal 
dimension in the assessment of lesions, Walch’s emphasis on the premorbid 
personality, and Klages identification of a mere relation between morality and certain 
brain areas. Though all of these researchers admired Kleist for his seminal work and 
partly utilized the “logic of deletion”, none of them proposed an exact localization of 
morality. 
This absence of exact localizations of morality mirrored a comprehensive shift 
regarding the general theory of brain functioning. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, a holistic understanding of brain functioning surfaced, offering an alternative 
to the strict modularity of the localization doctrine. In addition, the rigidity of the 
doctrine made it impossible to account for the heterogeneous data (war-inflicted head 
wounds, tumors, leucotomies) that abounded in the period under review. Researchers 
gradually realized that the simplicity of the “logic of deletion” disregarded the 
complexity of the brain. The logic demanded the observation of disturbed functions 
in  conjunction  with  destroyed  regions  and  then  reasoned  to  regions  for  intact 
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functions. The application of this inference to the multitude of lesion cases yielded 
inconsistent and thus contestable conclusions. Experts questioned classical 
neuropathological   inference   and   frequently   resorted   to   other   methods   (e.g. 
angiography and electroencephalography) that had increasingly become available 
(Häfner, 1957). The continuing problems (inconsistent results, unsuitable methods, 
and unjustified generalizations) made theoretical modifications necessary: 
Neuropathologists started to emphasize the brain’s integration, connectivity, and 
dynamicity. Brain compensation, time-dependent symptoms, and the influences of the 
premorbid personality challenged the idea that the brain was a bundle of invariant, 
isolated units. More and more, the strict version of the localization doctrine became 
untenable: a revision of the theory occurred. Localization doctrine in general had 
changed considerably since the nineteenth century. As Finger (2010) put it: 
“Localization theory today is much more complex and dynamic than the localization 
of sharply demarcated centers envisioned by Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig, and Ferrier” 
(p. 125). In German neuropathology from 1930 to 1960, aspects of this transition – 
from a strict version positing isolated centers to an extenuated version proclaiming a 
division of labor between brain areas– were clearly visible. Accordingly, 
neuropathologists’ notions of morality in the brain changed from moral centers to 
diversified morality in a dynamic brain. This view resonates through the modern 
neuroscience of morality in which the search for moral centers is replaced with the 
quest to identify neuronal networks activated during moral functioning (Schirmann, 
2013b; L. Young & Dungan, 2012).  In the past, this transition took place gradually. 
 
Kleist's  followers  simultaneously  adhered  to  the  localization  doctrine  and 
reformulated and expanded it. The simultaneity of adherence and advancement 
indicates the passage from one understanding of brain functioning to another. Old 
and new ideas co-existed for a while. However, by the end of the 1950s exact 






connections between orbital and interbrain lesions and moral lapses, experts in this 
period proclaimed a relation or ties of the brain with morality. The strict version of 
the localization doctrine was no longer a legitimate method or theory. German 
neuropathologists devalued the “logic of deletion” as epistemic tool and abandoned 
the associated ontological claim – that is, morality occupies a specific neuronal spot. 
Thus, the fate and form of neuropathological attempts to trace morality in the brain in 
the period 1930 – 1960 has to be understood in the light of the simultaneous 
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This article presents a history of the early electroencephalography (EEG) of 
psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality in Great Britain and the United States in 
the 1940s and 1950s. Then, EEG was a novel research tool that promised ground- 
breaking insights in psychiatry and criminology. Experts explored its potential 
regarding  the  diagnosis,  classification,  etiology,  and  treatment  of  unethical  and 
unlawful persons. This line of research yielded tentative and inconsistent findings, 
which the experts attributed to methodological and theoretical shortcomings. 
Accordingly, the scientific community discussed the reliability, validity, and utility of 
EEG, and launched initiatives to calibrate and standardize the novel tool. The analysis 
shows that knowledge production, gauging of the research tool, and attempts to 
establish   credibility   for   EEG   in   the   study   of   immoral   persons   occurred 
simultaneously. The paper concludes with a reflection on the similarities between 






morality – and calls for a critical assessment of their potentials and limitations in the 
study of immorality and crime. 
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“Presumably prisons harbor many persons afflicted not with moral turpitude 
but with disordered brain waves which require chemical therapy, or, for the 




In 1942, William Gordon Lennox, a pioneer of epilepsy research at Harvard Medical 
School, surmised that researching disordered brain waves could revolutionize the 
understanding of immorality. Lennox’ anticipation was incited by a recently invented 
technology that visualized brain activity: Electroencephalography (EEG). 
Approximately seventy years later, modern neuroscience has appropriated immorality 
and delinquency as viable objects of research. Especially the emergence of 
neuroimaging technology in the last two decades facilitated research on the good, the 
bad, and the brain. According to some, a revolution in understanding morality is on 
its way (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Both technologies – 
EEG and neuroimaging – have opened up new epistemic spaces, unlocked new 
phenomena, spurred research, generated promises of scientific progress, encountered 
methodological problems, and attracted diverse criticism (Borck, 2005a; Choudhury & 
Slaby,  2012;  N.  Rose  &  Abi-Rached,  2013;  Schleim  &  Roiser,  2009).  Both 
technologies afforded unprecedented empirical access to the living brains of 
wrongdoers and generated hopes for imminent solutions for the intractable problem 
of immorality. This resemblance is worth exploring. 
The hype surrounding both technologies has to be understood in historical, 
social, political context for it influenced their potential for deployment as well as their 
capability to provide solutions for social problems (Alder, 2007; Borck, 2005a; Bunn, 
2012; Hayward, 2001; Ortega & Vidal, 2011). While neuroimaging research has 






Littlefield, 2009), the history of EEG of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality 
has not been addressed with sufficient detail yet. Historical work in the area only 
touches upon the issue (Borck, 2005a; Pickersgill, 2014; Rafter, 2008; N. Rose & Abi- 
Rached, 2013; Verplaetse, 2009). How were “the wondrous eyes of a new technology” 
(Syndulko, 1978 p. 145) constructed, used, and appraised? Answering this question 
provides valuable insights into the potentials and limitations of brain science – then 
and now. 
In  this paper,  I present a history of  early  EEG research on psychopathy, 
delinquency, and immorality in Great Britain and the United States in the 1940s and 
1950s. Though different histories could be written, my focus is on the experts’ 
appraisal of the new research tool, the associated problems and proposed solutions. 
The paper commences with a sketch of the complex history of somatic immorality 
and   the   state   of   Anglo   Saxon   psychiatry   in   the   1940s.   Subsequently,   the 
heterogeneous concept of psychopathy along with its moral connotation and the 
emergence of EEG as a tool for psychiatric research are described. The body of the 
paper specifies the role of EEG in the diagnosis, classification, etiology, and treatment 
of unethical and unlawful persons. Though initially experts had high hopes for the 
new technology in this field, they soon realized that its use involved methodological 
problems. EEG, then, was a novel, unstandardized research tool still under 
development. The experts were uncertain and at odds regarding its proper application 
and  the  interpretation  and  utilization  of  the  generated  data.  Uncertainty  and 
dissension pervaded EEG research on misdemeanants. The research community tried 
to manage this uncertainty through developing research standards, devising criteria for 
the interpretation of data, refining the technology, discussing the validity of EEG, and 
acknowledging the tentativeness of their findings. The analysis shows that knowledge 
production, calibration of the research tool, and the establishment of credibility of the 
new technology in the study of immoral persons occurred simultaneously. The paper 
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concludes with a reflection on the past and present of the brain science of morality, 
arguing that persistent methodological and theoretical problems already inherent in 








Somatic immorality - A long history 
 
Immorality  has  to  be  understood  in  context  –  as  well  as  corresponding  mental 
disorder concepts and their putative biological manifestations. Ideas on a hereditary, 
physiological, or neurological basis for anti-sociality, violence, and crime have a long 
and multifarious history (Rafter, 2008). In the course of the 19th century, bio-medical 
theories on the genesis and proliferation of immorality emerged from early psychiatry, 
criminal anthropology, and Social Darwinism. Diverse moral transgressions (ranging 
from promiscuity over alcoholism to murder) were re-conceptualized and treated as 
biological disease. The focus on criminals’ bodies and brains gave rise to a new class 
of medical experts, new discourses on guilt, and new options for policing and 
controlling badness. Against this backdrop, bio-medicine offered solutions for the 
management of society, e.g. via eugenics (Becker & Wetzell, 2006; Richards, 1987; 
Schirmann, 2013a; Smith, 1981; Wiener, 1990). Although bio-medical views on 
immorality  and  crime  had  been  continuously  criticized  on  scientific,  social,  and 
political grounds, they still constituted an explanatory resource within British and 
American psychiatry in the 1940s and 1950s. At that time, the field was dominated by 
biological and psychodynamic views, which often mixed in the description of anti- 
sociality   (Pickersgill,   2010;   Shorter,   1997;   Wallace   &   Gach,   2008).   Various 
classification systems for mental disorder co-existed. Experts advocated different 
nosologies and etiologies, reflecting their training and theoretical commitments. The 






Association  (DSM)  in  1952  was  an  attempt  to  homogenize  classification.  Among 
others, the definition of one particular mental disorder was arduous: Psychopathy. 
 
The concept of psychopathy – a wastebasket with moral overtones 
 
“It is a confusing term; it is misleading, and it means nothing.”  (Dr. James J. 
Ryan at a meeting of the Philadelphia Psychiatric Society (see Matthews, 1949 
p. 872)) 
 
Who is a psychopath? What is psychopathy? These questions were indelibly 
intertwined. Identifying psychopaths required a definition of the condition. In the 
1940s,  definitions  were  plentiful  –  and  contradictory.  Since  its  origination  in 
nineteenth century Germany, the term psychopathic had acquired multiple meanings, 
designating a host of different people and mental conditions (Sass & Herpertz, 1995; 
Werlinder, 1978; Wetzell, 2000). The notorious ambiguity of the concept expressed 
itself  in  multiple  manifestations  (e.g.  psychopathic  inferiority,  psychopathic 
personality, constitutional psychopathic state). In 1923, at a symposium initiated by 
Benjamin Karpman, who would later become one of Americas leading experts on 
psychopathy, the concept was called “a wastebasket into which all sorts of things have 
been thrown” (cited in Werlinder, 1978 p. 147). In the following decades, the 
psychiatric community on both sides of the Atlantic almost unanimously criticized the 
equivocality of the concept (Curran & Mallinson, 1944; Gurvitz, 1951; Partridge, 
1930;  Preu,  1944).  Some  psychiatrists  even  called  for  its  abolishment:  In  1948, 
 
Karpman stated that psychopathy has become so diluted that “what remains is a myth 
and is a nonexistent entity” (Karpman, 1948 p. 527). 
The  vacuity  of  the  concept  in  the  1930s,  1940s,  and  1950s  called  for 
clarification. Several definitions, classifications, and typologies emerged (for 
bibliographies, see Hare & Hare, 1967; Maughs, 1941; Maughs, 1955). For example in 
Great   Britain,   Henderson   (1939)   proposed   three   types   of   psychopaths:   a 
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predominantly  aggressive,  a  predominantly  passive  or  inadequate,  and  a 
predominantly  creative  type.  In  the  United  States,  Partridge’s  (1930)  sociopath 
(codified in the first DSM in 1952) as well as Cleckley’s (1955/1941) and Karpman’s 
(e.g. 1947; 1948) work on the concept were seminal (for overviews, see Hervé, 2007; 
Sass & Herpertz, 1995). These attempted conceptual refinements occurred 
simultaneously with an increment in research: Whereas 28 articles in English appeared 
on psychopathy from 1930 to 1940; 171 articles were published from 1940 to 1955 
(see also Cason, 1948; see McCord & McCord, 1956 p. ix). Apparently the concept 
attracted researchers’ attention; but the question remained: What characterized the 
psychopath? 
Despite ambiguity, many definitions converged on the presence of persistent 
anti-social, immoral, and illegal conduct (Curran & Mallinson, 1944; Darling, 1945; 
East, 1945; Preu, 1944). Several classifications of psychopathic personalities contained 
a distinct anti-social or amoral type, such as East’s (1945) ethical aberrant personalities or 
Karpman’s (1948) anethopaths. These persons’ callous, egotistic, aggressive, indecent, 
and unprincipled behavior appeared unalterable. Karpman (1947) called their 
unreceptiveness to ethical training, treatment, and punishment moral agenesis. “In 
general,” Kennard (1953 p. 101) wrote, “the psychopathic personality is said to be the 
individual who has little or no moral sense or social responsibility and who, in 
consequence, performs acts which are amoral or antisocial without sufficient sense of 
guilt to restrain future performance.” These character traits often manifested in crime. 
Experts noted the overlap between psychopathy and delinquency. Some even stated 
that delinquency was a criterion for the diagnosis (Craft, 1966; McCord & McCord, 
1956; Preu, 1944). Hence, differentiating between the mentally disordered psychopath 
and the mere criminal was difficult; a momentous difference with regard to legal 
responsibility (Conrad, 1959; Gibbens, 1951; Ward, 2010). Contributing to these 






immorality. An editorial to a special issue on the psychopathic offender in the British 
Journal of Delinquency in 1951 stated that “our understanding of psychopathy is still 
rudimentary and our researches wretchedly inadequate” (Anonymous, 1951 p. 77). 
Neurological evidence was particularly scarce: The functioning of the living brain of 
psychopaths was inscrutable. This situation changed dramatically when a new research 
tool became available in the 1930s. 
 
The emergence of electroencephalography (EEG) 
 
Electroencephalography – the recording of the brain’s electrical activity – had a slow 
start. Certain electrical properties of the nervous system had been known since the 
late eighteenth century, yet only in the 1920s the German neurologist Hans Berger 
constructed a device that registered an electrical rhythm on the human scalp. In the 
1930s, Edgar Adrian replicated and popularized Berger's findings, stimulating the use 
of EEG as research tool in neurology and psychiatry (Borck, 2005a; Brazier, 1961). 
The new technology spread from Germany, to Great Britain, and the United States 
along different trajectories in the respective national contexts. The initial slow start 
was followed by a massive growth “[a]s the field of EEG expanded after World War 
II with the speed and vigor of a prairie fire” (Knott, 2009 p. 155; Adrian, 1963/1950). 
In the 1940s, various EEG laboratories emerged, congresses were held, an EEG 
journal was launched, and professional societies originated (e.g. the American 
Electroencephalographic Society was founded in 1946) (Niedermeyer & Lopes da 
Silva, 1987; Stone & Hughes, 2013). Experts valued the EEG signal as reliable 
indicator of brain function. The new technology soon proved great utility in the study 
of epilepsy and the localization of tumors. What other riddles might EEG help to 
solve? What hidden meaning was encoded in the changing amplitude and frequency 
of the brain waves? Researchers began to explore the potential of the new technology, 
applying it to all sorts of neurological, psychiatric, and psychological phenomena. In 
his marvelous book on the cultural history of electroencephalography, Borck (2005a 
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p. 232) described the situation as follows: “with the scientific recognition of the EEG 
as valid parameter for brain function the entirety of human life from procreation to 
death could count as object for electroencephalographic investigation, and indeed 
almost no human activity was left without a representation in form of an EEG- 
curve.” Starting in the late 1930s, EEG studies on intelligence, personality, psychosis, 
homosexuality, and peptic ulcers began appearing (P. Davis & Davis, 1939; Ellingson, 
1954; Lindsley, 1944). Around the same time, “the wondrous eyes” of EEG caught 






The EEG of psychopathy, delinquency, and immorality in the 
 
1940s and 1950s 
 
 
The inception: Early EEG traces of unwanted behavior and a sprouting 
hope 
In 1938, a study with the title “Electroencephalographic analyses of behavior problem 
 
children” appeared in the American Journal of Psychiatry. The authors claimed that 
the EEG records of so-called behavior problem children deviated from those of 
normal children (H. H. Jasper, Solomon, & Bradley, 1938). This was one of the first 
studies that identified traces of unwanted behavior in the electrical activity of the 
nervous system. What is more, the logic of the conducted comparison exemplified a 
seminal assumption of the study: Behavioral aberration correspondents to abnormal 
brain waves; deviant people have deviant brain functioning. This momentous 
speculation guided research in the years to come. Soon more experts conducted EEG 
research on behavior problem children and delinquent boys whose abnormal brain 
waves made it seem likely that “[t]hese children will furnish some of the […] 






& Gibbs, 1942; Gottlieb, Knott, & Ashby, 1945; Lindsley & Cutts, 1940; Michaels, 
 
1945).  Accordingly,  psychopaths  and  criminals  attracted  experts’  attention  in  the 
 
1940s. East and west of the Atlantic, researchers attached electrodes to the scalps of 
inmates of specialized asylums and prisons. In Great Britain, Denis Hill, Desmond 
Pond, David Stafford-Clarke, Trevor Charles Noel Gibbens – all with ties to the 
Maudsley Hospital in London– formed the forefront, with William Grey Walter and 
others contributing and commenting . In the United States, initially Frederic and Erna 
Gibbs at Harvard (Cambridge, Massachusetts), John Knott and colleagues at the Iowa 
Psychopathic Hospital (Iowa City, Iowa), and Daniel Silverman at the Medical Center 
for Federal Prisoners (Springfield, Missouri) studied misdemeanants’ brain waves, 
inspiring others to follow them. 
Researchers had high hopes for the new, promising tool. The enthusiasm 
reflected in Lennox’ remark about “moral turpitude” not being sin, but disease 
reflected by “disordered brain waves” (see above) reverberated through several early 
EEG publications. The hopes clustered around four themes: Diagnosis, classification, 
etiology, and treatment of the unethical and unlawful. Improving diagnosis could be 
attained by EEG’s capacity to provide “objective data” (Hill & Sargant, 1943 p. 527) 
which might purge subjectivity from diagnosis (Gibbens, Pond, & Stafford-Clark, 
1955). Furthermore, EEG could aid to elucidate biological nuances in psychopathic 
personalities that evaded the eye of the psychiatrist (Diethelm & Simons, 1946). With 
regard to etiology, EEG could rule out tumors or epilepsy as causes for immoral 
behavior and could illuminate an organic origin of psychopathy and delinquency (D. 
Silverman, 1947). Also, EEG established “new vistas for therapy” (D. Silverman, 1943 
p. 30) which promised improved therapeutic success (Knott & Gottlieb, 1943). A few 
researchers even speculated on EEG’s power in determining criminal responsibility 
(Conrad, 1959; Stafford-Clark & Taylor, 1949). Yet, others accentuated the limited 
value of EEG in psychiatry (Lindsley, 1944; Walter, 1944). But even amongst the 
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critics, there were hopes that “when the new techniques are perfected” (Walter, 1944 
p. 73), psychiatry and criminology might profit (see also S. Levy & Kennard, 1953). In 
general, hopes were fraught with uncertainty: In the 1940s, nobody knew whether 
EEG could deliver on its promise to define, classify, explain, and treat psychopathy, 
delinquency, and immorality. 
 
Defining the “elephant”: EEG in diagnosis and classification 
 
“I can't define an elephant; but I know one when I see one.” (Curran & 
Mallinson, 1944 p. 266) 
 
When the first brain waves of immoral people unfurled, informed judgments on their 
composition, their supposed oddity, and their meaning were needed. The criterion of 
choice was comparative: Experts gauged the deviation between EEG curves of 
abnormal and normal people. The deviation was then interpreted as neurological trace 
of unethical behavior. Such traces were abundant: Hill and Watterson (1942) reported 
EEG abnormalities in aggressive psychopaths. Knott and Gottlieb (1943; 1944) stated 
that about half of the psychopathic personalities in their sample had abnormal EEG. 
Silverman (1943) found approximately the same abnormality ratio in psychopathic 
criminals. Something seemed out of tune in the brain rhythms of psychopaths. 
Moreover, there appeared to be distinct degrees of abnormality for different 
psychopathic sub-groups. For example, Silverman (1943) reported diverging 
percentages of abnormality for hostile, hedonistic, inadequate, and homosexual 
psychopaths. However, EEG did not detect deviant rhythms in mere criminals (Hill 
& Watterson, 1942; D. Silverman, 1944a). Robbery, larceny, murder, sex offences, 
assault and battery were untraceable in the brain waves – as a whole and as individual 
categories (Gibbs, Bagchi, & Bloomberg, 1945). Nevertheless, dividing psychiatric or 
legal categories into sub-classes in order to search for distinct EEG abnormalities was 






incidental, clearly motivated, apparently motiveless, sexually motivated, and driven by 
insanity. Their results were somewhat puzzling: Motiveless murder was clearly 
associated with an abnormal EEG whereas the abnormality was negligible for other 
types of murder. Seemingly, the EEG could be of use in discerning different types of 
psychopaths and criminals; but could the new technology aid in delineating 
psychopaths from criminals? Starting in 1948, a major British study investigated the 
psychopath in prison with the aim of deciding this question and improving the 
diagnostic criteria for psychopathy (Gibbens et al., 1955; Gibbens, Pond, & Stafford- 
Clark, 1959; Hill & Pond, 1952; Stafford-Clark, Pond, & Doust, 1951). Gibbens and 
colleagues  collected  psychological  and  electrophysiological  evidence  on  a  fairly 
constant sample of incarcerated psychopaths for several years, finding – among other 
things – that EEG abnormality was “four times as frequently in the psychopaths as in 
the controls” (Gibbens et al., 1955 p. 131). In a similar vein, an American study 
suggested different degrees of EEG abnormality to correlate with type and severity of 
crime (S. Levy & Kennard, 1953). 
However, abnormality was a coarse criterion. It was crucially dependent on 
what was deemed normal (see Analysis below). Some researchers responded to this 
caveat by tightening the criteria for abnormality on the behavioral and the 
electrophysiological level, resulting in negligible differences between psychopaths and 
controls (Simon, O'Leary, & Ryan, 1946). Generally, more refined criteria for the 
classification of brain waves could aid to improve accuracy and consistency in the 
nascent discipline. What exactly did abnormality consist in? And, were there 
characteristic aspects of the EEG signal that signified badness? In general, brain 
waves could be too fast or too slow (Hill & Watterson, 1942). The early studies had 
indicated  slowness  –  that  is,  low  frequency  –  as  conspicuous  aspect  in  EEG 
recordings of behavior problem children. In this context, particularly the theta rhythm 
(4-7 cycles per second) was a promising candidate. Several studies reported slow 
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activity in general or theta activity in particular in the EEG of psychopaths and 
criminals.  For  example,  Ostow  and  Ostow  (1946)  noted  the  strong  correlation 
between specific slow activity and antisocial behavior in a diverse group of inmates 
(Hill, 1944; Hill & Pond, 1952; Knott & Gottlieb, 1943; Sessions Hodge, 1945; 
Stafford-Clark et al., 1951). Based on these findings, a few researchers proposed 
classifications for certain sub-groups of psychopathy predicated on distinct wave 
patterns.   Simons   and   Diethelm   (1946   p.   622)   observed   that   “psychopathic 
personalities with poor ethical standards and resulting social difficulties” exhibited 
“moderately slow activity”, which set them apart from other psychopaths. For the 
sake of simplicity, Kennard (1956 p. 109) separated “the pure and the aggressive 
psychopath, solely because these correspond to particular EEG patterns.” 
Yet, all these attempts were provisional. EEG seemingly picked up abnormal 
signals from abnormal people, but the degree and type of abnormality varied (R. 
Cohn, 1949; Hill & Parr, 1963). Accordingly, some psychopaths had abnormal EEG 
others did not. This generated ideas about there being two types of psychopathic 
personality: one with normal and one with abnormal EEG (Knott & Gottlieb, 1944). 
Many experts conceded that the observation and identification of certain rhythms 
were  of  limited  diagnostic  utility:  The  EEG  was  merely  a  supplement  –  not  a 
substitute – to psychiatric assessment (Diethelm & Simons, 1946; Hill, 1952; D. 
Silverman, 1947). Moreover, EEG-based classifications of psychiatric or criminal 
subgroups were speculative at best and often met with criticism. Psychiatric categories 
in general did not correspond to electrophysiological categories. Research results were 
irritatingly inconsistent. Researchers identified reasons for this incongruity in 
conceptual confusion and inadequate samples. Psychopathy was a wastebasket and 
delinquency a broad category. Samples consisted of diverse mental and neurologic 
patients  as  well  as  unequal  criminals  (Craft,  1966;  Hill,  1952;  Karpman,  1948; 






Syndulko, 1978). The desire for an anatomical definition of psychopathy or 
delinquency could not be satisfied with the EEG (Cason, 1948; Sessions Hodge & 
Walter, 1953). 
 
“cerebral dysrhythmia”: EEG in etiology and therapy 
 
Could EEG contribute to establish badness as dysfunction of genes, bodies, 
and brains in the 1940s? The potential of EEG lay in its capability to unveil brain 
function. If EEG curves indicated brain function, then – so the reasoning went – 
aberrant curves signified cerebral dysfunction. Yet, it was not known precisely how, 
where, and why “cerebral dysrhythmia” (see Hill, 1944) originated. Several researchers 
surmised an inborn defect as cause that was passed on through generations (Gottlieb, 
Ashby, & Knott, 1947; Knott, Platt, Ashby, & Gottlieb, 1953; Williams, 1941). To 
others, EEG data made clear “that the psychopath possesses a brain which is 
malfunctioning, and which has been malfunctioning since early childhood” (Knott & 
Gottlieb, 1943; D. Silverman, 1943 p. 28). The undecided question whether deviant 
brain waves were signs of aberrant heredity, or of malfunctioning brains, or both, 
complicated matters regarding the etiology of badness. Explanations using EEG were 
often of rather general nature: Experts associated “ ‘good’ personality and ‘good’ 
EEG” (Kennard, 1953 p. 104) or stability of brain waves with stability of personality 
(Ehrlich & Keogh, 1956). Explanations of psychopathy in particular referred to 
“disturbed cortical function” (D. Silverman, 1944b p. 439), “defect in physiologic 
functioning” (Diethelm & Simons, 1946 p. 411), or “elasticity in […] neural limits” 
(Knott & Gottlieb, 1944 p. 519). Out of these rather broad attempts at etiology, two 
more concrete theories emerged that testified to the role of EEG as theory inspiring 
tool (Cf. Borck, 2005a p. 264). 
Psychopaths’ childlike impulsivity, their lack of forethought and restraint along 
 
with the fact that many bearing the label were in their early twenties suggested that the 
condition consisted in a failure to mature (Mangun, 1942). In addition, the EEG 
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curves of psychopaths resembled those of children, whereas normal adults’ brain 
waves followed a distinct pattern. Thus cortical immaturity mirrored behavioral 
immaturity,  suggesting  that  psychopaths’  brains  were  underdeveloped.  The 
observation that the peculiar EEG abnormalities decreased with age corroborated the 
so-called cortical immaturity hypothesis (Hill & Watterson, 1942; Hill, 1952; Schwab, 
1951; D. Silverman, 1944a). With regard to therapy, this indicated that anti-social, 
 
criminal, and immoral behavior was arrested development and that it cured itself 
through aging. Just as the cortical immaturity hypothesis, the second relevant theory 
of the day was based on a similarity of the brain waves of two distinct groups of 
people. By visualizing dysrhythmia, the EEG had proven to be a useful tool in the 
diagnosis of epilepsy. Dysrhythmia, or more generally, abnormal EEG also showed in 
the records of aggressive, criminal, and psychopathic people (Hill, 1944; Ostow & 
Ostow, 1946). The idea that “latent epilepsy” (see Brill & Walker, 1945) caused these 
behaviors, opened up new options for therapy. If anticonvulsive drugs alleviated 
epilepsy, they might also reduce aggression and anti-sociality. Correspondingly, 
behavior problem children, delinquents, and psychopaths were treated with 
anticonvulsants in explorative trials (Brown & Solomon, 1942; D. Silverman, 1944b). 
Yet, other experts soon contested the similarity of epilepsy and misbehavior because it 
owed its existence to a “regrettable fault of logic” (Sessions Hodge & Walter, 1953 p. 
163). Dysrhythmia in the brain waves of epileptic and immoral people was not 
identical. Vague terminology had misled proponents of EEG in their suggestion for 
treatment (Hill & Pond, 1952; Sessions Hodge & Walter, 1953). Nevertheless, EEG 
contributed to the framing of immoral and unlawful behavior as neurobiological 
disorder: “The attitude that the psychopath may be a sick individual rather than a bad 
one receives some support from brain wave studies” (Brill & Walker, 1945 p. 549). 














Analysis: EEG, immorality, and methodological uncertainty 
 
 
EEG research on immoral people’s brain waves produced cursory and inconsistent 
findings. Breakthroughs were not attained. Researchers deliberated on contradictory 
results and review articles documented the heterogeneity of the findings (Ellingson, 
1954; Kennard, 1956; Kennard, 1953). Amidst the confusion, admonishing voices 
raised concerns regarding the utility of EEG in psychiatry and criminology (Gibbs & 
Gibbs,  1964;  Walter,  1944).  Simultaneously,  an  expert  debate  on  the  origin, 
production, meaning, and interpretation of the EEG took place in the 1940s and 
1950s. In this context, the power of EEG as research tool and especially its scope of 
application were critically discussed. This methodological debate pervaded EEG 
research  on  unethical  persons  and  is  of  great  significance  in  understanding  its 
historical trajectory. In what follows, I analyze methodological and theoretical issues 
that impeded the acuity of vision of “the wondrous eyes” of the EEG. 
 
“a relatively new yardstick” and a mysterious signal 
 
“Only very few objective facts stand out in the sea of confusion surrounding 
the concept of psychopathic personality. The brain wave pattern is such a fact. 
This pattern cannot be disguised or falsified.” (Ehrlich & Keogh, 1956 p. 286) 
 
Were brain waves really objective, factual, precise, and valid? Parenthetically Gottlieb 
et al. (1945 p. 138) described EEG as “a relatively new yardstick.” This metaphor 
captured the uncertainty associated with the new technology in its early days. EEG as 
a “new yardstick” referred to twofold novelty: a new technological device and a new 
measurement method. Firstly, the technological device differed between laboratories. 
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Scattered laboratory technicians engineered their own electroencephalographs with 
diverging electrodes, channels, and amplifiers. In addition, the technology was 
constantly developed further in the 1940s and 1950s (Collura, 1993; Rösler, 2005). 
Gibbens et al. (1955 p. 131) commented on this issue in one of their follow-up studies 
on criminal psychopaths: “EEG technique has made great strides in the last five years; 
study by modern methods might have revealed much more valuable information.” 
Thus, EEG technology varied geographically and transformed in the period under 
review with unclear consequences for data production and comparability of findings 
(Adrian, 1963/1950; Fabisch, 1966; Kennard, 1953). Secondly, EEG data was 
mysterious and its relation to the mind nebulous (Borck, 2005b). It was generally 
agreed that the EEG signal reflected electrical activity of the nervous system, but the 
precise neurophysiological origin remained obscure (Cobb, 1971; R. Cohn, 1949; H. 
H. Jasper, 1948; Schwab, 1951; Walter, 1950). Additionally, the proportion of signal 
and noise in the brain wave was not entirely clear. Researchers criticized others for 
taking  artifacts  to  be  data  (Walter,  1944).  Also,  the  EEG  signal  was  volatile: 
movement, as well as physiological and psychological states disrupted it. Eye- 
movement, blood sugar, epilepsy, flickering light, hyperventilation, age, relaxation, 
sleep – all of these and other determinants altered the brain waves. Some alterations 
were distinct and already classified; others were still being sorted out. The 
measurement tool was in the process of being calibrated. The resulting uncertainty 
impacted knowledge production. For example, Gibbs et al. (1945) qualified their 
initial statements on the incidence of abnormal EEG in criminals once they accounted 
for age as confounding variable. Hence, the “yardstick” was under permanent 
construction in the 1940s and 1950s. 
 
The art of interpretation 
 
“[…] the interpretation of the EEG is still an art which must be learned 









In addition to the unknown origin and partly indeterminate constitution of the EEG 
signal, its meaning was encrypted: Brain waves were not self-explanatory. Rather they 
were a code in need of decipherment (Borck, 2005b; Borck, 2008; H. Davis, 1938). A 
classificatory and interpretative system needed to be devised. Accordingly, experts 
classified alternating amplitude and frequency as distinct wave patterns (e.g. theta- 
rhythm), related these rhythms to distinct physiological or psychological phenomena 
(e.g. sleep), and in so doing charged the electrical signals with meaning. The difficulty 
to make sense of EEG curves increased with the complexity of the phenomena 
studied. Complex psychological and social phenomena, such as delinquency, did not 
express themselves in simple wave patterns. Despite the growing availability of EEG 
data owing to the spread and refinement of the technology, interpretation remained 
demanding. This illustrates the essential difference between producing EEG data and 
making sense of them by means of interpretation. Making sense of brain waves, 
however, was saturated with subjectivity: “[i]n short, no two electroencephalographers 
interpret all EEG’s in exactly the same manner” (Ellingson, 1954 p. 264; Syndulko, 
1978; Williams, 1941). Thus, contradictory findings could result from researchers’ 
 
bias, stemming from differences in experience, training and skill (Gibbs & Gibbs, 
 
1941;  Lindsley,  1944;  D.  Silverman,  1947).  Moreover,  the  art  of  interpretation 
changed over time and was susceptible to fashions (Cobb, 1971; Sessions Hodge & 
Walter, 1953). Attempts to improve interpretation aimed at eradicating subjective 
elements. For example, over the years automated analysis procedures replaced the 
“naked-eye method of analysis” (Greenblatt & Sittinger, 1950 p. 313). Trained 
judgment thus was heterogeneous and was frequently considered as a source of bias 
that vitiated the objectivity of EEG research (Daston & Galison, 2007). 
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Normality and abnormality in the making 
 
“It  is  tantalising,  at  present,  to  see  the  elaborate  records  of  electrical 
oscillations, to know that they are, in some measure at least, a picture of the 
activity of the human brain, but to be unable to interpret the picture except to 
say where it is grossly distorted.” (Adrian, 1963/1950 p. vii) 
 
 
Gross distortion was what EEG could detect; gross distortion compared to what? 
Gauging data as abnormal required a norm. Normality as a reference category, 
however, had to be ascertained. Around 1940, normal EEG was poorly defined and, 
hence, classifications of abnormality varied (Bloch & Hill, 1982; H. H. Jasper et al., 
1938; Williams, 1941). Around a decade later, Hill (1952 p. 440) described the 
prevailing biases in earlier years with the statement: “[w]hat is abnormal to some is, 
still, normal to others.” In addition to the above described fickleness of the EEG 
signal, approximately 15 per cent of normal people had abnormal EEG. The reliability 
of EEG as indicator for brain dysfunction was in question. As a countermeasure, 
experts attempted to constitute normality. Multiple, partly contradictory classification 
systems and norming samples coexisted; an influential one being Frederic and Erna 
Gibbs’ (1941) comprehensive Atlas of Electroencephalography. However, variability in 
normality continued to hamper research well into the 1950s, rendering earlier studies 
on immoral persons’ abnormal brain waves disputable (Ellingson, 1954; Hill & Parr, 
1963; Kennard, 1956; Schwab, 1951; Sessions Hodge & Walter, 1953). Along with the 
standards for normality, the standards for doing proper science with EEG were 
changing. 
 
Acknowledging problems, seeking remedies, and changing the rules 
 
One of the most striking features of the early EEG research on psychopathy, 
delinquency, and immorality was the researchers’ almost unanimous agreement on the 






highlighted the poor understanding of the EEG signal, the technological difficulties 
and idiosyncrasies in its production, the subjectivity in its interpretation, the 
arbitrariness of normality as reference category, the limits in EEG’s diagnostic utility, 
the inadequacy of the samples, and the heterogeneity of the people and concepts 
studied. Moreover, they acknowledged the tentativeness of their findings and often 
presented their theorizing as mere speculation. For example, Sessions-Hodge (1945 p. 
472) opens a paper with the statement that it “should be considered a preliminary 
communication,   tentative   and   suggestive.”   The   prevalent   comments   on   the 
premature,   provisional,   and   inchoate   state   of   the   research   testified   to   its 
predominantly explorative nature. Reconnaissance appeared to be the main goal. In 
the   process   of   exploration,   researchers   identified   shortcomings.   Knowledge 
production was somewhat insular and its means so diverse that results from different 
laboratories were often incommensurable (Ellingson, 1954; Kennard, 1953; Syndulko, 
1978). Recognition of the putative problems allowed for tackling them. Accordingly, 
 
experts sought to remedy inconsistency, heterogeneity, and diversity. The aspired cure 
lay in unifying research methods: Standardization was the key. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the scientific community launched extensive initiatives 
to standardize EEG research. There appeared to be great need in every associated 
area. In the first issue of the newly established Journal of Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology, Grey Walter (1949 p. 474) stated: “If we are to understand 
one another at all, our language must contain agreed terms and symbols, conventional 
signs and scales, yet must admit originality.” Experts, then, did not speak the same 
language. Terminological confusion continued to be a problem. Until 1961, even the 
most essential aspect of EEG, the wave, had not been defined (Brazier et al., 1961). 
The administration of anticonvulsive drugs to psychopathic criminals owing to a 
misinterpretation of the term dysrhythmia (see above) was a noteworthy consequence 
of the unstandardized language (see also Hill, 1952). Diverging electrode placement 
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was another cause of dissimilitude identified in the late 1940s. As a countermeasure, 
committees suggested unifying the positions of the electrodes on the scalp (H. H. 
Jasper, 1958). Furthermore, the already mentioned attempts to establish norming 
samples to homogenize judgments on abnormality (e.g. Gibbs & Gibbs, 1941) and the 
introduction of automated data analysis procedures to reduce subjectivity in 
interpretation of data (Niedermeyer & Lopes da Silva, 1987) demonstrated how 
researchers scrutinized and changed the standards of the science in the period under 
review. Rules for data production, interpretation, and analysis were in transition: The 





Conclusion on the past: “The wondrous eyes” of the EEG in 
historical perspective 
 
The emergence of EEG in the 1930s had opened up an uncharted epistemic terrain; a 
frontier worth exploring. The anticipation was great. Unable to predict what seminal 
discoveries EEG might facilitate, experts applied the new research tool to all sorts of 
psychological phenomena. 
Yet, they operated under uncertainty with the novel method. The science was 
in its infancy: Brain waves were mysterious. Data accumulation was somewhat 
haphazard and rarely driven by hypotheses. The new research tool needed to be 
handled, understood, and gauged. Standards, rules, and guidelines for using EEG 
were only in the making and research proceeded in the absence of specified 
methodological criteria. The lack of knowledge and constraints created scientific 
freedom: In the early days of EEG research almost anything went. Simultaneously, a 
debate on the limits and potentials of EEG took place. The reliability, the validity, and 
the scope of application of EEG were being investigated, negotiated, and determined. 






remedies, and established criteria for doing proper science with the new technology in 
the process. Thus, knowledge production with EEG, calibration of EEG, and sense- 
making of psychopathic, delinquent, and immoral persons via EEG occurred 
simultaneously in the 1940s and 1950s. 
In this period, “the wondrous eyes” of EEG wandered over immoral persons’ 
brains without spotting significant characteristics. The findings were inconclusive. 
There were no comprehensive EEG-based theories that connected the results or 
satisfactorily explained human badness. The new technology failed to deliver the 
hoped for revelations regarding diagnosis, classification, etiology, and therapy. In 
general, the contribution of EEG to psychiatry proved disappointing (Borck, 2008; 
Schwab,  1951;  Walter,  1944).  In  the  1960s,  Gibbs  and  Gibbs  (1964  p.  460) 
commented: “The electroencephalographic study of psychiatric disorders has yielded 
surprisingly little information. This does not mean that it is of no value, but the 
electroencephalographer should not deceive himself; his technique does not convert 
psychiatric disorder into an ‘open book’.” Consensus formed that the complexity of 
psychiatric disorder could not be reduced to brain waves. Accordingly, experts 
gradually attenuated their hopes and acknowledged that the immoral brain remained 
inscrutable and intractable despite the novel technological outlook. In hindsight, 
researchers attributed the perceived failure of EEG to methodological problems: ill- 
defined concepts, contaminated samples, wanting norming samples, unstandardized 
technology, unclear terminology, and cryptic data had disabled research (Craft, 1966; 
Ellingson, 1954; Hill & Parr, 1963; Syndulko, 1978). Rather than clarifying the picture, 
EEG had added to the obscurity by providing an alternative, yet distorted image of 
wickedness. After 1960 EEG in general was beyond its zenith (Niedermeyer & Lopes 
da Silva, 1987). The hype surrounding the new technology abated. Correspondingly, 
EEG research on unethical and unlawful persons lost momentum, though studies 
kept on appearing in the following decades (M. Dolan, 1994; Milstein, 1988; Raine, 
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1993; Volavka, 1987). Although there was no definite closure, researchers gradually 
neglected the brain waves of psychopaths and delinquents and pursued the study of 
other psychophysiological  measures  (e.g.  skin  conductance and heart rate) (Hare, 
1970). Today, EEG research continues, but shares the observation of psychopathy, 





Comment on the present: A novel set of eyes 
 
 
In 1997, what is believed to be the first neuroimaging study on psychopathy appeared 
(see Hare, 2007; Intrator et al., 1997). In 2001, the first functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies on moral judgment followed (Greene et al., 2001; Moll, 
Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001). Up to the present, a host of neuroimaging 
research on antisocial persons has been conducted (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012). 
Neuroimaging provided a novel set of eyes and an auspicious perspective on the 
immoral brain. Again, the new sight promises new insights. The present situation in 
neuroimaging resembles the early days of EEG research in the 1940s. Needless to say, 
the technologies themselves, the research procedures, the produced data, the 
definitions of immorality and psychopathy, and the historical context differ markedly. 
However,  certain  noteworthy  parallels  exist that merit a  comparison.  Few  topics 
evaded the prying eyes of the new technologies. Experts used both to explore almost 
the entirety of the human mind, ranging from economic decision-making to romantic 
love (Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010; Gergen, 2010). The exploration of freshly accessible 
phenomena entailed unsystematic data collection in some areas with no apparent goal 
other than using the new technologies. Both technologies operate on the same tenet, 
stating that deranged, illicit, and unethical behavior can be understood by studying the 
brain. This belief also promoted the rise of biomedical experts, claiming specialist 






emergence of both technologies sparked great hopes for the study of psychopathy, 
delinquency, and immorality, accompanied by rhetoric of promise that advertised their 
massive potential and, for a certain time, perpetuated their application despite the 
absence of ground-breaking discoveries. This rhetoric strategy is exemplified by 
experts’ formulaic reservations that emphasize the tentativeness of the findings along 
with calls for more research found in almost every neuroscientific research report (e.g. 
N. E. Anderson & Kiehl, 2012). Just as in the past, vignettes for anti-social behavior 
continue to be equivocal, contributing to contaminated research samples and related 
issues of comorbidity (Mullen, 2007; J. L. Müller, 2010; Pickersgill, 2009). Analysis and 
interpretation of EEG and neuroimaging data was and is a versatile art, with different 
approaches yielding unequal results (Carp, 2012). The meaning and significance of the 
data regarding the assessment of misdemeanants was and is equivocal and contested. 
Over  the  years,  EEG  and  neuroimaging  were  calibrated,  validated,  and  refined, 
altering the quality of the produced data (Logothetis, 2008). These processes of 
calibration and changing styles of interpretation testify to the non-neutrality of brain- 
focused methods. Making sense of the generated data was and is a matter of human 
expertise defined by standards that changed in the past and that are likely to change in 
the future. Thus, neither EEG nor neuroimaging provide direct access to morality in 
the brain; the access is restricted and mediated at best (Schirmann, 2013b). 
Neuroimaging aided to “change the picture” (Borck, 2008 p. 377) without remedying 
the persistent methodological and theoretical shortcomings. By altering the view, 
neuroimaging has provided clues, but certainly no incontrovertible evidence. Hence, 
the immoral brain remains elusive in the present. 
The commonalities between EEG and neuroimaging suggest that history might 
have a lesson to offer. In the past, EEG enabled a new perspective on psychopathy, 
delinquency, and immorality and facilitated hopes for imminent research 
breakthroughs.  In  the  ensuing  exploration  of  the  power  of  the  EEG,  experts 
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encountered constraints: Their research tool was in need of calibration and its utility 
restricted. EEG illuminated certain neurologic phenomena (e.g. epilepsy), yet yielded 
negligible results in psychiatry (e.g. criminal psychopathy). Hence, experts assessed the 
limits and potentials of EEG and adjusted its scope of application, neglecting it in the 
study   of   complex   psychological   and   social   phenomena.   In   a   similar   vein, 
neuroimaging is – and should be – up for discussion at the moment. Reliability, 
validity, utility, and credibility of neuroimaging in the study of diverse psychological 
and social phenomena are not a given, but are in need of critical acclaim. While 
neuroimaging has doubtlessly revolutionized our understanding of brain functioning, 
it has failed to deliver more than provisional evidence in forensic psychiatry and 
criminology. Just as with EEG, a fair appraisal and an informed critique of 
neuroimaging are needed in order to illustrate its potentials and mark its limitations. 
In conclusion, “the wondrous eyes” of new research tools clearly enable novel 
perspectives, insights and visions – yet it needs to be determined when, where, and 
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By taking scientific knowledge on somatic immorality as a vantage point, this paper 
examines historical and contemporary contexts in which bio-criminology has been 
utilized   for determining therapeutic and punitive action as well as socio-political 
order.  Penal  reform  debates  in  Germany  (1880s  –  1940s),  the  British  Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1913, endocrinology and psychosurgery of criminality (USA 1930s 
and after), and the present discussion on biomarkers for anti-sociality are discussed. 
Based on these examples, the analysis suggests that how immorality was deemed to be 
materialized in the body or brain partly predetermined attempts to control it. 
Moreover, in the course of history, concepts for somatic immorality became more 
complex  and elusive. Policies  aimed  at treating,  policing,  and legislating immoral 
bodies or brains mirrored this development. Finally, the paper analyzes the mutual 
constitution  of  epistemic  and  normative  discourses  and  takes  a  stance  against 









“His counsel [...] requested that his client be permitted to enter a hospital to 
have a prefrontal lobotomy performed in an attempt to cure the prisoner of his 
criminal tendencies.” (Mayer, 1948 p. 576) 
 
 
Millard Wright was a burglar. During his trial at the zenith of psychosurgery in the 
 
1940s, a surgeon suggested an unusual measure: a brain operation to remedy his 
criminality (Koskoff & Goldhurst, 1968). The procedure was experimental. It lacked 
theoretical and empirical support. In fact, there were reports of patients turning 
immoral after similar surgery (Golla, 1946; Malone, 1947). Yet operating on the 
criminal's brain seemed promising: If criminality had a cerebral origin, then it must be 
amenable to surgical treatment. A prefrontal lobotomy was carried out, destroying 
parts of Wright’s brain. He appeared unaltered after the operation, reoffended, and 
later killed himself while incarcerated. Psychosurgery for criminals was rare and highly 
controversial (Pressman, 1998; Valenstein, 1986). However, the intervention on 
Wright’s putatively immoral brain is a case in point for acting on somatic immorality. 
Conceptualizations of immorality as physiological dysfunction and attempts to 
 
govern it as such have a long past (Rafter, 2008; Verplaetse, 2009). In several historical 
contexts, neurobiological knowledge facilitated therapeutic or punitive procedures on 
immoral persons’ bodies or brains  and functioned as evidence-based justification in 
socio-political debates. Presently, a growing neuroscience of morality investigates vice 
and virtue, proclaims a revolution in understanding criminality, and calls for a major 
overhaul   of   the   legal   system.   Recently   reasoning   based   on   developmental 
neuroscience featured in a US court ruling which repealed the death penalty for a 
juvenile offender (Snead, 2007). In other court cases, experts used neuroimaging 
evidence to explain criminal behavior as the result of brain dysfunction with the aim 
of exonerating the accused (Schirmann 2013a; Farisco and Petrini 2014). Suggestions 
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for  population-wide screening for biomarkers for anti-sociality and visions of eugenic 
futures surface (Raine, 2013). Proponents of neuroscience and bio-criminology 
welcome the application of neurobiological evidence, methods, and arguments in 
normative  questions and  assert that their sciences  can  (or will  soon  be  able  to) 
function  as  foundation  for  moral  codes,  criminal  law,  and  the  penal  system 
(Gazzaniga, 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). These ideas are met with strong 
opposition. In general, the growing impact of neuroscience on understanding being 
human and organizing society has been critically discussed and – at times – flatly 
rejected across disciplinary boundaries (Choudhury & Slaby, 2012; Ortega & Vidal, 
2011; Pickersgill & van Keulen, 2011; N. Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). Ethicists and 
legal scholars antagonize neuroscientists and bio-criminologists inroads into moral 
and legal territory. In particular, the founding of  normative practices and principles 
on provisional scientific findings has generated dispute (Singh, Sinnott-Armstrong, & 
Savulescu, 2014). In light of this controversial interplay of what is and what ought to 
be, the potential of knowledge to function as fundament for action and order merits 
analysis. 
Generally, the entanglement of knowledge, action, and order has been concisely 
described as follows: “The ways in which we know and represent the world (both 
nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” 
(Jasanoff, 2004 p. 2). Scientific knowledge can constitute social worlds and justify 
actions in them. In short, knowledge orders: it arrays and it commands. It can be used 
and abused. It can pre-structure or frame phenomena idiosyncratically, suggesting or 
determining certain ways of dealing with them. Yet, knowledge can also be ignored; 
since it merely affords the “capacity for action” which “may remain unused and 
dormant” (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012 p. 114). Historical research repeatedly 
demonstrated that the acceptance of knowledge is contingent on social, political, and 






Bunn, 2012). For example, knowledge – however provisional, contested or spurious it 
may have been or seem now – served as rationale for the oppression of women, the 
implementation of eugenics, and the reshaping of mental health law (Daston, 1992; 
Pickersgill, 2013; Weindling, 1989). Correspondingly, ideas on natural order, human 
nature, and socio-political organization have been found to be mutually constitutive 
and historically in flux. Often, the descriptive and the normative appeared inextricable 
(B. Barnes & Shapin, 1979; Daston & Vidal, 2004; Jasanoff, 2012; N. Rose, 2007). 
Against this theoretical and historical backdrop and in view of the ongoing 
dispute, this paper asks the following question: How has knowledge on somatic 
immorality undergirded normative principles, practices, and policies in the past and 
present? While acknowledging the inextricability of knowledge, action, and order, this 
paper takes scientific knowledge as a vantage point to analyze its role as foundation 
for therapeutic and punitive action and legal and political order. The twofold meaning 
of acting on is used to conceptualize this dual function of knowledge: First, acting in 
the light of or according to somatic immorality – that is, as if immorality in the body 
or brain were real, true, and factual. This facet of acting on captures the utilization of 
knowledge to provide ostensibly evidence-based arguments for altering mental health 
and penal legislation. Second, impacting on or interfering with somatic immorality – 
that is, practices which police and intervene in putatively immoral bodies or brains. 
This refers to how scientific knowledge rendered immorality, delinquency, and anti- 
sociality as corporeal or cerebral dysfunction and thus laid the fundament for 
physiological interventions. In this context, the specific framing of somatic immorality 
is momentous because it suggested a specific locus for intervention (see Rosenberg & 
Golden, 1989 on framing). Thus, the double meaning of acting on somatic immorality 
aptly captures the fertility of knowledge, action based upon it, and order constructed 
in  light  of  it.  Several  historical  examples  of  acting  on  somatic  immorality  are 
discussed: Penal reform debates in Germany (1880s – 1940s), the British Mental 
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Deficiency Act of 1913, and endocrinology and psychosurgery of criminality (USA 
 
1930s and after). The goal is not a meticulous reconstruction of the respective 
historical periods; rather the aim is to explore different structures and implications of 
frames of somatic immorality. Based on these sketches of the past, the epistemic 
foundations and normative implications of current biomarkers for criminality are put 
in historical perspective. The overall analysis suggests that the specific framing of 
somatic immorality determined how it was acted on: How immorality was deemed to 
be materialized in the body or brain partly predetermined attempts to control it. In the 
course of history, concepts for somatic immorality became more complex and elusive. 
Attempts to treat, police, and govern immoral bodies or brains mirrored this 
development. Subsequently, the paper argues that in the past and present the political, 
economic, and social context co-determined whether or not somatic immorality was 
acted on. In closing, the paper critically discusses the political potential of bio- 
criminology to function as a foundation for making and managing society by 




Acting on somatic immorality – then and now 
 
 
The conviction that social order should be based on reason and a thorough 
understanding of human nature prospered during the Enlightenment (Carson, 2007). 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, phrenologists suggested brain science as 
organizing principle for society and provided early notions of cerebral immorality 
(Hagner & Borck, 2001; Verplaetse, 2009). The idea that badness is rooted in the 
body developed in the course of the nineteenth century in Western Europe and North 
America. Against a backdrop of nascent naturalistic understandings of being human 
and medical views on vice, explanations of moral transgressions as results of bad 
heredity, degeneration, or neurological disorder surfaced (Jacyna, 1981; Rafter, 2008; 





immorality, assessed criminals, moved into the courtroom, and at times advocated 
legal reform. Moreover, penal evaluation changed its focus from the criminal act to 
the criminal actor, emphasizing the significance of criminals’ character, upbringing, 
constitution, and milieu (Foucault, 1978; Schirmann, 2013a; Smith, 1981). 
 
Bio-criminology and penal reform debates, Germany 1880s – 1940s 
 
In 1896 the influential neurologist Paul Flechsig (1896 p. 34) argued that “it must be 
possible, to found ethics on physiology, [...] in order to possibly base legislation on it – 
thus current medical psychology is doubtlessly on the way to achieve this goal.” 
Scientific  advances  on  moral  questions  were  widely  expected  in  late  nineteenth 
century Germany. Continuing decades of industrialization and economic growth 
afforded a sense of progress. Developments in medicine, such as Robert Koch’s 
groundbreaking discoveries in bacteriology, promised a nearing end to disease and 
hardship in the teeming cities. Rapid urbanization had come together with poor living 
conditions for large parts of the society. To remedy the most pressing social and 
health problems of the time, the state initiated top-down measures (e.g. sickness 
insurance). In the political field, science became to be seen as crucial resource for 
argumentation and administration. Darwinian theorizing pervaded socio-political 
discourses and suggested itself as organizing principle for society. Social and moral 
problems were redefined as medical and psychiatric issues. Among other voices, an 
influential strand in psychiatry insisted that mental disorder and deviancy had 
hereditary or neurological causes (Proctor, 1988; Weindling, 1989; Wetzell, 2009). 
Accordingly, medical men examined immoral persons for biological aberrations 
(Schirmann, 2013a). Lombroso’s notorious theory on born criminals which stated that 
criminality was congenital and manifested in distinct bodily features offered a 
theoretical framework for such investigations. However, Lombroso’s ideas sparked 
admiration and disdain. The German experts discussed multiple causes for crime, 
such as atavism, bad heredity, brain defect, mental disorder, venereal disease, alcohol 
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abuse, false upbringing, or poor diet. Lombroso’s notorious theory on born criminals 
sparked admiration and disdain. These new scientific insights on criminals amplified 
calls for a reorganization of penal policy. Moreover, the public felt a constant threat 
from criminals. In this climate, improving security became a matter of crime 
prevention (Becker, 2002; Gadebusch Bondio, 2006; C. Müller, 2004). 
In his very first publication, Emil Kraepelin (1880), one of the founding fathers 
 
of psychiatry, postulated that the normative code of the law should be predicated on 
scientific facts. In unison with Kraepelin, the jurist Franz von Liszt (1948/1882) 
advocated the scientification and individualization of the penal system with the aid of 
bio-criminological  expertise.  Liszt  claimed  that  the  medico-legal  evaluation  of 
criminals should focus on their dangerousness and capability to improve. The 
introduction of these criteria signified a change in the rationale for detention – from 
punishment to prevention – and a shift in the assessment of offenders. Preventive 
detention   was   indicated   especially   for   so-called   habitual   criminals.   If   their 
unchangeable bad constitution destined them to be incorrigible, then any form of 
punishment  is  pointless  and  their  reoffending  is  likely.  Thus,  they  should  be 
indefinitely detained in order to protect society. 
The ascertainment of incorrigibility often lay in the hands of biomedical experts 
who used diverse mental disorder labels (e.g. moral insanity, moral idiocy, moral 
imbecility, born criminals) for unalterable malefactors. For these cases, therapy was 
futile and would – as an extreme position emphasized – remain so until “the art of 
putting a new normally functioning brain in place of a weakened or damaged one has 
not been invented” (Trueper cited in E. Müller, 1899 p. 371). In Switzerland, Eugen 
Bleuler  approved  of  the  execution  of  incorrigible  criminals  especially  since  it 
prevented “the procreation of congeneric progeny” (Bleuler, 1896 p. 75). His pupil 
and later successor, Hans W. Maier (1908), also claimed that German law did not 





exempted from punishment, though they clearly belonged in the class of the insane. 
During the Weimar Republic bio-criminological knowledge continued to fortify socio- 
political courses of action. Under the title “Crime as Destiny” Johannes Lange (1929) 
identified criminality as heritable in the first twin-study on the matter. Accordingly, it 
was imperative for society to avoid the “breeding of criminal predispositions” 
[Hochzucht verbrecherischer Anlagen] (Lange, 1929 p. 96). The possibility of 
biologically controlling crime by expunging lines of descent depended on information 
on criminals’ heredity. Correspondingly, Lange praised the bio-criminological 
examination in Bavaria whose goal was the establishment of an extensive data base on 
offenders’ ancestry (Liang, 2006). If criminality was heritable disease, then sterilizing 
criminals seemed expedient to control crime. Passed in 1933, the Law for the 
Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring [Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken 
Nachwuchs] legitimized this practice for feebleminded criminals. However, the 
differentiation between congenital transgressors and mentally ill persons proved 
complicated. Bio-criminology was not capable to provide definite hereditary evidence, 
which led to a legal conundrum. Scientific knowledge could not adjudicate on the 
issue of identifying suitable perpetrators for sterilization (Dubitscher, 1935). While a 
group  of  psychiatrists  and  jurists  endorsed  sterilization,  others  contested  the 
underlying notion of somatic immorality and the penal action based on it. Even under 
the Nazi regime, the sterilization and execution of criminals was controversial. 
However, the hereditary examination of criminals was routine and ideas on a criminal 
disposition of entire races pervaded Nazi ideology (Becker, 2002; C. Müller, 2004; 
Proctor, 1988; Wetzell, 2000). Despite continuities after the fall of the Nazi regime, 
somatic views were in demise and eugenics vanished abruptly in the new political 
climate (Roelcke, 2005). Strikingly, the science of somatic immorality did not stand on 
firm ground during the late nineteenth century, the Weimar Republic, or the Nazi 
regime.  There  was  neither  incontrovertible  evidence,  nor  scientific  consensus. 
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Nevertheless, bio-criminological interpretative frameworks enabled specific actions 
for controlling crime and allowed for allegedly evidence-based arguments for the 
endorsement of penal reform. 
 
British Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 
 
Another historical example from Great Britain documents how knowledge on somatic 
immorality influenced policy making. At the end of the nineteenth century, criminality 
and immorality became to be understood as amenable to scientific investigation. 
Misconduct no longer was the result of a lack of self-restraint – that is, a weakness of 
the will – rather it had diverse psychological, social, and biological causes (Garland, 
1988; Smith, 1981; Wiener, 1990). Physicians debated the influence of nature and 
nurture in the genesis of badness. Nature had fervent advocates. For example, the 
influential British alienist, Henry Maudsley described mentally disordered criminals as 
“step-children of nature [who] groan under the worst of all tyrannies – the tyranny of 
bad constitution” (Maudsley, 1873 p. 43) and later asserted that “no mortal can 
transcend his nature; and it will ever be impossible to raise a stable superstructure of 
intellect and character on bad natural foundations” (Maudsley, 1874 p. 20). In this line 
of reasoning, bad biology destined individuals to be mentally disordered or criminal. 
This rationale influenced concepts for criminal insanity, verdicts and policies in later 
decades. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a hope that science could contribute 
to better individuals and society was prevalent. Feeblemindedness was perceived as a 
pressing social problem. Experts claimed that the depravity of the feebleminded was a 
hereditary condition which was not susceptible to training, treatment, or punishment. 
Furthermore, their unregulated reproduction precipitated societal demise. Interpreting 
immorality as proliferating, incorrigible biology sparked suggestions for radical 
solutions: Eugenicists called for preventive detention and sterilization. Against this 









Alfred Frank Tredgold, who functioned as an influential medical expert on the 
commission for the Act of 1913, held that moral imbecility was congenital neurological 
disorder: “I believe that this condition is practically incurable, and that the only 
safeguard lies in strict and permanent detention.” (Tredgold, 1908 p. 354). Obviously, 
Tredgold’s belief fed his suggestion for an adequate penal measure. Tredgold largely 
based his position on hereditary evidence, but “with regard to the brain, the results do 
not enable one to say that a special ‘criminal type’ exists but nearly all the inquirers are 
agreed that anatomical anomalies indicative of arrested development are of much 
more common occurrence than in the normal” (Tredgold, 1908 p. 296). The science 
substantiating   Tredgold’s   proposal   for   reform   was   tentative.   Advocates   and 
opponents utilized bio-criminological knowledge for and against the new policy. Yet, 
“the Royal Commission […] was much impressed with the weight of evidence in 
favour of the biological explanation” (Wormald, 1913 p. 94). 
The Act of 1913 stipulated moral imbecility as congenital mental defect with 
incorrigible criminal tendencies. The controversial statutory definition of moral 
imbecility shaped professionals’ discussions in the following decades (Tredgold, 1921). 
Some   experts   criticized   the   Act   for   stopping   short   of   what   the   available 
neurobiological evidence had proven because it did not make reference to those moral 
defectives who suffered from an inborn absence of their brains’ “moral sense centre” 
(Steen, 1913 p. 484). Later, discontent with the type of somatic immorality codified in 
the Act grew (Verplaetse, 2009). The psychiatric community abandoned the category 
of moral imbecility (and its successor of 1927: moral deficiency), as well as the putative 
biological evidence in favor of such classifications. Moreover, the measure of 
sterilization never came to fruition in Great Britain (Penrose, 1947; Thomson, 1998). 
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With regard to acting on somatic immorality, it is noteworthy that disputable 
knowledge was sufficient to crystallize in legislation. 
 
Endocrinology and Psychosurgery of Criminality, USA 1930s and after 
 
In  various  other  contexts,  bio-scientific  knowledge  led  to  speculations  about 
morality’s corporeal basis and triggered demands for restructuring socio-political 
organization. Despite being eagerly promoted by their champions, often these ideas 
were not translated into policies but were rebutted or simply ignored. For example, 
the discovery of several hormones and neurotransmitters at the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Finger, 2005) inspired novel perspectives on wickedness in the 
body.  Although  these  biochemical  agents  were  ill-understood  at  the  time,  their 
assumed potential incited revolutionary calls: “All our concepts of justice, punishment 
and crime must be revised and reconstructed in the light of these findings” (Berman, 
1932 p. 235). Sometimes such ideas resulted in treatments. For example, the chief 
surgeon at San Quentin Prison injected ground-up testes of executed felons under the 
skin of inmates in order to cure their putative hormonal imbalance. Though small in 
number, advocates of the endocrinology of crime promoted evidence-based 
suggestions for new punishments, sterilization, and eugenics in connection with large- 
scale examinations of the population, data gathering, and preventive measures 
(Podolsky, 1955; Schlapp & Smith, 1928; Cf. Rafter, 2008). While biological views on 
individual depravity and societal degeneration as well as eugenic measures existed in 
the American context (Degler, 1991; Stubblefield, 2007), the hormonal version of 
immorality failed to gather political momentum. 
Acting directly on the ostensibly immoral brain was another possibility to fight 
crime. At least it was an option worth exploring as the surgeon of Millard Wright, the 
lobotomized  burglar,  contended  (Koskoff  &  Goldhurst,  1968).  Even  during  the 
zenith of psychosurgery this was problematic, though the underlying rationale that 





of seminal breakthroughs led three Harvard researchers to suggest that the leaders of 
political uprisings in the US were suffering from brain disorder; a condition which 
could be cured surgically (Mark, Sweet, & Ervin, 1967). This suggestion caused an 
outrage in the scientific community and in the public (Breggin, 1975; Valenstein, 
1980). Despite opposition and a dubious empirical basis, two of the originators of the 
proposal, Mark and Ervin (1970), operated on several aggressive patients and hailed 
the intervention as an efficient means to contain violence. Surgical interventions on 
criminals’ and psychopaths’ brains also took place (e.g. Andy, 1975) although the 
efficacy of psychosurgery as a remedy for anti-sociality was highly questionable and its 
empirical basis disputed (O'Callaghan & Carroll, 1987). 
There is a series of other historical contexts in which somatic immorality has 
been acted on: phrenology, brain-based moral insanity, constitutional psychology, 
electroencephalography,  pharmacological  therapies,  and  genetics  (Rafter,  2008;  N. 
Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013; Schirmann, 2014a; Verplaetse, 2009; Wasserman & 
Wachbroit, 2001). Though all of them differ regarding the respective socio-political 
backgrounds, methods, and explanatory frameworks, the key point here is that all of 
these scientific approaches engendered specific lines of argument and modes for 
interference in light of what was taken to be somatic immorality. 
 
The new science of somatic immorality 
 
Presently, modern neuroscience is unlocking new potentialities for rationalizing 
neurological  interventions  and  structuring  social  worlds  (Dunagan,  2010;  Keiper, 
2006; N. Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). New technologies that image and stimulate the 
brain enable novel perspectives on somatic immorality. For example, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging allows for the study of misdemeanants’ brain activation 
and transcranial magnetic stimulation excites or inhibits neuronal networks associated 
with  morality.  Propelled  by  these  technologies,  new  epistemic  gateways,  new 
ontologies for building blocks of morality, and new versions of the immoral brain 
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emerged (Schirmann, 2013b; A. Young, 2012). Recently a proposition to revitalize 
brain surgery for moral dysfunction has been made (De Ridder, Langguth, Plazier, & 
Menovsky, 2009). Moreover, a host of genes, neurotransmitters, hormones, brain 
areas, and neuronal networks appeared as candidates for housing, sustaining, or 
modifying moral mind and behavior. The amount of data in need of explanation and 
classification is increasing. Accordingly new interpretative frameworks evolve and 
novel  concepts  for  somatic  immorality  originate.  In  particular,  biomarkers  for 
antisocial behavior currently capture the attention of science and society (Singh et al., 
2014). 
 
In general, a biomarker is defined as “a characteristic that is objectively 
measured and evaluated as an indicator of normal biological processes, pathogenic 
processes, or pharmacologic responses to a therapeutic intervention” (Biomarkers 
Definitions Working Group, 2001 p. 91). Biomarkers promise breakthroughs in 
diagnosis, prevention, and therapy. Yet there is an ongoing debate on the 
conceptualization, production, value, and meaning of biomarkers. Are they signs, 
indicators, proxies, or protodiseases (Boksa, 2013; Metzler, 2010; Rosenberg, 2002; 
Singh & Rose, 2009)? Just as their epistemic status, the medico-legal significance of 
biomarkers   is   controversial.   Several   candidate   biomarkers   for   immorality   or 
criminality are being discussed at the moment, such as low resting heart rate (Raine & 
Portnoy, 2012), the so-called warrior gene which encodes monoamine oxidase A 
(MAOA) (Caspi et al., 2002), as well as certain neuronal activation patterns 
(Nadelhoffer et al., 2012). Though none of the currently available biomarkers is 
reliable, they have been acted on occasionally. In several court cases, the warrior gene 
was used to buttress an insanity defense or to justify mitigating circumstances for a 
perpetrator (Bernet, Vnencak-Jones, Farahany, & Montgomery, 2007; Singh et al., 
2014). Biological explanations of criminal behavior seem to have a special role with 





and appear to alter juries’ evaluation of the accused. However, bad biology can also be 
seen as an aggravating factor which justifies indefinite preventive detention There are 
voices that call for adaptations of legal systems in light of new scientific findings; yet 
no major reforms are currently under way (Farahany, 2009; Spranger, 2012). However, 
biomarkers enable new options for diagnosing and controlling immorality. As the 
first, provisional studies on neuroprediction of recidivism appear (Aharoni et al., 
2013), moral judgment tendencies are rendered intelligible in terms of genes (Marsh et 
al., 2011), and proposals for population-wide screening for risk factors for criminality 
are launched (Raine, 2013), possibilities for crime control are increasingly becoming a 
matter of screening and intervening (N. Rose, 2010). However, the often hailed 
revolutionary potential of biomarkers for criminality stands in contrast to their poor 
reliability, validity and utility. Political and legal futures build around modern bio- 
criminology are met with fierce opposition. Increasingly, the hype is debunked as 





Framing, constituting, and ordering in perspective 
 
 
Approximately two centuries of bio-criminological thinking has yielded a host of 
frames for somatic immorality that have been acted on in a variety of ways. While all 
of the frames locate criminality in the body, there are distinct differences with regard 
to their structure, their socio-political utility, and the historical contexts in which they 
emerged. Accordingly, comparisons across the ages have to acknowledge disparities 
between past and present periods. However, a look back in time allows for 
understanding  historical  development  and  identifying  similarities  of  argument.  In 
broad historical perspective, it becomes clear that frames for somatic immorality were 
in flux. Bumps on the skull or conspicuous facial aberrations were superseded by 
deviant hereditary endowment, neurological differences, and later by sophisticated 
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biomarkers. This development is reflected in the historical cases discussed above. The 
search for outer bodily signs of badness by the followers of Lombroso in late 
nineteenth century Germany was replaced by a quest for less conspicuous bad 
hormones in the 1930s in the US. Over the years, immorality has retreated into the 
body,  becoming  less  visible  and  more  elusive.  This  development  is  an 
acknowledgment of complexity. The more research (as well as its methods and 
technologies)  advanced,  the  more  complicated  somatic  immorality  became 
(Schirmann, 2013b; Walby & Carrier, 2010). Accordingly, bio-criminology is now 
rejecting the crudeness of its earlier approaches and refines its concepts, which is 
mirrored in the trades’ adoption of biomarkers. Currently immorality does not have 
clearly or easily observable correspondents in the body or brain. Indeed biomarkers 
seemingly “increase[d] uncertainty and ambiguity” (Metzler, 2010 p. 407) regarding 
somatic immorality. Experts now know more – and know less. Along with this 
conceptual evolution, came another shift regarding the mode of action of somatic 
immorality. Often, the role of the diverse frames in constituting immoral mind and 
behavior  was  ambiguous:  Were  they  signs,  dispositions,  determinants,  or 
consequences of immorality? In the past, the frames emphasized invariability. Late 
nineteenth century hereditary criminality and early twentieth century congenital moral 
imbecility  were  unchangeable.  Whereas  past  frames  tended  to  render  biology  as 
destiny, biomarkers embody susceptibility. Accordingly, bio-criminological discourse 
has shifted from determination to risk and from causation to correlation (Pickersgill, 
2009; Singh & Rose, 2009). 
 
In different historical contexts, knowing somatic immorality has shaped 
decisions on how to organize social worlds. The mere availability of knowledge 
generated options for intervention and opened up evidence-based lines of 
argumentation. That is, the frames had constitutive qualities: By defining the problem, 





encompassing heredity, eugenics is the answer. To malfunctioning brains, 
psychosurgery is the answer. To biochemical imbalance, hormone administration is 
the answer. Thus, how immorality was deemed to be materialized in the body or brain 
predetermined how it was acted on. In historical perspective, changing frames entailed 
changing possibilities for actions and orders. As present suggestions to screen for 
biomarkers for criminality document, the pattern of basing preventive measures on 
specific scientific representations continues. 
In hindsight, it becomes clear that many of the putative facts about somatic 
immorality proved to be wrong. As the historical examples demonstrated, the 
acceptance and success of scientific knowledge also depended on the socio-political 
context  and  the  consensus  in  a  scientific  community  –  and  not  solely  on  the 
soundness, veracity, or quality of a scientific claim. Presently, disputes on validity 
persist: Bio-criminology is indicted for being unsound and researchers, legislators, 
policy-makers, and other stakeholders challenge its significance and influence 
(Farahany, 2009; Singh et al., 2014). Put differently and with regard to potential 
policies founded on biomarkers: “While the validity of the scientific claim is quite 
important, ultimately the policy question is not whether the science is accurate, but 
whether it is believed to be accurate” (Wolpe, 2014 p. 120, emphasis in original). Hence, 
notions of somatic immorality appear to have a life of their own. Despite being 
invalid and lacking unanimous expert approval, bio-criminological knowledge can be 
generative, and – as history has shown – acting on it can have ramifications for 
understanding crime, penalizing individuals, and organizing societal control. 
Importantly, the degree of acceptance of knowledge on somatic immorality 
differed considerably in the historical and contemporary contexts sketched above. 
Frames for somatic immorality were used, abused, challenged, criticized, dismissed, or 
ignored. Knowledge did not simply override established discourses, but it challenged 
them: Scientific knowledge is “potential power” (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012 p. 17, 
125  
Acting on somatic immorality 
 
 
emphasis in original). Knowledge on its own does not dictate politics. Yet, scientific 
ideas on somatic immorality provide epistemic rationalizations and justifications for 
establishing normative practices (e.g. screening) – that is, they allow for making 
arguments in the political arena. The adoption of these lines of argument is contingent 
upon cultural and political needs. Historical insight on when, why, how, with which 
consequences, and under which socio-political circumstances somatic immorality 
featured in the shaping of society can aid to comprehend the normative potential of 
bio-scientific etiologies for immorality. In hindsight it becomes clear that when bio- 
criminology prevailed in the past, it did so because it was accepted and encouraged by 
relevant stakeholders, institutions, and states. For example, the scientific status of the 
bio-criminological examination in Bavaria during the Weimar Republic was highly 
contested. Yet, the examination served the administrative purpose to reorganize the 
prison population and was thus put into practice.  In a similar vein, the failures of bio- 
criminology can be attributed to public opposition, exemplified by the outcry at the 
proposed psychosurgery for riot leaders in the 1960s. The surrounding’s endorsement 
or disapproval proved decisive. The persistence of lie-detectors in American society 
(Alder, 2007; Bunn, 2012), the boost in neuroimaging research on deceit after 9/11 
(Littlefield, 2009), the establishment of therapeutic justice in drug courts (Vrecko, 
2009), or the initial hype around the neuroscience of immorality testify to the 
paramount relevance of the context. Accordingly, understanding the appeal of bodies 
and brains– as explanatory resources and as loci for intervention – in current brain 
cultures partly renders the fascination with biomarkers for criminality intelligible 








This paper discussed several examples of acting on somatic immorality in past and 
present contexts and analyzed the potential of bio-criminological knowledge to alter 
punitive or therapeutic actions and endorse policies. First, acting in the light of or 
according to somatic immorality yielded attempts to alter legislation which – when 
successful – constructed aspects of socio-legal order on bio-criminological rationales, 
such  as  the  hereditary  examination  of  criminals  in  Bavaria  during  the  Weimar 
Republic. Second, impacting on or interfering with somatic immorality is exemplified 
by concrete physiological measures that aimed to eradicate immoral bodies or brains, 
such as sterilization. The instantiated policies and dire consequences for those deemed 
to be immoral persons testify to the general principle that certain ideas of human 
nature suggest corresponding ways to govern human beings (Chorover, 1979). 
Moreover,  acting  on  somatic  immorality  is  indicative  of  the  tensions  between 
scientific knowledge and individual rights (Cf. Thomson, 1998 p. 76). In different 
historical contexts, acting on (disputable) somatic immorality infringed personal rights 
and trumped established normative practices. 
On a more abstract level, bio-criminological knowledge served as a fundament 
 
on which politics were built. The (putative) facts it provided were subject to 
interpretation and normative valorization by policy-makers. The science functioned as 
rationalization and legitimation in order to consolidate arguments, to authorize 
therapeutic and punitive practices, and to justify political procedures. Regarding this 
liaison between facts and politics, it has been observed that “knowledge and norms (is 
and ought) are not separable, as they are often taken to be, but are simultaneously 
defined through intertwined processes that put together new epistemic and social 
realities” (Jasanoff, 2012 p. 16, emphasis in original). As the historical examples 
discussed in this paper demonstrated, new epistemic and social realities emerged in relation 
with acting on somatic immorality. However, clearly tracing their genesis is bound to 
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fail  as  “causality  remains  murky”  (Carson,  2007,  xiii)  in  studies  of  the  mutual 
constitution of the epistemic and the normative. 
This mutual constitution of what there is and what should be is characteristic of 
bio-criminology since its object of study – the biological roots of crime – is situated 
by  definition  in  the  biological  as  well  as  the  socio-normative.  Its  findings  and 
evidence-based instructions are possibly relevant for understanding, treating, policing, 
and preventing immorality and crime - and ultimately for the organization of society 
at large. The politics lurking in bio-criminology are strikingly apparent in the political 
agendas advocated by some of its proponents, exemplified by their telling dystopias of 
biological crime control (Raine, 2013; Schlapp & Smith, 1928; Tancredi, 2005). The 
persistent political appeal of bio-criminology in the absence of scientific substantiation 
is remarkable; particularly,  since the trade’s idiom evokes obsolete and controversial 
notions of immoral persons along with bad memories of horrendous practices. 
Unsurprisingly, the contestation of the quality and implications of bio-criminological 
research continues. Multifarious disputes arise when biological evidence coated in the 
objectivity of technology and the authority of science is hauled into moral affairs 
(Alder, 2007; Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008; Singh et al., 2014). Validity is 
only  one  of  the  points  at  issue.  However,  validity  plays  a  key  role  in  bio- 
criminologists’ justification to participate in scientific and political debates on crime. 
In the discipline’s literature, acknowledgments of the science’s tentativeness are 
followed (and glossed over) with the promotion of the potential to solve intractable 
societal problems as well as promises of imminent research breakthroughs. Calls for 
more bio-criminological research often purport that it is only a matter of time until its 
theorems  will  be  demonstrated  empirically  and  the  dissenters  will  be  converted. 
Present inroads into moral territory are substantiated with possible future 
achievements. Other arguments (urgency in light of high crime rates, failure of other 





efficacy,  objective  assessment  and  effective  prevention  of  crime)  similarly  echo 
through the ages. As was argued above, this rhetoric is as old as notions of somatic 
immorality. Moreover, promotion and promises cannot gloss over bio-criminology’s 
dubious evidentiary basis, its atrocious history, and its disputable politics. Accordingly, 





See the psychopath – anew. Brian Dugan was diagnosed with a modern mental 
disorder label, studied with cutting-edge machinery, and made sense of according to 
the neuropsychiatric state of the art. The scanning of Dugan’s brain is one of the 
present endpoints of a long and complicated past. Understanding immorality as brain- 
based insanity, researching the cerebral manifestation of badness, assessing criminals’ 
biology,  and  discussing  its  significance  for  punishment  are  of  long  standing. 
Contrarily, diagnosing moral insanity, searching for isolated moral centers, and 
endorsing the killing of allegedly biologically-aberrant criminals are mainly things of 
the past. Current research perpetuates, refines, and rejects its historical legacy, yielding 
a field that is old and young at the same time. Accordingly, this dissertation analyzed 
constancy and change by investigating the theory and history of the rationales, 
practices, implications, and contexts of the neuroscience of morality. The branched 
historical roots of the field were studied in five independent chapters. Specifically, this 
dissertation examined the epistemology, ontology, and semantics of the neuroscience 
of morality and argued that scientific representations of the brain and morality are 
historically in flux and are specified idiosyncratically in order to meet the demands of 
methods, theories, machineries (chapter 1). Second, it showed that explaining immoral 
persons in terms of disordered brains was and is intricate; especially since such 
understandings alter malefactors’ moral agency and legal responsibility (chapter 2). 
Third, it traced the origin, existence, and demise of a specific localization of morality 
in a particular historical period and demonstrated its context-dependency (chapter 3). 
Fourth, this dissertation analyzed the emergence of electroencephalography in the 
study of immorality and documented experts’ hope, uncertainty, and subsequent 
reappraisal of the new technology (chapter 4). Fifth, it scrutinized the interplay of 





criminological knowledge and social order in several historical and contemporary 




Reflecting on the past 
 
 
Several recurring themes emerged from the individual chapters. As already mentioned 
in  the  introduction,  the  meaning  of  morality  was  historically  in  flux.  The  term 
described a variety of things: social norms, codes of conduct, specific vices, mental 
disorders symptoms, character traits or states, emotional, cognitive, or neurobiological 
preconditions or constituents for moral mind and behavior and so on. Two extreme 
examples highlight this equivocality: Being a good National Socialist (Cosack, 1936) or 
a picture of “an animal locked in a small cage” (Harenski & Hamann, 2006 p. 315) 
both had moral meaning to different researchers. There was (and is) no universally 
agreed on definition of morality, making it extremely hard to compare research 
findings. 
Moreover, definitions changed with the available methods and theories. Both 
framed  not only  the  way  in  which  morality  was  studied,  but also  the  object of 
research. The predominant general understanding of brain functioning and the 
capacities of the methods facilitated and constrained research at the same time. For 
example, old-fashioned localization doctrine suggested the existence of a moral center. 
Contrarily, present views on the connected, plastic brain preclude such inferences and 
point to dynamic neuronal circuits for morality. Accordingly, changing knowledge 
about the brain entailed changing concepts of morality. Often it was unclear whether 
these concepts were a result or a pre-condition for the respective research – that is, a 
finding or a tenet. Several instructive examples for this interdependence of scientific 






The changing definitions (particularly pertaining to immorality as a result of 
brain disorder or as inherited quality) entailed differences in understanding and 
controlling immoral persons. Given the centrality of morality to being human and 
social organization at large, rendering it in terms of the body or brain enabled specific 
conceptualizations of moral transgressions and associated modes of legislation, 
intervention, and prevention (see especially chapter 2 and 5). On a few occasions, 
scientific arguments on somatic immorality seeped into normative practices, testifying 
to the enormous potential of science to alter social worlds. 
Finally, all chapters documented scarcity, tentativeness, and controversy. In the 
past,  research  on  cerebral  morality  was  rare,  provisional,  and  marginal.  The  few 
experts  who  studied  the  matter  emphasized  the  shortcomings  and  speculative 
character of their research. Nevertheless, they were subjected to scathing criticism 
from their colleagues who denigrated or just elided this type of research. In the 
present, the neuroscience of morality is still in its infancy. The claim that morality is 
neurobiological has not been demonstrated empirically. There is evidence pointing 
towards  the  veracity  of  this  claim  and  there  is  evidence  pointing  away  from  it. 
Likewise, controversy continues: Heated debate accompanies efforts to haul the brain 





The present surge 
 
 
From 1800 - 1930 there were no monographs, conferences, or professional societies 
on the brain science of morality (Cf. Verplaetse, 2009 pp. 258-59). The research 
presented here (especially chapters 3 and 4) documented that a few experts devoted 
their efforts to the topic after 1930. The science, however, was marginal in earlier 
periods.  This  has  changed  dramatically.  Recently  there  has  been  a  surge  in 





programs on the moral brain. The neuroscience of morality today is more visible, 
salient, and popular than ever before.17 In general, neuroscience has risen to immense 
popularity in science and society over the last two decades. The 1990s decade of the 
brain, the emergence of brain cultures, and the so-called neuro-turn testify to the 
current vogue. Its champions promise that age-old riddles of human mind and 
behavior, social organization, and even politics are intelligible in terms of the brain – 
and neuroscience allegedly has access to this wondrous explanatory resource. The 
brain’s popularity and persuasiveness are puzzling. 
What makes present neuroscience competent to foist its interpretative regime 
on psycho-social phenomena and normative practices (Becker, 2012)? Put differently: 




On the authority of the brain and its science 
 
 
“In short, I would like to support the idea that there could be a universal set of 
biological responses to moral dilemmas, a sort of ethics, built into our brains. 
My hope is that we soon may be able to uncover those ethics, identify them, 
and begin to live more fully by them. I believe we live by them largely 
unconsciously now, but that a lot of suffering, war, and conflict could be 
eliminated if we could agree to live by them more consciously.” (Gazzaniga, 




Hope and assertiveness pervade this often quoted passage from Michael Gazzaniga's 
(2005) book “The ethical brain”. Gazzaniga sets a clear agenda: There are moral rules 
inscribed in our brains which can and should be made explicit with the aid of 
neuroscience and subsequently humankind should knowingly follow these natural 





speak with such authority on morality? Why does brain science allegedly allow for 
knowing what is true and right? 
Part of the answer lies in the philosophical and historical commitments of 
neuroscience. From the perspective of modern neuroscience, human beings are 
neurobiological beings. In holding this view, neuroscience is capitalizing on a long 
history  of  naturalizing  being  human  (Smith,  2007;  Vidal,  2009).  The  underlying 
doctrine of dissolving the cultural in the natural and the moral in the corporeal rose 
and fell in popularity over the last centuries – and is being reinvigorated in the current 
discourse. Against this backdrop, the brain appeals because it is rooted in an 
indisputable source for reliable knowledge: nature. Nature is sincere. Its neutrality 
guarantees its honesty. Its uniformity allows for deriving universal knowledge from it 
(Daston, 2004a; Daston, 2004b). The brain is the representative of nature in the 
human body. Nature shaped it through ages of evolution, inscribing its laws in it. 
Moreover, the brain appeals as the ultimate origin of mind and behavior. Although 
many neuroscientists readily concede that the environment matters as well, this is only 
the case because it affects the brain. The brain is thus seen as a pervasive mediator 
whose study is sufficient for understanding the complexity of the psyche. In addition, 
the brain appeals as a reliable informant (see chapter 1).  People can lie, but the brain 
speaks the truth. This truth in the brain is beyond the control of the person; it is non- 
manipulable and thus promises unbiased empirical evidence. Neuroscience with its 
philosophical commitment to empiricism, reductionism, and materialism and its 
cutting-edge  methods and  technologies  allegedly  has  direct access  to  this  neutral 
source (Crawford, 2010; Littlefield, 2009; H. Rose & Rose, 2009). These 
epistemological and ontological convictions form the foundation for neuroscience’s 
entitlement: If the brain is nature’s organ of moral truth and neuroscience has the 
proper means to study it, then brain-based knowledge is sufficient to comprehend 





Having epistemic access is different from demanding that “we should live more 
fully by” the “ethics [...] built into our brains” (Gazzaniga, 2005 p. xix). It requires a 
contested logical leap known as the naturalistic fallacy, stating that one cannot deduce 
an ought from an is. What is true in nature or the brain does not automatically 
translate into a code of conduct. When confronted with this caveat, neuroscientists 
generally take one of the following positions. Either they claim that they are 
researching the neurobiological building blocks for moral mind and behavior – that is, 
the cognitive-affective architecture on which morality supervenes – and thus they are 
not making normative claims. Or they ignore the objection (such as Gazzaniga) and 
postulate that normative practices should be based on the brain’s rules. Assertions 
that what is true is also right, good, or moral, in combination with demands that 
nature’s moral code should be observed have a long historical tradition, described as 
the moral authority of nature (Daston & Vidal, 2004). In this view, living in 
correspondence  with  the  “ethics  [...]  built  into  our  brains”  becomes  a  moral 
obligation. At the moment it remains largely unclear what this moral code is (or could 
be), however, the strategies to justify, rationalize, and possibly institutionalize it have 
been laid out by a long line of historical predecessors. 
These epistemic, ontological, and ethical foundations – crystallized in 
Gazzaniga’s words – grant descriptive and normative authority to the brain and its 
science. Correspondingly, modern neuroscience of morality is partly capitalizing on 
long-standing historical traditions of scientism and naturalization which form a 
powerful coalition in determining what is true and right. This seemingly persuasive 
philosophy along with the putative superiority of the methods and technologies of 








Answering who we are and what we should do in the same breath requires authority; 
authority  which  can  be  questioned.  The self-staging of  neuroscience  as  potential 
arbiter in moral questions has sparked a flood of analysis and opposition.   The 
criticism is as diverse as the critics: Neuroscientists, philosophers, sociologists, 
anthropologists, lawyers, and historians target the status, methods, foundations, and 
rhetoric of neuroscience (Choudhury & Slaby, 2012; Dumit, 2004; Ortega & Vidal, 
2011; Pickersgill & van Keulen, 2011; Schleim, 2011). While the majority of the critics 
readily concede that neuroscience is an intriguing and promising research field, they 
impugn its primacy in understanding being human and antagonize its inroads into the 
territory of other disciplines. The merit of this interdisciplinary criticism is becoming 
increasingly visible. There are signs that the initial hype regarding neuroscience’s 
revolutionary potential is abating. Empirical and theoretical gaps between certain 
neuroscientists’ claims and what their science actually sustains are being revealed to 
the academy and the public (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013). The rhetoric of progress (“It is 
only a matter of time...”) and closure (“Neuroscience will solve age-old philosophical 
puzzles…”) are frequently debunked as exaggerated. In addition, neuroscience’s prime 
research tool – functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) – has come under 
attack lately. The hiatus between making visible and rendering intelligible is becoming 
apparent (G. Miller, 2008). The sway of neuroimaging is up for discussion. 
With regard to the neuroscience of morality, critics appropriated these more 
general objections and combined them with tailored arguments against experimental 
designs, faulty reasoning, and undue generalizations. Particularly, the science’s 
supposed ethical and legal implications generated opposition (e.g. Berker, 2009; 
Kahane & Shackel, 2010; Morse, 2006). Neuroscientists themselves emphasize that 
nescience outweighs the adduced evidence by far. Young and Dungan (2012 p. 7) put 






because  it  does  not  exist.”  Nevertheless,  the  recent  surge  in  research  spurred 
instructive interdisciplinary debates on the conditions of possibility for studying 
morality and the associated normative implications; however, the findings remain 
inconclusive and contested. For now, the moral brain remains elusive. Accordingly, 
neuroscientists have not taken over courtrooms, replaced forensic psychiatrists, or 
annexed ethics departments. Questioning the authority of the brain and its science 





Knowing the past, understanding the present 
 
 
This dissertation adds to this questioning by putting the neuroscience of morality into 
historical perspective. It takes a stance against the widespread appreciation of 
neuroscience as being completely novel by showing that several of its claims, notions, 
and theories are not unprecedented. More importantly, the theoretical and historical 
analyses provided here document inconstancy, uncertainty, and context-dependency 
and argue that these are not merely things of the past, but persist in current research. 
Thus, writing a history of the good, the bad, and the brain amounts to more than 
telling how it was or keeping the past alive. Historical knowledge can be a valuable 
resource for explanation and critique. In contrast to seeing the past as a “narrative of 
growing insight” (C. Silverman & Rosenberg, 2013 p. 363), I saw constancy, change, 
tentativeness, and controversy. The historical vicissitude of the science of the moral 
brain relatives its necessity and opens space for critiquing its materialism. Accordingly, 
historical analyses of heated expert dissension, the rise and fall of methods and 
theories, the influence of science in shaping definitions of morality, and the politics 
looming behind bio-criminology allow for making cogent arguments about the 
potentials, limitations, and ramifications of present neuroscience. The consequence of 






relativism nor  a vilification of neuroscience per  se. Rather, understanding this science 
in  historical and  theoretical context calls  for  acknowledging complexity and, 
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Modern neuroscientific methods and technologies offer new perspectives on an 
intriguing and elusive object of research: morality. Currently, neuroscientists scan 
psychopaths’ brains, study the effects of neurotransmitters on moral cognition, 
temporarily interrupt neuronal networks associated with moral decision-making, and 
research immoral conduct in patients with distinct brain lesions. Recently, a science 
that confidently calls itself neuroscience of morality has emerged. Neuroscience of morality 
integrates findings, methods, and theories from a range of disciplines and research 
fields in order to study the neurobiology of moral mind and behavior. Predicated on 
the rationale that good and evil are essentially functions of the brain, the insights 
offered by this nascent science are fascinating and puzzling at the same time. 
Ostensibly, this science undermines established penal evaluation practices, criminal 
law,  and  legal  policy.  Perhaps  because  of  its  alleged  revolutionary  potential,  this 
science sparked extensive analysis and opposition – from within and without the 
discipline. Neuroscientists critically assess their colleagues’ studies and relativize their 
claims. Philosophers, historians, jurists, anthropologists, and sociologists analyze 
neuroscience’s inroads into moral territory. Harsh criticism is voiced against the 
neurobiologization of vice and virtue. The upshot is a heated debate about the 
potentials and limitations of neuroscience and its implications for normative 
discourses. 
This controversy is of long standing. Though modern neuroscience of morality 
is comparatively young and its proponents often describe it as unprecedented, the 
scientific search for the somatic origin of good and evil has a long history. 
Phrenologists, brain anatomists, criminal anthropologists, social Darwinists, and bio- 
psychiatrists explored the physiology of morality over the course of the last two 
centuries. Their science yielded descriptions of moral brain centers, murder cells, and 






notions of morality and caused disputes in the academy, the courtroom, and society at 
large. Thus, the science of the moral brain ignited controversy – then and now. 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation asks the following question: When, why, 
where, how, in which contexts, and with which consequences was morality in the 
brain researched? The dissertation consists of five independent scholarly discourses 
which have been published or under review for publication in scientific journals. The 
five  chapters  address  different  topics,  contexts,  and  periods  in  theoretical  and 
historical perspective. The chapters analyze how the moral brain was known and 
made knowable, how it emerged and developed, and how it framed people and 
societies and was framed by them. The aim throughout is to elucidate the past in 
order to render the present intelligible. 
The first chapter provides an historical overview over when, where, and how 
the brain has been invoked in the study of morality. Over the last centuries, several 
scientific experts surmised a physiological basis for vice and virtue. The 
conceptualizations of morality varied over the course of time, reflecting theoretical 
shifts and an evolution of the available methods and technologies. For example, at the 
end of the nineteenth century some medical men suggested the existence of moral 
brain centers, whereas modern neuroscientists argue for morality being a product of 
widely dispersed neuronal networks. 
In addition, the first chapter analyzes the epistemic and conceptual labor 
necessary in operationalizing morality for neuroscientific means. Neuroscientific 
methods, technologies, and theories are not neutral tools, but make demands of their 
object of research. The chapter shows how morality is located, translated, and defined 
in order to make it accessible and assessable in terms of the brain. Correspondingly, it 
is argued that in the view of modern neuroscience morality now exists in the brain, is 






clarifies that neuroscience shapes its object of research according to its needs, yielding 
a specific concept of morality. 
The second chapter scrutinizes bio-psychiatric frames for immoral persons at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Then, certain psychiatric experts discussed the 
relation between brain malfunction and moral misconduct. The experts were at odds 
and, correspondingly, diverse neurobiological explanations for immoral mind and 
behavior co-existed at the time. To document this diversity, five exemplary cases of 
immoral  persons  are  described  in  the  context  of  the  respective  bio-psychiatric 
theories. The chapter shows how these misdemeanants were rendered as immoral and 
insane due to a disordered brain and discusses the consequences of this framing in 
terms of moral agency and legal responsibility. For example, it is shown that experts’ 
diagnoses could alter the course of misdemeanants from prison to asylum. Moreover, 
a current case that was assessed with modern neuroimaging technology is used to 
illustrate constancy and change in biological understandings of immoral persons. 
The third chapter traces a specific localization of morality in its particular 
historical context. In the 1930s, the German neuropathologists Karl Kleist pinpointed 
what he called the Gemeinschafts-Ich (community-I) in the prefrontal cortex of the 
brain and claimed that this was the cerebral seat of morality. In doing so, Kleist made 
use of the localization doctrine – that is, the idea that the brain is divided into 
different  functional  units.  Contemporaries  launched  scathing  criticism  at  Kleist, 
among other things, for applying the outmoded localization doctrine. In the wake of 
the criticism, Kleist qualified his findings and ostensibly acknowledged that he had 
erred. Nevertheless, the Gemeinschafts-Ich lived on over the following decades. 
Several  neuropathologists  used  Kleist’s  notion  to  make  sense  of  their  patients’ 
behavior and a few tried to corroborate the localization. However, the localization 
doctrine vanished more and more from experts’ theoretical repertoire. Accordingly, 






posited correlations between dysfunctional brain areas and immoral conduct and, 
hence, abandoned the idea of distinct moral centers. On an abstract level, this chapter 
clarifies the dependence of research on morality on general theories of brain 
functioning. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the study of immorality in the 1940s and 1950s 
through the eyes of an emerging neuroscientific research tool: electroencephalography 
(EEG). It presents a history of early EEG research on psychopathy, delinquency, and 
immorality in Great Britain and the United States. EEG reliably indicated epilepsy and 
brain tumors. Spurred by these research successes, several experts began to investigate 
the brain waves of psychopaths and murderers. The results were puzzling. The new 
research tool and the data it produced were ill-understood. Uncertainty and dissension 
pervaded EEG research on misdemeanants. Accordingly, the scientific community 
discussed the reliability, validity, and utility of EEG, and launched initiatives to 
standardize it. The analysis shows that knowledge production, calibration of the novel 
research tool, and the establishment of credibility for the new technology occurred 
simultaneously. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the past and present of the 
brain science of morality, arguing that persistent methodological and theoretical 
problems already inherent in early EEG research call the merit of modern 
neuroimaging technology into question. 
This fifth chapter takes scientific knowledge on somatic immorality as a vantage 
point in order to assess its formative power on normative practices in historical and 
contemporary contexts. Several historical examples of acting on somatic immorality 
are discussed: Penal reform debates in Germany (1880s – 1940s), the British Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1913, and endocrinology and psychosurgery of criminality (USA 
1930s and after). A focused analysis of the fertility of bio-criminological knowledge 
for therapeutic or punitive action and policy formation is provided, with the aim of 






criminological discourses. Moreover, the present discussion on biomarkers for 
criminality is put into historical perspective. The analysis suggests that the respective 
knowledge (that is, how it was framed) determined how somatic immorality was acted 
on: How immorality was deemed to be materialized in the body or brain partly 
predetermined attempts to control it. In the course of history, concepts for somatic 
immorality became more complex and elusive. Policies aimed at treating, policing, and 
legislating immoral bodies or brains mirrored this development. Subsequently, the 
chapter argues that in the past and present the political, economic, and social context 
co-determined  whether  or  not  somatic  immorality  was  acted  on.  In  closing,  the 
chapter critically discusses the political potential of bio-criminology to function as a 
foundation  for  making  and  managing  society  by  generating,  rationalizing,  and 
justifying interventions and policies. 
Several recurring themes emerged from the individual chapters. First of all, the 
meaning of morality is historically in flux. The term described and describes a variety 
of things: social norms, codes of conduct, specific vices, symptoms of mental 
disorders, character traits or states, emotional, cognitive, or neurobiological 
preconditions or constituents for moral mind and behavior and so on. There was (and 
is)  no  universally  agreed  on  definition  of  morality,  making  it  extremely  hard  to 
compare research findings. Moreover, definitions changed with the available methods 
and theories. Both framed not only the way in which morality was studied, but also 
the object of research. The predominant general understanding of brain functioning 
and the capacities of the methods facilitated and constrained research at the same 
time. For example, old-fashioned localization doctrine suggested the existence of a 
moral center. Contrarily, present views on the connected, plastic brain preclude such 
inferences and point to dynamic neuronal circuits for morality. 
The changing definitions (particularly pertaining to immorality as a result of 






controlling immoral persons. Given the centrality of morality to being human and 
social organization at large, rendering it in terms of the body or brain enabled specific 
conceptualizations of moral transgressions and associated modes of legislation, 
intervention, and prevention (see especially chapter 2 and 5). On a few occasions, 
scientific arguments on somatic immorality seeped into normative practices, testifying 
to the enormous potential of science to alter social worlds. 
Finally, all chapters documented scarcity, tentativeness, and controversy. In the 
past,  research  on  cerebral  morality  was  rare,  provisional,  and  marginal.  The  few 
experts  who  studied  the  matter  emphasized  the  shortcomings  and  speculative 
character of their research. Nevertheless, they were subjected to scathing criticism 
from their colleagues who denigrated or just ignored this type of research. While 
tentativeness and controversy persist, scarcity is a thing of the past. Today the 
neuroscience of morality is more visible, salient, and popular than ever before. 
However,  as  many  neuroscientists  in  the field  concede,  the  moral brain  remains 
elusive.  Accordingly,  neuroscientists  have  not  taken  over  courtrooms,  replaced 
forensic psychiatrists, or annexed ethics departments. 
In conclusion, this dissertation assesses the present surge in research in the 
neuroscience of morality and analyzes the epistemic, ontological, and ethical 
foundations on which it is grafted.   These foundations are questioned by 
interdisciplinary criticism. This dissertation adds to this questioning by putting the 
neuroscience of morality into historical perspective. The theoretical and historical 
analyses provided here document inconstancy, uncertainty, and context-dependency 
and argue that these are not merely things of the past, but persist in current research. 
The historical vicissitude of the science of the moral brain relatives its necessity and 
opens space for critiquing its materialism. Accordingly, historical analyses of heated 
expert dissension, the rise and fall of methods and theories, the influence of science in 







for  making cogent arguments about the  potentials, limitations, and   ramifications of 









Hedendaagse neurowetenschappelijke methoden en technologie bieden nieuwe 
perspectieven op een intrigerend en ongrijpbaar object van onderzoek: moraliteit. 
Neurowetenschappers scannen tegenwoordig het brein van psychopaten, bestuderen 
de effecten van neurotransmitters op moreel denken, schakelen tijdelijk neuronale 
netwerken uit geassocieerd met morele besluitvorming en onderzoeken immoreel 
gedrag bij patiënten met bepaald hersenletsel. Een wetenschap die zichzelf vol 
vertrouwen de neurowetenschap van moraliteit noemt is kort geleden ontstaan. De 
neurowetenschap van moraliteit combineert onderzoeksuitkomsten, methoden en 
theorieën uit een reeks disciplines en onderzoeksgebieden om de neurobiologie van 
het morele denken en gedrag te bestuderen. Het uitgangspunt dat goedheid en 
slechtheid in essentie hersenfuncties zijn, maakt de inzichten geboden door deze 
opkomende wetenschap fascinerend zowel als verwarrend. Deze wetenschap 
ondermijnt  traditionele  evaluatiepraktijken  in  het  strafrecht,  strafwetgeving  en 
juridisch beleid. Het is vermoedelijk vanwege zijn veronderstelde revolutionaire 
potentieel  dat  zij  uitgebreide  analyse  en  oppositie  oproept  –  zowel  binnen  de 
discipline zelf als van buitenaf. Neurowetenschappers geven kritisch beoordelingen 
van het onderzoek van hun collega’s en relativeren hun claims. Filosofen, historici, 
juristen, antropologen en sociologen analyseren de intrusie van de neurowetenschap 
in het morele territorium. Er wordt harde kritiek geuit op de ‘neurobiologisering’ van 
slechtheid en deugdzaamheid. Het gevolg is een fel debat over de mogelijkheden en 
beperkingen van de neurowetenschap en de implicaties ervan voor normatieve 
discussies. 
Deze  controverse  heeft  lange  wortels.  Hoewel  de  hedendaagse 
neurowetenschap van moraliteit relatief jong is en de voorstanders ervan hem vaak 
beschrijven als volledig nieuw, heeft de wetenschappelijke zoektocht naar de 






hersenanatomen, antropologen van criminaliteit, sociale darwinisten en biologisch 
psychiaters onderzochten de afgelopen twee eeuwen de fysiologie van moraliteit. Hun 
wetenschap leverde beschrijvingen op van morele centra in het brein, ‘moordcellen’ in 
het brein, en postencefalitische geestesziekte. Deze somatische opvattingen 
ondermijnden bestaande noties van moraliteit en leidden tot debatten in de academie, 
de rechtszaal en de samenleving als geheel. De wetenschap van het morele brein 
leidde dus tot controversen – zowel toen als nu. 
Vanuit deze achtergrond stelt dit proefschrift de volgende vraag: wanneer, 
waarom, waar, hoe, in welke contexten en met welke consequenties werd moraliteit in 
het brein onderzocht? Het proefschrift bestaat uit vijf op zichzelf staande analyses die 
zijn gepubliceerd in, of ter publicatie zijn aangeboden aan, wetenschappelijke 
tijdschriften. De vijf hoofdstukken plaatsen verschillende onderwerpen, situaties en 
perioden in theoretisch en historisch perspectief. Ze analyseren de wijzen waarop het 
morele brein werd gekend en kenbaar werd gemaakt, hoe het ontstond en zich 
ontwikkelde en hoe het mensen en samenlevingen zowel voorzag van een specifiek 
kader als door hen werd ingekaderd. Het doel is steeds het verleden te verhelderen om 
het heden begrijpelijk te maken. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk geeft een historisch overzicht van wanneer, waar en hoe 
het brein betrokken is in het onderzoek naar moraliteit. Gedurende de afgelopen 
eeuwen, hebben diverse experts een fysiologische basis verondersteld voor 
kwaadaardigheid en deugdzaamheid. De conceptualisering van moraliteit varieerde in 
de loop der tijd en reflecteerde theoretische verschuivingen evenals veranderingen in 
de beschikbare methoden en technologieën. Tegen het eind van de negentiende eeuw 
veronderstelden  enkele  medici  bijvoorbeeld  het  bestaan  van  morele  breincentra, 
terwijl hedendaagse neurowetenschappers de visie verdedigen van moraliteit als een 






Het eerste hoofdstuk analyseert bovendien het epistemische en conceptuele 
werk  dat  noodzakelijk  is  bij  het  operationaliseren  van  moraliteit  voor 
neurobiologische doelstellingen. Neurowetenschappelijke methoden, technologieën en 
theorieën zijn geen neutrale gereedschappen maar stellen eisen aan hun object van 
onderzoek. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe moraliteit is gelokaliseerd, getransformeerd en 
gedefinieerd om het toegankelijk en beoordeelbaar te maken in termen van de 
hersenen. Daarmee betoog ik tevens dat volgens het beeld van de hedendaagse 
neurowetenschap moraliteit nu in het brein bestaat en daar wordt gezocht, terwijl er 
ook over wordt gesproken in de terminologie van deze wetenschap. Deze historische 
en theoretische analyse toont dat de neurowetenschap zijn object van onderzoek 
vorm geeft volgens de behoeften van het veld, zodat er een specifieke opvatting van 
moraliteit ontstaat. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk onderzoekt eind negentiende eeuwse biopsychiatrische 
 
‘frames’ of ‘denkkaders’ voor het onderzoek naar immorele personen. Een groep 
psychiatrisch experts besprak indertijd de relatie tussen het disfunctioneren van de 
hersenen en moreel wangedrag. De experts waren het onderling oneens, zodat er 
verschillende   neurobiologische   verklaringen   naast   elkaar   bestonden   voor   een 
immoreel brein en het bijbehorende gedrag. Om deze diversiteit te documenteren, 
bespreek ik vijf exemplarische gevallen van verdorven personen in relatie tot de 
bijbehorende biopsychiatrische theorieën uit die tijd. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de 
betrokken wetsovertreders als immoreel en krankzinnig werden beschreven als gevolg 
van een gestoord brein en het bespreekt de gevolgen van deze manier van inkaderen 
in  termen  van  moreel  daderschap  en  verantwoordelijkheid.  Het bespreekt 
bijvoorbeeld dat de diagnosen door experts de overplaatsing konden betekenen van 
de wetsovertreder van een gevangenis naar een gesticht. Daarnaast dient een 






gebruikt  ter  illustratie  van  de  constanten  en  de  veranderingen  in  de  biologische 
opvatting van immorele mensen. 
Hoofdstuk drie traceert een specifieke lokalisatie van moraliteit in zijn 
historische context. In de jaren dertig van de vorige eeuw, specificeerde de Duitse 
neuropatholoog Karl Kleist het zogeheten Gemeinschafts-Ich (Gemeenschaps-ik) in de 
prefontale  cortex  van  het  brein  en  hij  claimde  dat  deze  de  cerebrale  zetel  van 
moraliteit was. Daarbij maakte Kleist gebruik van de lokalisatiedoctrine – dat wil 
zeggen van het idee dat het brein in verschillende functionele eenheden is 
onderverdeeld. Tijdgenoten kwamen met vernietigende kritiek op Kleist, onder andere 
omdat de lokalisatiedoctrine achterhaald werd geacht. Als gevolg daarvan verklaarde 
Kleist openlijk dat hij er naast had gezeten. Desondanks overleefde zijn Gemeinschafts- 
Ich nog decennia lang. Diverse neuropathologen gebruikten Kleists notie om inzicht te 
krijgen in het gedrag van hun patiënten en sommigen probeerden de lokalisering te 
bevestigen. Toch verdween de lokalisatiedoctrine gaandeweg van het theoretische 
repertoire en daarmee nam ook de populariteit af van Kleists Gemeinschafts-Ich. Latere 
neuropathologen opperden het bestaan van correlaties tussen disfunctionerende 
hersengebieden en immoreel gedrag en verlieten daarmee het idee van afgegrensde 
morele centra. Op abstracter niveau verheldert dit hoofdstuk de afhankelijkheid van 
onderzoek naar moraliteit van algemene theorieën over het functioneren van het 
brein. 
 
In het vierde hoofdstuk analyseer ik het onderzoek van immoraliteit in de jaren 
 
1940 en 1950, dat was geïnspireerd door een opkomend onderzoeksinstrument: 
electroencephalografie (EEG). Het hoofdstuk beschrijft een geschiedenis van vroeg 
EEG-onderzoek naar psychopathie, delinquentie en immoraliteit in Groot Brittannië 
en   de   Verenigde   Staten.   De   EEG-techniek   was   in   staat   om   epilepsie   en 
hersentumoren betrouwbaar te identificeren. Aangespoord door dit succes, begonnen 






onderzoeken. De resultaten waren verwarrend. Het nieuwe onderzoeksinstrument en 
de gegevens die het produceerde werden niet goed begrepen. Onzekerheid en 
onenigheid waren kenmerkend voor het EEG-onderzoek naar wetsovertreders. De 
wetenschappelijke  gemeenschap  bediscussieerde  daarom  de  betrouwbaarheid, 
validiteit en bruikbaarheid van EEG en nam initiatieven om de techniek te 
standaardiseren. Deze analyse laat het gelijktijdige optreden zien van kennisproductie, 
kalibratie van een nieuw onderzoeksinstrument en het verwerven van 
geloofwaardigheid voor een nieuwe technologie. Het hoofdstuk besluit met een 
beschouwing over het verleden en het heden van het hersenonderzoek van moraliteit. 
Het betoogt daarbij dat hardnekkige methodologische en theoretische problemen die 
al kenmerkend waren voor het vroege EEG-onderzoek ook de verdiensten van 
hedendaagse beeldvormende technieken voor hersenonderzoek beperken. 
Het vijfde hoofdstuk kiest wetenschappelijke kennis over somatische moraliteit 
als uitgangspunt om de vormende kracht ervan te onderzoeken voor normatieve 
praktijken in het verleden en het heden. Een reeks historische voorbeelden van het 
behandelen van somatische immoraliteit komt aan bod, zoals discussies over 
strafrechtelijke hervormingen in Duitsland (jaren 1880– 1940), de Britse Mental 
Deficiency Act van 1913 en endocrinologie en psychochirurgie van criminaliteit in de 
Verenigde Staten (jaren 1930 en daarna). Ik geef daarbij een analyse van de 
vruchtbaarheid van biocriminologische kennis voor therapeutisch en strafrechtelijk 
handelen en voor beleidsvorming, met als doel de wederzijdse totstandkoming te 
doorgronden van het epistemische en het normatieve in biocriminologische 
verhandelingen. Ook plaatst dit hoofdstuk het hedendaagse debat over biomarkers 
voor criminaliteit in historisch perspectief. De analyse geeft aan dat de betrokken 
kennis (dat wil zeggen, hoe deze was ingekaderd) uitmaakte hoe er met somatische 
immoraliteit werd omgegaan: de veronderstelde materiële representatie ervan in het 






loop van de geschiedenis, werden de begrippen voor somatische immoraliteit 
complexer en vager. Beleid gericht op het behandelen, reguleren en juridiseren van 
immorele lichamen of hersenen weerspiegelde deze ontwikkeling. Vervolgens betoogt 
dit hoofdstuk dat zowel in het verleden als het heden de politieke, economische en 
sociale context meebepaalde of somatische immoraliteit de basis van handelen werd. 
Het hoofdstuk besluit met een kritische discussie van de maatschappelijke potentie 
van een biologische opvatting van criminaliteit als een basis voor de regulering van de 
samenleving door het produceren, rationaliseren en rechtvaardigen van interventies en 
beleid. 
 
In de individuele artikelen (of hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift) keren diverse 
thema’s terug. Allereerst is de betekenis van moraliteit historisch variabel. De term 
beschreef en beschrijft een variëteit aan dingen: sociale normen, gedragsregels, 
bepaalde ondeugden, symptomen van stoornissen, karaktertrekken, emotionele, 
cognitieve of neurobiologische voorwaarden of oorzaken voor een morele geest , 
enzovoorts. Er was en is geen universele overeenstemming over een definitie van 
moraliteit, wat het buitengewoon ingewikkeld maakt om onderzoeksgegevens te 
vergelijken. Bovendien veranderen de definities met de beschikbare 
onderzoeksmethoden en theorieën. Beiden kaderen niet alleen de manier in waarop 
moraliteit wordt  bestudeerd, maar zelfs het object van onderzoek. De vigerende 
algemene opvatting van het functioneren van de hersenen en de gebruikte methoden 
maken onderzoek mogelijk maar leggen er tegelijkertijd beperkingen aan op. De 
ouderwetse localisatiedoctrine leidde bijvoorbeeld tot de veronderstelling van een 
moreel centrum. Hedendaagse opvattingen van het brein als een netwerk en een 
plastisch orgaan sluiten dergelijke veronderstellingen echter uit en impliceren een 
dynamisch neuronaal circuit voor moraliteit. 
De  veranderende  definities  (vooral  die  gerelateerd  aan  immoraliteit  als  het 






begrip van en de omgang met immorele personen in. Door het grote belang van 
moraliteit voor menselijkheid en voor de inrichting van de samenleving, bracht de 
somatische voorstelling ervan specifieke conceptualiseringen met zich mee van morele 
overtredingen, evenals van wetgeving, interventies en preventie (zie met name 
hoofdstuk 2 en 5). Wetenschappelijke argumenten voor somatische immoraliteit 
drongen ook door in normatieve praktijken, wat getuigt van het enorme potentieel 
van de wetenschap om sociale werelden te veranderen. 
Alle artikelen (of hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift) documenteren schaarste, 
onzekerheid en controverse. In het verleden was onderzoek naar cerebrale moraliteit 
zeldzaam,   tentatief   en   marginaal.   De   enkele   experts   die   hem   onderzochten 
benadrukten  de  tekortkomingen  en  speculatieve  aard  van  hun  onderzoek. 
Desondanks  kregen  zij  scherpe  kritiek  van  collega’s  die  dit  soort  onderzoek 
kleineerden als ze het niet gewoon negeerden. Tegenwoordig is de neurowetenschap 
van moraliteit meer prominent, zichtbaar en populair dan ooit. Zoals veel 
neurowetenschappers in dit veld echter toegeven, blijft het morele brein moeilijk 
grijpbaar. Dus hebben neurowetenschappers de rechtszaal niet overgenomen, noch 
forensisch psychiaters verdrongen of afdelingen ethiek aan universiteiten geannexeerd. 
Kort samengevat bespreekt deze these de hedendaagse golf van onderzoek naar 
de neurowetenschap van moraliteit en analyseert hij de epistemische, ontologische en 
ethische grondslagen waarop dit onderzoek is gebaseerd. Deze grondslagen worden 
ter discussie gesteld vanuit interdisciplinaire kritiek, waaraan het proefschrift een 
historisch perspectief toevoegt. De verschafte theoretische en historische analyses 
signaleren veranderlijkheid, onzekerheid en contextafhankelijkheid en ze betogen dat 
dit niet slechts voor het verleden geldt maar ook voor hedendaags onderzoek. De 
historische onbestendigheid van de wetenschap van het morele brein relativeert de 
onvermijdelijkheid ervan en geeft ruimte voor kritiek op het materialisme ervan. 






van methoden en theorieën, de vormende invloed van de wetenschap op definities 
van moraliteit evenals de politiek die schuilgaat achter biocriminologie, bieden 
krachtige argumenten om de mogelijkheden, beperkingen en gevolgen van de 






First of all, I would like to thank Stephan Schleim, my co-supervisor, who guided me 
in writing this dissertation over the past years. I would especially like to thank you for 
your support, fairness, trust, and the academic freedom that you granted me. 
Furthermore, your work on the strengths and weaknesses of neuroscience was an 
influential source of inspiration for this thesis. 
Also, I would like to thank Trudy Dehue, my supervisor, for your guidance, 
encouragement, and feedback. You opened my eyes to the political dimension of 
science and have – in that sense – left your mark on this dissertation. 
Moreover, I would like to thank my colleagues at the Theory and History of 
 
Psychology Group at the University of Groningen. Your comments on several of the 
chapters aided me to improve this dissertation in many ways. In addition, the 
discussions during group meetings or over lunch were a great help to me. So, thank 
you: Hilde Tjeerdema, Jonna Brennikmeijer Maarten Derksen, and Douwe Draaisma. 
Your input was much appreciated. 
I would also like to thank the members of the reading committee, Douwe 
Draaisma, Peter Becker, and Fernando Vidal for taking the time to read and evaluate 
this dissertation. I am especially grateful to Fernando for being so kind to host me in 
Barcelona and taking the time to discuss my work. Likewise, I would like to thank 
Guy Kahane for hosting me in Oxford and providing instructive feedback during the 
early stages of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank the Netherlands Graduate Research School 
of Science, Technology, and Modern Culture (WTMC) for introducing me to Science 
and Technology Studies. I have learned a lot at WTMC and believe that my work 
improved as a result of my training. 
A warm Thank you! to my paranimfs: Anselm Fürmaier for unintentionally 
 






Müller for continuously reminding me that my research is of no interest to anyone 
 
(tongue-in-cheek again). Your support was invaluable. 
 
There are a number of people who have helped me to improve my work or 
aided in a different way: Jess Cadwallader, Rod Buchanan, Regina Rini, Roger Smith, 
Jan Verplaetse, Julia von Thienen, Hanny Baan, and Sander Sprik. Thank you all. 
Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the Volkswagen 
 
Foundation which supported the research project with the grant ‘Intuition and 
Emotion in Moral Decision-Making: Empirical Research and Normative Implications’ 






1  The case files from the Kingston Asylum (Ontario, Canada) helped to identify W.B. (see Tuke, 
 
1885a) as William Bigg. 
 
2 The experts differed widely in their theoretical position and their diagnoses. For example, Guiteau 
was diagnosed with hereditary monomania (Beard), partial moral imbecility (Folsom) and primäre 
Verrücktheit [monomania] (Spitzka) by the experts for the defense, whereas the prosecution experts 
contested Guiteau’s insanity (see Rosenberg, 1968). 
3  The autopsy generated some dispute of its own. Various experts quarreled over the brain and the 
 
quality of the autopsy (Paulson, 2006; Rosenberg, 1968). 
 




5  Moral idiocy [moralische Idiotie] was the term Bleuler preferred over moral insanity [moralische 
 
Verrücktheit] (see Bleuler, 1893 p. 69). 
 
6  A detailed description of the case and the court proceedings featured in the Journal of Mental 
Science 18 (1872). No author was indicated. However, Henry Maudsley was one of the editors for 
the respective volume. Another description of the case can be obtained online from the Berkshire 
Record Office (Stevens, 2009). 
7 I did not find intersections between brain-based morality (e.g. the existence of a moral center) and 
 
Nazi race-ideology in the literature. Rather than on neurological considerations, Nazi race-ideology 
was predominantly based upon Social Darwinism, degeneration theory, and eugenics (Schmuhl, 
1987), exemplified by the genetic work of Ernst Rüdin in Munich (Roelcke, 2002). With varying 
degrees, the majority of the scientists mentioned in the text were involved in Nazi politics or even 
acted as consultants for the Nazi regime, such as Maximinian de Crinis (see H. Jasper, 1991). But 
even de Crinis, one of the devisers of Aktion T4 [Action T4] (that is, the organized killing of 
mentally disordered in the Third Reich), did not make links between brains, morality, and putative 
inferiority in his paper on the topic (de Crinis, 1938). However, brains of victims of Action T4 were 
used for neuropathological research by, among others, Hugo Spatz (Hagner, 2001). 
8  Moral insanity initially signified general emotional disturbances while the intellect remained intact 
 
(Prichard, 1835). Over the decades, however, the term evolved and received an ethical meaning in 
 






9     This   work   appeared   piecewise   between   1926   and   1934   as   ‘Gehirnpathologische   und 
 
Lokalisatorische Ergebnisse’ in German brain science journals and as a section in von Schjerning’s 
 
‘Handbuch der ärztlichen Erfahrungen im Weltkriege, 1914/1918‘ (1922/1934 Vol. IV, p. 343 - 
 
1408). The differences for the sections relevant to this paper are negligible. Thus, the analysis here is 
based on Kleist (1934). 
10 The brain area Kleist had in mind approximately corresponded to Brodmann area 11. This region 
 
is frequently identified to be pertinent to morality in modern research (see Fumagalli & Priori, 2012 
for a review). 
11 A description of Kleist’s localization and the events at the Meeting of the German Psychiatric and 
 
Neurological Society can be found in Verplaetse’s monograph (2009 p. 109-115). I present Kleist’s 
ideas and the ensuing discussion anew because both are fundamental to the scientific debate in the 
period until 1960. 
12  The term “brain mythology” [Hirnmythologie] was originally coined by Karl Jaspers (1913) and 
 
reference to it was a common objection against brain-based explanations of mental disorder at the 
time. 




14  I do not elaborate on Vogt (1951) here; rather I focus on the macroscopical attempts to identify 
large brain regions associated with morality. In this debate, researchers rarely referred to Vogt's 
work. Moreover, Verplaetse (2009 see pp. 182-189) and Hagner (2004 see pp. 261-264 and 282-287) 
have done comprehensive research on Vogt's studies of criminals' brains. 
15   To be precise: Inconsistent results had troubled the localization doctrine since its origins in 
 
previous centuries (Finger, 1994; Hagner, 2008). 
 
16 In the present German Penal Code, the corresponding paragraphs are 21 and 22. 
 
17 The term “neuroscience” emerged only in the 1960s (Abi-Rached & Rose, 2010). Scientific inquiry 
into the brain prior to this period was carried out by a range of disciplines, such as neurology, 
neuropathology, or histology. In order not to use the term “neuroscience” anachronistically, this 
dissertation only refers to brain research after the 1960s as “neuroscience” and labeled earlier 
scientific investigations “brain science”. 
